§3.1286aἢ οὐ συμφέρει, ἓν δὲ πότερον ἕνα συμφέρει κύριον εἶναι πάντων, ἢ οὐ συμφέρει.
or is not advantageous, and another, whether it is advantageous for one person to be sovereign over all things, or is not advantageous.
τὸ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης στρατηγίας ἐπισκοπεῖν νόμων ἔχει μᾶλλον εἶδος ἢ πολιτείας (ἐν ἁπάσαις γὰρ ἐνδέχεται γίγνεσθαι τοῦτο ταῖς πολιτείαις), ὥστʼ ἀφείσθω τὴν πρώτην· ὁ δὲ λοιπὸς τρόπος τῆς βασιλείας πολιτείας εἶδός ἐστιν, ὥστε περὶ τούτου δεῖ θεωρῆσαι καὶ τὰς ἀπορίας ἐπιδραμεῖν τὰς ἐνούσας.
Now, to examine about such a generalship has more the character of laws than of a constitution (for this is capable of occurring in all constitutions); so let it be dismissed for the first; but the remaining mode of kingship is a species of constitution, so that about this we must contemplate and run over the difficulties that are inherent in it.
ἀρχὴ δʼ ἐστὶ τῆς ζητήσεως αὕτη, πότερον συμφέρει μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνδρὸς ἄρχεσθαι ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρίστων νόμων.
And the starting-point of the inquiry is this: whether it is more advantageous to be ruled by the best man or by the best laws.
δοκοῦσι δὴ τοῖς νομίζουσι συμφέρειν βασιλεύεσθαι τὸ καθόλου μόνον οἱ νόμοι λέγειν, ἀλλʼ οὐ πρὸς τὰ προσπίπτοντα ἐπιτάττειν, ὥστʼ ἐν ὁποιᾳοῦν τέχνῃ τὸ κατὰ γράμματʼ ἄρχειν ἠλίθιον (καὶ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ μετὰ τὴν τετρήμερον κινεῖν ἔξεστι τοῖς ἰατροῖς, ἐὰν δὲ πρότερον, ἐπὶ τῷ αὑτοῦ κινδύνῳ).
Now, to those who think it is advantageous to be ruled by a king, the laws seem to speak only of the universal, but not to command for falling circumstances, so that in any art whatever, to rule according to written rules is foolish (and in Egypt, after the fourth day, it is permitted for the physicians to alter the treatment, but if earlier, at their own risk).
φανερὸν τοίνυν ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ κατὰ γράμματα καὶ νόμους ἀρίστη πολιτεία, διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν.
It is manifest, therefore, that the constitution according to written rules and laws is not the best, for the same reason.
ἀλλὰ μὴν κἀκεῖνον δεῖ ὑπάρχειν τὸν λόγον, τὸν καθόλου, τοῖς ἄρχουσιν.
Nevertheless, indeed, that reason, which is universal, must also belong to the rulers.
κρεῖττον δʼ ᾧ μὴ πρόσεστι τὸ παθητικὸν ὅλως ἢ ᾧ συμφυές· τῷ μὲν οὖν νόμῳ τοῦτο οὐχ ὑπάρχει, ψυχὴν δʼ ἀνθρωπίνην ἀνάγκη τοῦτʼ ἔχειν πᾶσαν.
And that to which the passionate element is not attached at all is better than that in which it is innate; now, this does not belong to the law, but every human soul must have this.
ἀλλʼ ἴσως ἂν φαίη τις ὡς ἀντὶ τούτου βουλεύσεται περὶ τῶν καθʼ ἕκαστα κάλλιον.
But perhaps someone would say that, in compensation for this, he will deliberate about particular cases more finely.
ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἀνάγκη νομοθέτην αὐτὸν εἶναι, δῆλον, καὶ κεῖσθαι νόμους, ἀλλὰ μὴ κυρίους ᾗ παρεκβαίνουσιν, ἐπεὶ περὶ τῶν γʼ ἄλλων εἶναι δεῖ κυρίους· ὅσα δὲ μὴ δυνατὸν τὸν νόμον κρίνειν ἢ ὅλως ἢ εὖ, πότερον ἕνα τὸν ἄριστον δεῖ ἄρχειν ἢ πάντας;
That it is necessary, therefore, for him to be a legislator is clear, and that laws must be established, but not to be sovereign where they deviate, since in all other matters they must be sovereign; but as for matters which it is impossible for the law to judge either at all or well, should one, the best, rule, or all?
καὶ γὰρ νῦν συνιόντες δικάζουσι καὶ βουλεύονται καὶ κρίνουσιν, αὗται δʼ αἱ κρίσεις εἰσὶ πᾶσαι περὶ τῶν καθʼ ἕκαστον.
For even now, coming together they judge, deliberate, and decide, and these decisions are all about particular cases.
καθʼ ἕνα μὲν οὖν συμβαλλόμενος ὁστισοῦν ἴσως χείρων· ἀλλʼ ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις ἐκ πολλῶν, ὥσπερ δʼ ἑστίασις συμφορητὸς καλλίων μιᾶς καὶ ἁπλῆς· διὰ τοῦτο καὶ κρίνει ἄμεινον ὄχλος πολλὰ ἢ εἷς ὁστισοῦν.
Individually, therefore, whoever it may be, when compared, is perhaps inferior; but the city is made of many, and just as a feast provided by many contributors is finer than a single and simple one, for this reason also a crowd judges many things better than any single person.
ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀδιάφθορον τὸ πολύ—καθάπερ ὕδωρ τὸ πλεῖον, οὕτω καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ὀλίγων ἀδιαφθορώτερον·
Moreover, the great quantity is more incorruptible; just as a larger amount of water, so also the multitude is more incorruptible than the few.
τοῦ δʼ ἑνὸς ὑπʼ ὀργῆς κρατηθέντος ἤ τινος ἑτέρου πάθους τοιούτου ἀναγκαῖον διεφθάρθαι τὴν κρίσιν, ἐκεῖ δʼ ἔργον ἅμα πάντας ὀργισθῆναι καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν.
But when one person is overcome by anger or some other such passion, it is necessary that his judgment be corrupted, whereas there, it is a hard task for all to become angry and err at the same time.
ἔστω δὲ τὸ πλῆθος οἱ ἐλεύθεροι, μηδὲν παρὰ τὸν νόμον πράττοντες ἀλλʼ ἢ περὶ ὧν ἐκλείπειν ἀναγκαῖον αὐτόν.
But let the multitude be the free men, doing nothing contrary to the law except in matters where it must of necessity fail.
εἰ δὲ δὴ τοῦτο μὴ ῥᾴδιον ἐν πολλοῖς, ἀλλʼ εἰ πλείους εἶεν ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἄνδρες καὶ πολῖται, πότερον ὁ εἷς ἀδιαφθορώτερος ἄρχων, ἢ μᾶλλον οἱ πλείους μὲν τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἀγαθοὶ δὲ πάντες;
But if indeed this is not easy among many, yet if there were several who were good both as men and as citizens, is the one more incorruptible as a ruler, or rather those who are more in number, but all of them good?