§3.1283aδεῖ γὰρ εἰς τὸ ἔργον συμβάλλεσθαι τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τοῦ πλούτου καὶ τῆς εὐγενείας, συμβάλλονται δʼ οὐδέν.
For the superiority of both wealth and noble birth ought to contribute to the performance, but they contribute nothing.
ἔτι κατά γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον πᾶν ἀγαθὸν πρὸς πᾶν ἂν εἴη συμβλητόν.
Furthermore, according to this argument, every good would be comparable with every other.
εἰ γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ τὶ μέγεθος, καὶ ὅλως ἂν τὸ μέγεθος ἐνάμιλλον εἴη καὶ πρὸς πλοῦτον καὶ πρὸς ἐλευθερίαν· ὥστʼ εἰ πλεῖον ὁδὶ διαφέρει κατὰ μέγεθος ἢ ὁδὶ κατʼ ἀρετήν, καὶ πλεῖον ὑπερέχει ὅλως ἀρετὴ μεγέθους, εἴη ἂν συμβλητὰ πάντα.
For if a certain size is more of a good, then generally size would be rival to both wealth and freedom; so that if this person differs more in size than that person does in virtue, and virtue as a whole excels size by a greater degree, all things would be comparable.
τοσόνδε γὰρ εἰ κρεῖττον τοσοῦδε, τοσόνδε δῆλον ὡς ἴσον.
For if this much of one is better than that much of another, it is clear that this much is equal to that much.
ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτʼ ἀδύνατον, δῆλον ὡς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν εὐλόγως οὐ κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀνισότητʼ ἀμφισβητοῦσι τῶν ἀρχῶν (εἰ γὰρ οἱ μὲν βραδεῖς οἱ δὲ ταχεῖς, οὐδὲν διὰ τοῦτο δεῖ τοὺς μὲν πλεῖον τοὺς δʼ ἔλαττον ἔχειν, ἀλλʼ ἐν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσιν ἡ τούτων διαφορὰ λαμβάνει τὴν τιμήν)· ἀλλʼ ἐξ ὧν πόλις συνέστηκεν, ἐν τούτοις ἀναγκαῖον ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν.
But since this is impossible, it is clear that also in political matters they do not reasonably dispute for offices on the basis of every inequality (for if some are slow and others fast, they ought not on this account to have more or less, but it is in athletic contests that their difference receives honor); but it is in those elements of which a city is constituted that they must make their claim.
διόπερ εὐλόγως ἀντιποιοῦνται τῆς τιμῆς οἱ εὐγενεῖς καὶ ἐλεύθεροι καὶ πλούσιοι.
Therefore, the noble, the free, and the wealthy reasonably lay claim to honor.
δεῖ γὰρ ἐλευθέρους τʼ εἶναι καὶ τίμημα φέροντας, οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴη πόλις ἐξ ἀπόρων πάντων, ὥσπερ οὐδʼ ἐκ δούλων·
For they must be free and possessing a property qualification, since a city could not consist of entirely poor people, just as it could not consist of slaves.
ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ δεῖ τούτων, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄνευ τούτων οἰκεῖσθαι πόλιν δυνατόν· πλὴν ἄνευ μὲν τῶν προτέρων ἀδύνατον εἶναι πόλιν, ἄνευ δὲ τούτων οἰκεῖσθαι καλῶς.
But indeed, if these are necessary, it is clear that both justice and political virtue are also necessary, for without these it is not possible for a city to be inhabited; except that without the former it is impossible for a city to exist, but without the latter it cannot be inhabited well.
πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πόλιν εἶναι δόξειεν ἂν ἢ πάντα ἢ ἔνιά γε τούτων ὀρθῶς ἀμφισβητεῖν, πρὸς μέντοι ζωὴν ἀγαθὴν ἡ παιδεία καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ μάλιστα δικαίως ἂν ἀμφισβητοίησαν, καθάπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον.
With view, then, to the existence of a city, either all or at least some of these might seem to dispute rightly; but with view to a good life, education and virtue would dispute most justly, as was also said before.
ἐπεὶ δʼ οὔτε πάντων ἴσον ἔχειν δεῖ τοὺς ἴσους ἕν τι μόνον ὄντας, οὔτε ἄνισον τοὺς ἀνίσους καθʼ ἕν, ἀνάγκη πάσας εἶναι τὰς τοιαύτας πολιτείας περεκβάσεις.
And since those who are equal in only one thing ought not to have an equal share of all things, nor those who are unequal in only one thing to have an unequal share in all, all such constitutions must be deviations.
εἴρηται μὲν οὖν καὶ πρότερον ὅτι διαμφισβητοῦσι τρόπον τινὰ δικαίως πάντες, ἁπλῶς δʼ οὐ πάντες δικαίως·
It has been said indeed before, therefore, that all dispute in a certain way justly, but absolutely not all of them do so justly.
οἱ πλούσιοι μὲν ὅτι πλεῖον μέτεστι τῆς χώρας αὐτοῖς, ἡ δὲ χώρα κοινόν, ἔτι πρὸς τὰ συμβόλαια πιστοὶ μᾶλλον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλέον· οἱ δὲ ἐλεύθεροι καὶ εὐγενεῖς ὡς ἐγγὺς ἀλλήλων (πολῖται γὰρ μᾶλλον οἱ γενναιότεροι τῶν ἀγεννῶν, ἡ δʼ εὐγένεια παρʼ ἑκάστοις οἴκοι τίμιος)· ἔτι διότι βελτίους εἰκὸς τοὺς ἐκ βελτιόνων, εὐγένεια γάρ ἐστιν ἀρετὴ γένους· ὁμοίως δὲ φήσομεν δικαίως καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀμφισβητεῖν, κοινωνικὴν γὰρ ἀρετὴν εἶναί φαμεν τὴν δικαιοσύνην, ᾗ πάσας ἀναγκαῖον ἀκολουθεῖν τὰς ἄλλας· ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ οἱ πλείους πρὸς τοὺς ἐλάττους, καὶ γὰρ κρείττους καὶ πλουσιώτεροι καὶ βελτίους εἰσίν, ὡς λαμβανομένων τῶν πλειόνων πρὸς τοὺς ἐλάττους.
The wealthy on the ground that they have a larger share of the land, and land is a common thing, and furthermore they are generally more trustworthy regarding contracts; and the free and the well-born on the ground that they are close to one another (for those of nobler birth are more citizens than the ignoble, and noble birth is honored at home among each people); furthermore because it is likely that those from better ancestors are better, for noble birth is virtue of a lineage; and similarly we shall say that virtue also disputes justly, for we say that justice is a social virtue, which all the other virtues must necessarily follow; but indeed, the majority also do so against the minority, for they are also stronger, wealthier, and better, when the majority are taken in relation to the minority.