§3.1282bἡ δὲ πρώτη λεχθεῖσα ἀπορία ποιεῖ φανερὸν οὐδὲν οὕτως ἕτερον ὡς ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς νόμους εἶναι κυρίους κειμένους ὀρθῶς, τὸν ἄρχοντα δέ, ἄν τε εἷς ἄν τε πλείους ὦσι, περὶ τούτων εἶναι κυρίους περὶ ὅσων ἐξαδυνατοῦσιν οἱ νόμοι λέγειν ἀκριβῶς διὰ τὸ μὴ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι καθόλου διορίσαι περὶ πάντων.
The first-mentioned difficulty makes nothing so clear as that correctly established laws should be sovereign, and that the ruler, whether one or more, should be sovereign over those matters about which the laws are completely unable to speak precisely, because it is not easy to make general definitions about all things.
ὁποίους μέντοι τινὰς εἶναι δεῖ τοὺς ὀρθῶς κειμένους νόμους, οὐδέν πω δῆλον, ἀλλʼ ἔτι μένει τὸ πάλαι διαπορηθέν.
What kind of laws, however, the correctly established ones ought to be is not yet clear, but the long-standing difficulty still remains.
ἅμα γὰρ καὶ ὁμοίως ταῖς πολιτείαις ἀνάγκη καὶ τοὺς νόμους φαύλους ἢ σπουδαίους εἶναι, καὶ δικαίους ἢ ἀδίκους.
For it is necessary that, along with and in the same way as the constitutions, the laws also are either bad or good, and just or unjust.
πλὴν τοῦτό γε φανερόν, ὅτι δεῖ πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν κεῖσθαι τοὺς νόμους.
Except that this much at least is clear, that the laws must be established with view to the constitution.
ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τοῦτο, δῆλον ὅτι τοὺς μὲν κατὰ τὰς ὀρθὰς πολιτείας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι δικαίους τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τὰς παρεκβεβηκυίας οὐ δικαίους.
But if this is so, it is clear that those in accordance with correct constitutions are necessarily just, while those in accordance with deviated ones are not just.
ἐπεὶ δʼ ἐν πάσαις μὲν ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις καὶ τέχναις ἀγαθὸν τὸ τέλος, μέγιστον δὲ καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τῇ κυριωτάτῃ πασῶν, αὕτη δʼ ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτικὴ δύναμις, ἔστι δὲ τὸ πολιτικὸν ἀγαθὸν τὸ δίκαιον, τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶ τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον, δοκεῖ δὴ πᾶσιν ἴσον τι τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ μέχρι γέ τινος ὁμολογοῦσι τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοις, ἐν οἷς διώρισται περὶ τῶν ἠθικῶν (τὶ γὰρ καὶ τισὶ τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ δεῖν τοῖς ἴσοις ἴσον εἶναι φασιν), ποίων δὴ ἰσότης ἐστὶ καὶ ποίων ἀνισότης, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν.
Since in all sciences and arts the end is a good, and the greatest good is especially in the most sovereign of all, and this is the political capacity, and the political good is justice, which is the common interest, it is indeed held by all that justice is a certain kind of equality, and up to a point they agree with the philosophical discussions in which ethical matters have been defined (for they say that justice is a certain thing and for certain people, and that it must be equal for equal people); but we must not fail to notice in what sort of things there is equality and in what sort of things there is inequality.
ἔχει γὰρ τοῦτʼ ἀπορίαν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν πολιτικήν.
For this involves a difficulty and political philosophy.
ἴσως γὰρ ἂν φαίη τις κατὰ παντὸς ὑπεροχὴν ἀγαθοῦ δεῖν ἀνίσως νενεμῆσθαι τὰς ἀρχάς, εἰ πάντα τὰ λοιπὰ μηδὲν διαφέροιεν ἀλλʼ ὅμοιοι τυγχάνοιεν ὄντες· τοῖς γὰρ διαφέρουσιν ἕτερον εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ κατʼ ἀξίαν.
For perhaps someone might say that according to superiority in any good, offices should be distributed unequally, even if they differ in no other respect but happen to be similar; for to those who differ, justice and what is according to merit are different.
ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τοῦτʼ ἀληθές, ἔσται καὶ κατὰ χρῶμα καὶ κατὰ μέγεθος καὶ καθʼ ὁτιοῦν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πλεονεξία τις τῶν πολιτικῶν δικαίων τοῖς ὑπερέχουσιν.
But indeed, if this is true, there will be a certain advantage in political rights for those who excel in color, in stature, or in any good whatsoever.
ἢ τοῦτο ἐπιπόλαιον τὸ ψεῦδος;
Or is this falsehood superficial?
φανερὸν δʼ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν καὶ δυνάμεων· τῶν γὰρ ὁμοίων αὐλητῶν τὴν τέχνην οὐ δοτέον πλεονεξίαν τῶν αὐλῶν τοῖς εὐγενεστέροις (οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐλήσουσι βέλτιον), δεῖ δὲ τῷ κατὰ τὸ ἔργον ὑπερέχοντι διδόναι καὶ τῶν ὀργάνων τὴν ὑπεροχήν.
It is clear in the case of the other sciences and capacities; for among flute-players who are equal in their art, one must not give an advantage in flutes to those who are of nobler birth (for they will not play any better), but one must give the superiority in instruments to the one who excels in the performance.
εἰ δὲ μήπω δῆλον τὸ λεγόμενον, ἔτι μᾶλλον αὐτὸ προαγαγοῦσιν ἔσται φανερόν.
If what is being said is not yet clear, it will become still more manifest as we advance it further.
εἰ γὰρ εἴη τις ὑπερέχων μὲν κατὰ τὴν αὐλητικήν, πολὺ δʼ ἐλλείπων κατʼ εὐγένειαν ἢ κάλλος, εἰ καὶ μεῖζον ἕκαστον ἐκείνων ἀγαθόν ἐστι τῆς αὐλητικῆς (λέγω δὲ τήν τʼ εὐγένειαν καὶ τὸ κάλλος), καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ὑπερέχουσι πλέον τῆς αὐλητικῆς ἢ ἐκεῖνος κατὰ τὴν αὐλητικήν, ὅμως τούτῳ δοτέον τοὺς διαφέροντας τῶν αὐλῶν.
For if there were someone who excelled in flute-playing, but was far inferior in noble birth or beauty, even if each of those is a greater good than flute-playing (I mean both noble birth and beauty), and they excel flute-playing proportionally more than he excels in flute-playing, nevertheless to him must be given the superior flutes.