§3.1283bἆρʼ οὖν εἰ πάντες εἶεν ἐν μιᾷ πόλει, λέγω δʼ οἷον οἵ τʼ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ οἱ εὐγενεῖς, ἔτι δὲ πλῆθος ἄλλο τι πολιτικόν, πότερον ἀμφισβήτησις ἔσται τίνας ἄρχειν δεῖ, ἢ οὐκ ἔσται;
Is it then the case that if all were in one city—I mean, for example, the good, the wealthy, and the well-born, and furthermore some other political multitude—there will be a dispute as to who must rule, or will there not?
καθʼ ἑκάστην μὲν οὖν πολιτείαν τῶν εἰρημένων ἀναμφισβήτητος ἡ κρίσις τίνας ἄρχειν δεῖ (τοῖς γὰρ κυρίοις διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων, οἷον ἡ μὲν τῷ διὰ πλουσίων ἡ δὲ τῷ διὰ τῶν σπουδαίων ἀνδρῶν εἶναι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑκάστη τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον)· ἀλλʼ ὅμως σκοπῶμεν, ὅταν περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ταῦθʼ ὑπάρχῃ χρόνον, πῶς διοριστέον.
Now, under each of the mentioned constitutions, the decision as to who must rule is undisputed (for they differ from one another in their sovereign elements, for instance, one by being through the wealthy, another by being through the excellent men, and each of the others in the same manner); but nevertheless, let us consider how we should make the determination when all these exist at the same time.
εἰ δὴ τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἶεν ὀλίγοι πάμπαν οἱ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχοντες, τίνα δεῖ διελεῖν τρόπον;
If indeed those who possess virtue should be altogether few in number, in what way must we decide?
ἢ τὸ
ὀλίγοι
πρὸς τὸ ἔργον δεῖ σκοπεῖν, εἰ δυνατοὶ διοικεῖν τὴν πόλιν ἢ τοσοῦτοι τὸ πλῆθος ὥστʼ εἶναι πόλιν ἐξ αὐτῶν;
Or must we look at their being "few" in relation to the task, to see whether they are able to administer the city, or are so many in multitude as to make a city consist of them?
ἔστι δὲ ἀπορία τις πρὸς ἅπαντας τοὺς διαμφισβητοῦντας περὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν τιμῶν.
There is, however, a certain difficulty for all who dispute about political honors.
δόξαιεν γὰρ ἂν οὐδὲν λέγειν δίκαιον οἱ διὰ τὸν πλοῦτον ἀξιοῦντες ἄρχειν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ κατὰ γένος· δῆλον γὰρ ὡς εἴ τις πάλιν εἷς πλουσιώτερος ἁπάντων ἐστί, δηλονότι κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον τοῦτον ἄρχειν τὸν ἕνα ἁπάντων δεήσει, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν εὐγενείᾳ διαφέροντα τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων διʼ ἐλευθερίαν.
For those who claim to rule on account of wealth would seem to say nothing just, and similarly also those on account of birth; for it is clear that if, again, some one person is wealthier than all together, it will clearly be necessary, according to the same justice, for this one person to rule all, and similarly also the one excelling in noble birth over those who dispute on the ground of freedom.
ταὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο ἴσως συμβήσεται καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀριστοκρατίας ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς· εἰ γάρ τις εἷς ἀμείνων ἀνὴρ εἴη τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι σπουδαίων ὄντων, τοῦτον εἶναι δεῖ κύριον κατὰ ταὐτὸ δίκαιον.
And this same thing will perhaps happen also concerning aristocracies on the basis of virtue; for if some one man should be better than the others who are excellent in the governing body, this man must be sovereign according to the same justice.
οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἶναί γε δεῖ κύριον διότι κρείττους εἰσὶ τῶν ὀλίγων, κἂν εἷς ἢ πλείους μὲν τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐλάττους δὲ τῶν πολλῶν κρείττους ὦσι τῶν ἄλλων, τούτους ἂν δέοι κυρίους εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ πλῆθος.
Therefore, if indeed the multitude ought to be sovereign because they are stronger than the few, then if one person, or more than one but fewer than the many, should be stronger than the others, these ought to be sovereign rather than the multitude.
πάντα δὴ ταῦτʼ ἔοικε φανερὸν ποιεῖν ὅτι τούτων τῶν ὅρων οὐδεὶς ὀρθός ἐστι καθʼ ὃν ἀξιοῦσιν αὐτοὶ μὲν ἄρχειν τοὺς δʼ ἄλλους ὑπὸ σφῶν ἄρχεσθαι πάντας.
All these things, indeed, seem to make it clear that none of these standards is correct according to which they claim that they themselves should rule and all others should be ruled by them all.
καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς κατʼ ἀρετὴν ἀξιοῦντας κυρίους εἶναι τοῦ πολιτεύματος, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς κατὰ πλοῦτον, ἔχοιεν ἂν λέγειν τὰ πλήθη λόγον τινὰ δίκαιον· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει ποτὲ τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι βέλτιον· τῶν ὀλίγων καὶ πλουσιώτερον, οὐχ ὡς καθʼ ἕκαστον ἀλλʼ ὡς ἀθρόους.
For indeed, even against those who claim to be sovereign over the governing body on the basis of virtue, and similarly against those on the basis of wealth, the multitudes might have some just argument to state; for nothing prevents the multitude from being at some time better than the few and wealthier, not as individuals but as a collective body.
διὸ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀπορίαν ἣν ζητοῦσι καὶ προβάλλουσί τινες ἐνδέχεται τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἀπαντᾶν.
Therefore, it is also possible to reply in this manner to the difficulty which some investigate and propose.
ἀποροῦσι γάρ τινες πότερον τῷ νομοθέτῃ νομοθετητέον, βουλομένῳ τίθεσθαι τοὺς ὀρθοτάτους νόμους, πρὸς τὸ τῶν βελτιόνων συμφέρον ἢ πρὸς τὸ τῶν πλειόνων, ὅταν συμβαίνῃ τὸ λεχθέν·
For some are puzzled whether a legislator who wishes to establish the most correct laws must legislate with a view to the benefit of the better citizens or with a view to that of the majority, when the situation mentioned occurs.
τὸ δʼ ὀρθὸν ληπτέον ἴσως· τὸ δʼ ἴσως ὀρθὸν πρὸς τὸ τῆς πόλεως ὅλης συμφέρον καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τὸ τῶν πολιτῶν· πολίτης δὲ κοινῇ μὲν ὁ μετέχων τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαί ἐστι,
But "the correct" must be taken equally; and that which is equally correct is with view to the benefit of the whole city and to the common good of the citizens; and a citizen in a general sense is one who shares in ruling and being ruled,