§8.6#1Ἐπεὶ δὲ δεῖ κίνησιν ἀεὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ διαλείπειν, ἀνἀγκη εἶναί τι ἀΐδιον ὁ πρῶτον κινεῖ, εἴτε ἓν εἴτε πλείω· καὶ τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον.
Since there must always be motion and it must not fail, it is necessary that there should be some eternal thing which primarily moves, whether one or more; and the first mover is unmoved.
ἕκαστον μὲν οὖν ἀΐδιον εἶναι τῶν ἀκινήτων μὲν κινούντων δὲ οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν νῦν λόγον· ὅτι δʼ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναί τι τὸ ἀκίνητον μὲν αὐτὸ πάσης ἐκτὸς μεταβολῆς, καὶ ἀπλῶς καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, κινητικὸν δʼ ἑτέρου, δῆλον ὧδε σκοποῦσιν.
Now, that each of the unmoved but moving things is eternal is nothing to the present argument; but that there must be something which is itself unmoved and outside of all change, both absolutely and accidentally, but capable of moving another, is clear to those who consider it as follows.
ἔστω δή, εἴ τις βούλεται, ἐπί τινων ἐνδεχόμενον ὥστε εἶναί ποτε καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἄνευ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς (τάχα γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον, εἴ τι ἀμερὲς ὁτὲ μὲν ἔστιν ὁτὲ δὲ μὴ ἔστιν, ἄνευ τοῦ μεταβάλλειν ὁτὲ μὲν εἶναι ὁτὲ δὲ μὴ εἶναι πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον).
Let it be assumed, if anyone wishes, that in the case of some things it is possible for them sometimes to be and sometimes not to be without generation and corruption (for perhaps it is necessary, if something without parts sometimes is and sometimes is not, that without changing, sometimes to be and sometimes not to be is necessary for all such things).
καὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν τῶν ἀκινήτων μὲν κινητικῶν δʼ ἐνίας ὁτὲ μὲν εἶναι ὁτὲ δὲ μὴ εἶναι, ἐνδεχέσθω καὶ τοῦτο.
And that among the principles which are unmoved but capable of moving, some sometimes are and sometimes are not, let this also be assumed as possible.
ἀλλʼ οὔ τί γε πάσας δυνατόν· δῆλον γὰρ ὡς αἴτιον τοῖς αὐτὰ ἑαυτὰ κινοῦσίν ἐστί τι τοῦ ὁτὲ μὲν εἶναι ὁτὲ δὲ μή.
But indeed, it is by no means possible for all of them; for it is clear that for things that move themselves there is some cause of their sometimes being and sometimes not.
τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν ἅπαν ἔχειν ἀνάγκη μέγεθος, εἰ μηδὲν κινεῖται ἀμερές, τὸ δὲ κινοῦν οὐδεμία ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.
For every self-moving thing must have magnitude, if nothing without parts is moved, but for the mover there is no necessity from what has been said.
τοῦ δὴ τὰ μὲν γίγνεσθαι τὰ δὲ φθείρεσθαι, καὶ τοῦτʼ εἶναι συνεχῶς, οὐδὲν αἴτιον τῶν ἀκινήτων μὲν μὴ ἀεὶ δʼ ὄντων, οὐδʼ αὖ τωνδὶ μὲν ταδί, τούτων δʼ ἕτερα.
Of the fact, then, that some things come to be and others perish, and that this is continuously, none of the unmoved but not always existing things is the cause, nor again are these the cause of those, and those of others.
τοῦ γὰρ ἀεὶ καὶ συνεχοῦς οὔτε ἕκαστον αὐτῶν οὔτε πάντα αἴτια· τὸ μὲν γὰρ οὕτως ἔχειν ἀΐδιον καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, τὰ δὲ πάντα ἄπειρα, καὶ οὐχ ἅμα πάντα ὄντα.
For neither each of them nor all of them are the cause of what is eternal and continuous; for to be in this state is eternal and necessary, whereas all those things are infinite and do not all exist at the same time.
δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι, εἰ καὶ μυριάκις ἔνια τῶν ἀκινήτων μὲν κινούντων δέ, καὶ πολλὰ τῶν αὐτὰ ἑαυτὰ κινούντων, φθείρεται, τὰ δʼ ἐπιγίγνεται, καὶ τόδε μὲν ἀκίνητον ὂν τόδε κινεῖ, ἕτερον δὲ τοδί, ἀλλʼ οὐδὲν ἧττον ἔστιν τι ὁ περιέχει, καὶ τοῦτο παρʼ ἕκαστον, ὅ ἐστιν αἴτιον τοῦ τὰ μὲν εἶ. ναι τὰ δὲ μὴ καὶ τῆς συνεχοῦς μεταβολῆς· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν τούτοις, ταῦτα δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις αἴτια κινήσεως.
It is clear, then, that even if some of the unmoved but moving things, and many of the self-moving things, perish ten thousand times, and others come to be, and this being unmoved moves this, and another moves that, nevertheless there is something which encompasses them, and this besides each of them, which is the cause of some things being and others not, and of the continuous change; and this indeed is the cause of motion to these, and these to the others.
εἴπερ οὖν ἀΐδιος
ἡ κίνησις, ἀΐδιον καὶ τὸ κινοῦν ἔσται πρῶτον, εἰ ἕν· εἰ δὲ πλείω, πλείω τὰ ἀΐδια, ἓν δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ πολλά, καὶ πεπερασμένα ἢ ἄπειρα, δεῖ νομίζειν.
If, then, motion is eternal, the first mover will also be eternal, if it is one; but if there are more, there will be more eternal things, but we must think that it is one rather than many, and finite rather than infinite.
τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ συμβαινόντων αἰεὶ τὰ πεπερασμένα μᾶλλον ληπτέον· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς φύσει δεῖ τὸ πεπερασμένον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον, ἂν ἐνδέχηται, ὑπάρχειν μᾶλλον.
For, the same things resulting, we must always prefer the finite; for in things that are by nature, the finite and the better must, if possible, rather belong.
ἱκανὸν δὲ καὶ ἕν, ὃ πρῶτον τῶν ἀκινήτων ἀΐδιον ὂν ἔσται ἀρχὴ τοῖς ἄλλοις κινήσεως.
And one is sufficient, which, being the first of the unmoved things and being eternal, will be the principle of motion to the others.
φανερὸν
δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦδε ὅτι ἀνάγκη εἶναί τι ἓν καὶ ἀΐδιον τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν.
And it is also clear from this that the first mover must be something one and eternal.
δέδεικται γὰρ ὅτι ἀνάγκη ἀεὶ κίνησιν εἶναι.
For it has been shown that there must always be motion.
εἰ δὲ ἀεί, ἀνάγκη συνεχῆ εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἀεὶ συνεχές, τὸ δʼ ἐφεξῆς οὐ συνεχές.
And if always, it must be continuous; for what is always is continuous, whereas what is in succession is not continuous.
ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ γε συνεχής, μία.
But indeed, if it is continuous, it is one.
μία δʼ ἡ ὑφ᾿ ἑνός τε τοῦ κινοῦντος καὶ ἑνὸς τοῦ κινουμένου· εἰ γὰρ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο κινήσει, οὐ συνεχὴς ἡ ὅλη κίνησις, ἀλλʼ ἐφεξῆς.
And the motion is one which is by one mover and of one moved; for if first one and then another moves, the whole motion is not continuous, but in succession.