§8.3#2ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἁδύ. νατον ἢ ἀεὶ πάντα κινεῖσθαι ἢ ἀεὶ πάντα ἠρεμεῖν, ἐκ τούτων καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων πιστεύσειεν ἄν τις.
Therefore, that it is impossible either that all things are always in motion or that all things are always at rest, one might believe from these and other such arguments.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τὰ μὲν ἀεὶ ἐνδέχεται ἠρεμεῖν, τὰ δʼ ἀεὶ κινεῖσθαι, ποτὲ δʼ ἠρεμεῖν καὶ ποτὲ κινεῖσθαι μηδέν.
But furthermore, neither is it possible that some things are always at rest, and others always in motion, while nothing is at one time at rest and at another time in motion.
λεκτέον δʼ ὅτι ἀδύνατον, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν εἰρημένων πρότερον, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων (ὁρῶμεν γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν γιγνομένας τὰς εἰρημένας μεταβολάς), καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ὅτι μάχεται τοῖς φανεροῖς ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν·
For it must be said to be impossible, just as in the cases mentioned before, so also in these (for we see the mentioned changes occurring in the same things); and in addition to these, that he who disputes this is in conflict with the facts.
οὔτε γὰρ αὔξησις οὔθ’ ἡ βίαιος ἔσται κίνησις, εἰ μὴ κινήσεται παρὰ φύσιν ήρεμοῦν πρότερον.
For there will be neither increase nor forced motion, unless what was previously at rest is moved contrary to nature.
γένεσιν οὖν ἀναιρεῖ καὶ φθορὰν οτος ὁ λόγος.
This argument, therefore, does away with generation and destruction.
σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι γίγνεσθαί τι καὶ φθείρεσθαι δοκεῖ πᾶσιν· εἰς ὃ μὲν γὰρ μεταβάλλει, γίγνεται τοῦτο ἢ ἐν τούτῳ, ἐξ οὗ δὲ μεταβάλλει, φθείρεται τοῦτο ἢ ἐντεῦθεν.
And indeed, to be in motion seems to almost everyone to be a kind of coming to be and passing away; for that into which a thing changes, it becomes this or in this, and that from which it changes, it passes away itself or from this.
ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι τὰ μὲν κινεῖται, τὰ δʼ ἠρεμεῖ ἐνίοτε.
Consequently, it is clear that some things are in motion, and others are at rest at times.
τὸ δὲ πάντα ἀξιοῦν ὁτὲ μὲν ἠρεμεῖν ὁτὲ δὲ κινεῖσθαι,
τοῦτʼ ἤδη συναπτέον πρὸς τοὺς πάλαι λόγους.
But to claim that all things are at one time at rest and at another in motion, this must now be connected with our previous arguments.
ἀρχὴν δὲ πάλιν ποιητέον ἀπὸ τῶν νῦν διορισθέντων, τὴν αὐτὴν ἥνπερ ἠρξάμεθα πρότερον.
And we must make a start again from what has just been defined, the very same starting-point with which we began before.
ἢ γάρ τοι πάντα ἠρεμεῖ, ἢ πάντα κινεῶται,ἢ τὰ μὲν ἠρεμεῖ τὰ δὲ κινεῖται τῶν ὄντων.
For either all things are at rest, or all things are in motion, or some of existing things are at rest and others are in motion.
καὶ εἰ τὰ μὲν ήρεμεῖ τὰ δὲ κινεῖται, ἀνάγκη τοι πάντα ὁτὲ μὲν ἠρεμεῖν ὁτὲ δὲ κινεῖσθαι, ἢ τὰ μὲν ἀεὶ ἠρεμεῖν τὰ δὲ ἀεὶ κινεῖσθαι, ἢ τὰ μὲν ἀεὶ ἠρεμεῖν τὰ δὲ ἀεὶ κινεῖσθαι αὐτῶν, τὰ δʼ ὁτὲ μὲν ἠρεμεῖν ὁτὲ δὲ κινεῖσθαι.
And if some are at rest and others in motion, it is necessary either that all things are at one time at rest and at another in motion, or that some are always at rest and others always in motion, or that some of them are always at rest and others always in motion, while others are at one time at rest and at another in motion.
ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν οὐχ οἷόν τε πάντʼ ἠρεμεῖν, εἴρηται μὲν καὶ πρότερον, εἴπωμεν δὲ καὶ νῦν.
Now, that it is not possible for all things to be at rest has indeed been said before, but let us say it now too.
εἰ γὰρ καὶ κατʼ ἀλήθειαν οῦτως ἔχει καθάπερ φασί τινες, εἶναι τὸ ὂν ἄπειρον καὶ ἀκίνητον, ἀλλʼ οὔτι φαίνεταί γε κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἀλλὰ κινεῖσθαι πολλὰ τῶν ὄντων.
For even if it is indeed so in truth as some say, namely, that what exists is infinite and unmoved, yet at any rate it does not appear so to our senses, but rather many of existing things seem to be in motion.
εἴπερ οὖν ἔστιν δόξα ψευδὴς ἢ ὅλως δόξα, καὶ κίνησις ἔστιν, κἂν εἰ φαντασία, κἂν εἰ ὁτὲ μὲν οὕτως δοκεῖ ὁτὲ δʼ ἑτέρως· ἡ γὰρ φαντασία καὶ ἡ δόξα κινήσεις τινὲς εἶναι δοκοῦσιν.
If, therefore, there is such a thing as a false opinion or opinion at all, there is also motion, even if there is imagination, and even if at one time it seems thus and at another otherwise; for imagination and opinion are thought to be certain motions.
ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν περὶ τούτου σκοπεῖν, καὶ ζητεῖν λόγον ὥν βέλτιον ἔχομεν ἢ λόγου δεῖσθαι, κακῶς κρίνειν ἐστὶν τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον, καὶ τὸ πιστὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ πιστόν, καὶ ἀρχὴν καὶ μὴ ἀρχήν.
But to examine this, and to seek an argument for things of which we have a better grasp than to need an argument, is to judge badly between the better and the worse, the trustworthy and the untrustworthy, and what is a starting-point and what is not.
ὁμοίως δὲ ἀδύνατον καὶ τὸ πάντα κινεῖσθαι, ἢ τὰ μὲν ἀεὶ κινεῖσθαι τὰ δʼ ἀεὶ ἠρεμεῖν.
Similarly, it is also impossible that all things are in motion, or that some are always in motion and others always at rest.
πρὸς ἅπόντα γὰρ ταῦτα ἱκανὴ μία πίστις· ὁρῶμεν γὰρ ἔνια ὁτὲ μὲν κινούμενα ὁτὲ δʼ ἠρεμοῦντα.
For against all these views, a single proof is sufficient; for we see some things at one time in motion and at another at rest.
ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἀδύνατον ὁμοίως τὸ πάντα ἠρεμεῖν καὶ τὸ πάντα κινεῖσθαι συνεχῶς τῷ τὰ μὲν ἀεὶ κινεῖσθαι τὰ δʼ ἠρεμεῖν ἀεί.
Consequently, it is clear that it is equally impossible for all things to be at rest and for all things to be in motion continuously, as it is for some to be always in motion and others always at rest.
λοιπὸν οὖν θεωρῆσαι πότερον πάντα τοιαῦτα οἷα κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἠρεμεῖν, ἢ ἔνια μὲν οὕτως, ἔνια δʼ ἀεὶ ἠρεμεῖ, ἔνια δʼ ἀεὶ κινεῖται· τοῦτο γὰρ δεικτέον ἡμῖν.
It remains, then, to consider whether all things are such as to be capable of being in motion and at rest, or whether some are so, while others are always at rest, and others always in motion; for this is what we must show.