§8.3#1Ἀρχὴ δὲ τῆς σκέψεως ἥπερ καὶ περὶ τῆς λεχθείσης ἀπορίας, διὰ τί ποτε ἔνια τῶν ὄντων ὁτὲ μὲν κινεῖται ὁτὲ δὲ ρεμεῖ πάλιν.
The starting-point of our inquiry is the same as that concerning the difficulty we have mentioned, namely, why on earth some of existing things are at one time in motion and at another time at rest again.
ἀνάγκη δὴ ἤτοι πάντα ἠρεμεῖν ἀεί, ἢ πάντα ἀεὶ κινεῖσθαι, ἢ τὰ μὲν κινεῖσθαι τὰ δʼ ἠρεμεῖν, καὶ πάλιν τούτων ἤτοι τὰ μὲν κινούμενα κινεῖσθαι ἀεὶ τὰ δʼ ἠρεμοῦντα ἠρεμεῖν, ἢ πάντα πεφυκέναι ὁμοίως κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἠρεμεῖν, ἢ τὸ λοιπὸν ἔτι καὶ τρίτον.
Now, it is necessary either that all things are always at rest, or that all things are always in motion, or that some things are in motion and others at rest; and again, of the latter, either that those in motion are always in motion and those at rest are always at rest, or that all are by nature capable of being similarly in motion and at rest, or what still remains as the third alternative.
ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὰ μὲν ἀεὶ τῶν ὄντων ἀκίνητα εἶναι, τὰ δʼ ἀεὶ κινούμενα, τὰ δʼ ἀμφοτέρων μεταλαμβάνειν· ὅπερ ἡμῖν λεκτέον ἐστίν.
For it is possible that some of existing things are always unmoved, others always in motion, and others participate in both; and this is what we must show.
τοῦτο γὰρ ἔχει λύσιν τε πάντων τῶν ἀπορουμένων, καὶ τέλος ἡμῖν ταύτης τῆς πραγματείας ἐστίν.
For this contains the solution of all the difficulties, and is the end of this treatise for us.
τὸ μὲν οὖν πάντʼ ἠρεμεῖν, καὶ τούτου ζητεῖν λόγον ἀφέντας τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἀρρωστία τίς ἐστιν διανοίας, καὶ περὶ ὅλου τινὸς ἀλλʼ οὐ περὶ μέρους ἀμφισβήτησις· οὐδὲ μόνον πρὸς τὸν φυσικόν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς πάσας τὰς ἐπιστήμας ὡς εἰπεῖν καὶ πάσας τὰς δόξας διὰ τὸ κινήσει χρῆσθαι πάσας.
Now, to say that all things are at rest, and to seek a reason for this while dismissing sense-perception, is a certain weakness of intellect, and a dispute about a whole, as it were, and not about a part; nor does it concern only the natural philosopher, but, so to speak, all sciences and all opinions, because they all use motion.
ἔτι δʼ αἱ περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐνστάσεις, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ μαθήματα λόγοις οὐδέν εἰσιν πρὸς τὸν μαθηματικόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, οὕτως οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ νῦν ῥηθέντος πρὸς τὸν φυσικόν· ὑπόθεσις γὰρ ὅτι ἡ φύσις ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεαως.
Further, just as objections concerning principles in discussions on mathematics are nothing to the mathematician, and similarly in the case of the others, so too the objection now mentioned is nothing to the natural philosopher; for it is a hypothesis that nature is a principle of motion.
σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ φάναι κινεῖσθαι
πάντα ψεῦδος μέν, ἦττον δὲ τούτου παρὰ τὴν μέθοδον· ἐτε θη μὲν γὰρ ἡ φύσις ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς ἀρχή, καθάπερ κινήσεως, καὶ ἠρεμίας, ὄμως δὲ φυσικὸν ἡ κίνησις.
And to say that all things are in motion is also almost false, though less contrary to our method than the former view; for nature was posited in our discussions on physics as a principle of rest no less than of motion, yet motion is nevertheless the subject of natural science.
καί φασί τινες κινεῖσθαι τῶν ὄντων οὐ τὰ μὲν τὰ δʼ οὔ, ἀλλὰ πάντα καὶ ἀεί, ἀλλὰ λανθάνειν τοῦτο τὴν ἡμετέραν αἴσθησιν·
And some say that of existing things, it is not the case that some are in motion and others not, but that all things are in motion and always, but that this escapes our sense-perception.
πρὸς οὕς καίπερ οὐ διορίζυντας ποίαν κίνησιν λέγουσιν, ἢ πάσας, οὐ χαλεπὸν ἀπαντῆσαι.
Although they do not define what kind of motion they mean, or whether they mean all, it is not difficult to answer them.
οὔτε γὰρ αὐξάνεσθαι οὕτε φθίνειν σἷόν τε συνεχῶς, ἀλλʼ ἔστι καὶ τὸ μέσον.
For it is impossible for a thing to increase or decrease continuously, but there is also the intermediate state.
ἔστι δʼ ὅμοιος ὁ λόγος τῷ περὶ τοῦ τὸν σταλαγμὸν κατατρίβειν καὶ τὰ ἐκφυόμενα τοὺς λίθους διαιρεῖν· οὐ γὰρ εἰ τοσόνδε ἐξέωσεν ἢ ἀφεῖλεν ὁ σταλαγμός, καὶ τὸ ήμισυ ἐν ἡμίσει χρόνῳ πρότερον· ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ ἡ νεωλκία, καὶ οἱ σταλαγμοὶ οἱ τοσοιδὶ τοσονδὶ κινοῦσιν, τὸ δὲ μέρος αὐτῶν ἐν οὐδενὶ χρόνῳ τοσοῦτον.
And the argument is similar to that concerning the wearing away of a stone by a drop of water, and the splitting of stones by things that grow in them; for it does not follow that if the drop has pushed out or removed so much, it also removed half of it in half the time before; but just as in the hauling of a ship, so also these drops of such a quantity move so much, but a part of them does not move so much in any time.
διαιρεῖται μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀφαιρεθὲν εἰς πλείω, ἀλλʼ οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἐκινήθη χωρίς, ἀλλʼ ἅμα.
Therefore, what is removed is divided into several parts, but none of them was moved separately, but all together.
φανερὸν οὖν ὡς οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἀεί τι ἀπιέναι, ὅτι διαιρεῖται ἡ φθίσις εἰς ἄπειρα, ἀλλʼ ὅλον ποτὲ ἀπιέναι.
It is clear, then, that it is not necessary that something is always departing because decrease is divided into infinitely many parts, but that the whole departs at some time.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπʼ ἀλλοιώσεως ὁποιασοῦν· οὐ γὰρ εἰ μεριστὸν εἰς ἄπειρα τὸ ἀλλοιούμενον, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἡ ἀλλοίωσις, ἀλλʼ ἀθρόα γίγνεται πολλάκις, ὥσπερ ἡ πῆξις.
And similarly also in the case of any alteration whatsoever; for even if that which is altered is divisible into infinitely many parts, it does not follow because of this that the alteration is so too, but it often takes place all at once, as in the case of freezing.
ἔτι ὅταν τι νοσήσῃ, ἀνάγκη χρόνον γενέσθαι ἐν ὧ ὑγιασθήσεται, καὶ μὴ ἐν πέρατι χρόνου μεταβάλλειν· ἀνάγκη δὲ εἰς ὑγίειαν μεταβάλλειν καὶ μὴ εἰς ἄλλο μηθέν.
Further, when a thing falls ill, it is necessary that there should be a time in which it will be cured, and that it does not change at a limit of time; and it must change into health and into nothing else.
ὥστε τὸ φάναι συνεχῶς ἀλλοιοῦσθαι λίαν ἐστὶ τοῖς φανεροῖς ἀμφισβητεῖν.
Consequently, to say that alteration is continuous is to dispute facts too obvious.
εἰς τοὐναντίον γὰρ ἡ ἀλλοίωσις· ὁ δὲ λίθος οὔτε σκληρότερος γίγνεται οὔτε μαλακώτερος.
For alteration is into the contrary; and the stone becomes neither harder nor softer.
κατά τε τὸ φέρεσθαι θαυμαστὸν εἰ λέληθεν ὁ λίθος κάτω φερόμενος ἢ μένων ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς.
And as regards locomotion, it would be wonderful if a stone escapes our notice when falling down or when remaining on the earth.
ἔτι δʼ ἢ γῆ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ἐξ ἀνάγκης μένουσι μὲν ἐν τοῖς οἰκείοις τόποις, κινοῦνται δὲ βιαίως ἐκ τούτων· εἴπερ οὖν ἔνιʼ αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς οἰκείοις τόποις, ἀνάγκη μηδὲ κατὰ τόπον πάντα κινεῖσθαι.
Further, the earth and each of the other elements remain of necessity in their proper places, and are moved by force from them; if, then, some of them are in their proper places, it is necessary that not all things are in motion even in respect of place.