§8.2Τὰ δὲ ἐναντία τούτοις οὐ χαλεπὸν λύειν.
But it is not difficult to solve the objections to these views.
δόξειε δʼ ἂν ἐκ τῶν τοιῶνδε σκοποῦσιν ἐνδέχεσθαι μάλιστα κίνησιν εἶναί ποτε μὴ οὕσαν ὅλως, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι οὐδεμία ἀίδιος μεταβολή· μεταβολὴ γὰρ ὅποσα πέφυκεν ἔκ τινος εἴς τι, ὥστε ἀνάγκη πάσης μεταβολῆς εἶναι πέρας τὰ ἐναντία ἐν οἷς γίγνεται, εἰς ἄπειρον δὲ κινεῖσθαι μηδέν.
But it might seem, to those who consider the matter from the following points of view, to be especially possible that motion should sometimes come to be when it did not exist at all before: first, because no change is eternal; for all change is by nature from something to something, so that it is necessary that the limits of every change are the contraries between which it takes place, and nothing can move to infinity.
ἔτι ὁρῶμεν ὅτι δυνατὸν κινηθῆναι μήτε κινούμενον μήτʼ ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ μηδεμίαν κίνησιν, οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων, ὧν οὔτε μέρος οὐδὲν οὔτε τὸ ὅλον κινούμενον ἀλλʼ ἠρεμοῦν κινεῖταί ποτε· προσῆκεν δὲ ἢ ἀεὶ κινεῖσθαι ἢ μηδέποτε, εἴπερ μὴ γίγνεται οὐκ οὗσα.
Moreover, we see that it is possible for a thing to be moved which is neither in motion nor has any motion in itself, as in the case of inanimate things, of which neither any part nor the whole is in motion but, being at rest, is moved at some time; but it would be fitting either that they should always be in motion or never, if indeed motion does not come to be when it was not existing.
πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμψύχων εἶναι φανερόν· οὐδεμᾶς γὰρ ἐν μῖν ἐνούσης κινήσεως ἐνίοτε, ἀλλʼ ἡσυχάζοντες ὄμως κινούμεθά ποτε, καὶ ἐγγίγνεται ἐν ἡμῖν ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἀρχὴ κινήσεαως, κὰν μηθὲν ἔξωθεν κινήση.
But this is by far most obvious in the case of living things; for though at times there is no motion in us, but we are at rest, yet we are moved at some time, and there arises in us, from ourselves, a principle of motion, even if nothing from without moves us.
τοῦτο γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων οὐχ ὁρῶμεν ὑμοίος, ἀλλʼ ἀεὶ κινεῖ τι αὐτὰ τῶν ἔξωθεν ἕτερον· τὸ δὲ ζον αὐτό φαμεν ἑαυτὸ κινεῖν.
For we do not see this in the same way in the case of inanimate things, but some other thing from without always moves them; whereas we say that the animal moves itself.
ὥστʼ εἶπερ ήρεμεῖ ποτὲ πάμπαν, ἐν ἀκινήτῳ κίνησις ἂν γίγνοιτο ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐκ ἔξωθεν.
Consequently, if an animal is ever entirely at rest, motion would come to be in an unmoved thing from itself and not from without.
εἰ δʼ ἐν ζήῳ τοῦτο δυνατὸν γενέσθαι, τί κωλύει τὸ αὐτὸ συμβῆναι καὶ κατὰ τὸ πᾶν;
And if this can happen in an animal, what hinders the same thing from happening also in the universe as a whole?
εἰ γὰρ ἐν μικρῷ κόσμῳ γίγνεται, καὶ ἐν μεγάλῳ· καὶ εἰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, κὰν τῷ ἀπείρῳ, εἶπερ ἐνδέχεται κινεῖσθαι τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ ἠρεμεῖν ὅλον.
For if it happens in a small world, it can happen also in a great one; and if in the world, also in the infinite, if indeed it is possible for the infinite as a whole to be moved and to be at rest.
τού. τῶν δὴ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον λεχθέν, τὸ μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀεὶ καὶ μίαν τῷ ἀριθμῷ εἶναι τὴν κίνησιν τὴν εἰς τὰ ἀντικείμενα, ὀρθῶς λέγεται.
Now of these arguments, the first mentioned, namely, that the motion into opposites is not always the same and one in number, is correctly stated.
τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἴσως ἀναγκαῖον, εἴπερ μὴ ἀεὶ μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι δυνατὸν τὴν τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἑνὸς κίνησιν· λέγω δʼ οἶον πότερον τῆς μιᾶς χορδῆς εἶς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς φθόγγος, ἢ ἀεὶ ἕτερος, ὁμοίως ἐχούσης καὶ κινουμένης.
For this is perhaps necessary, if indeed it is not possible for the motion of the same and single thing to be always one and the same; I mean, for instance, whether the sound from a single string is one and the same, or always different, when the string is in a similar state and is moved in a similar way.
ἀλλʼ ὄμως ὁποτέρως ποτʼ ἔχει, οὐδὲν κωλύει τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναί τινα τῷ συνεχῆ εἶναι καὶ ἀΐδιον· δῆλον δʼ ἔσται μᾶλλον ἐκ τῶν ὕστερον.
Nevertheless, whichever way this may be, nothing hinders a certain motion from being the same by being continuous and eternal; but this will be clearer from what follows.
τὸ δὲ κινεῖσθαι μὴ κινούμενον οὐδὲν ἄτοπον, ἂν ὁτὲ μὲν ῇ τὸ κινῆσον ἔξωθεν, ὁτὲ δὲ μή.
But for a thing to be moved when it was not in motion is nothing absurd, if at one time that which moves from without is present, and at another time is not.
τοῦτο μέντοι πῶς ἂν εἴη, ζητητέον, λέγω δὲ ὥστε τὸ αὐτὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ κινητικοῦ ὄντος ὁτὲ μὲν κινεῖσθαι ὁτὲ δὲ μή· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλʼ ἀπορεῖ ὁ τοῦτο λέγων ἢ διὰ τί οὐκ ἀεὶ τὰ μὲν ρεμεῖ τῶν ὄντων τὰ δὲ κινεῖται.
This, however, how it can be, must be investigated — I mean, how the same thing can be moved by the same potential mover at one time and not at another; for the person who says this is raising no other difficulty than why some of existing things are not always at rest and others always in motion.
μάλιστα δʼ ἄν δό. ξειεν τὸ τρίτον ἔχειν ἀπορίαν, ὡς ἐγγιγνομένης οὐκ ἐνούσης πρότερον κινήσεως, τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμψύχων· ἠρεμοῦν γὰρ πρότερον μετὰ ταῦτα βαδίζει, κινήσαντος τῶν ἔξωθεν οὐδενός, ὡς δοκεῖ.
But the third point would seem especially to present a difficulty, namely, what happens in the case of living things, as though motion arises in them when it was not present before; for though at rest before, the animal afterwards walks, with nothing from without having moved it, as it seems.
τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶ ψεῦδος.
But this is false.
ὁρῶμεν γὰρ ἀεί τι κινούμενον ἐν τῷ ζὥῳ τῶν συμφύτων· τούτου δὲ τῆς κινήσεως οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ ζῶον αἶτιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ περιέχον ἴσως.
For we see that some of the connate parts in the animal are always in motion; and of this motion, the animal itself is not the cause, but perhaps the environment.
αὐτὸ δέ φαμεν αὐτὸ κινεῖν οὐ πᾶσαν κίνησιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν κατὰ τόπον, οὐδὲν οὖν κωλύει, μᾶλλον δʼ ἴκως ἀναγκαῖον, ἐν μὲν τῷ σώματι πολλὰς ἐγγίγνεσθαι κινήσεις ὑπὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος, τούτων δʼ ἐνίας τὴν διάνοιαν ἢ τὴν ὄρεξιν κινεῖν, ἐκείνην δὲ τὸ ὅλον ἤδή ζῶον κινεῖν, οἷον συμβαίνει περὶ τοὺς ὕπνους·
And when we say that the animal moves itself, we do not mean every motion, but that which is in respect of place.
αἰσθητικῆς μὲν γὰρ οὐδεμιᾶς ἐνούσης κινήσεως, ἐνούσης μέντοι τινός, ἐγείρεται τὰ ζῷα πάλιν.
Nothing, therefore, prevents — or rather, perhaps, it is necessary — that many motions should arise in the body from the environment, and some of these should move the intellect or the appetite, and this in turn should move the whole animal, as happens in the case of sleep; for though there is no sensory motion present, yet some motion being present, animals wake up again.
ἀλλὰ γὰρ φανερὸν ἔσται καὶ περὶ τούτων ἐκ τῶν ἑπομένων.
But indeed, this also will be clear from what follows.