§8.1#2πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τθ πρότερον
καὶ ὕστερον πῶς ἔσται χρόνου μὴ ὄντος;
In addition to these, how will there be "prior" and "posterior" if time does not exist?
ἢ χρόνος μὴ οὔσης κινήσεως;
Or how can there be time if motion does not exist?
εἰ δή ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος κινήσεως ἀριθμὸς ἢ κίνησίς τις, εἴπερ ἀεὶ χρόνος ἔστιν, ἀνάγκη καὶ κίνησιν ἀΐδιον εἶναι.
If, indeed, time is the number of motion or a certain motion, then since time always exists, it is necessary that motion also is eternal.
ἀλλὰ μὴν περί γε χρόνου ἔξω ἑνὸς ὁμονοητικῶς ἔχοντες φαίνονται πάντες· ἀγένητον γὰρ εἶναι λέγουσιν.
Indeed, concerning time, all except one appear to be of one mind; for they say that it is ungenerated.
καὶ διὰ τούτου Δημόκριτός γε δείκνυσιν ὡς ἀδύνατον ἃπόντα γεγοτ νέναι· τὸν γὰρ χρόνον ἀγένητον εἶναι.
And by this Democritus shows that it is impossible for all things to have come into being; for time is ungenerated.
Πλάτων δὲ γενή μόνος· ἄμα μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν τῷ οὐρανῷ, τὸν δʼ οὐρανὸν γεγονέναι φησίν.
Plato alone makes it generated; for he says that it came into being together with the heaven, and that the heaven has come into being.
εἰ οὖν ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν καὶ εἶναι καὶ νοῆσαι χρόνον ἄνευ τοῦ νῦν, τὸ δὲ νῦν ἐστι μεσότης τις, καὶ ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν ἔχον ἅμα, ἀρχὴν μὲν τοῦ ἐσομένου χρόνου, τελευτὴν δὲ τοῦ παρελθόντος, ἀνάγκη ἀεὶ εἶναι χρόνον.
If, then, it is impossible either to exist or to conceive of time without the "now," and the "now" is a certain limit, having both a beginning and an end simultaneously — a beginning of the future time and an end of the past time — it is necessary that time always exists.
τὸ γὰρ ἔσχατον τοῦ τελευταίου ληφθέντος χρόνου ἔν τινι τῶν νῦν ἔσται (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔστι λαβεῖν ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ παρὰ τὸ νῦν), ὥστʼ ἐπεί ἐστιν ἀρχή τε καὶ τελευτὴ τὸ νῦν, ἀνάγκη αὐτοῦ ἐπʼ ἀμφότερα εἶναι ἀεὶ χρόνον.
For the limit of the last assumed time will be in one of the "nows" (for there is nothing to be taken in time except the "now"), so that, since the "now" is both a beginning and an end, it is necessary that there is always time on both sides of it.
ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ γε χρόνον, φανερὸν ὅτι ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ κίνησιν, εἴπερ ὁ χρόνος πάθος τι κινήσεαως. ὁ δʼ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ τοῦ
ἄφθαρτον εἶναι τὴν κίνησιν· καθάπερ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι κίνησιν· συνέβαινεν προτέραν εἶναί τινα μεταβολὴν τῆς πρώτης, οῦτως ἐνταῦθα ὑστέραν τῆς τελευταίας·
But indeed, if time exists, it is clear that motion must also exist, since time is a certain affection of motion. And the same argument holds also with regard to motion being imperishable; for just as in the case of motion coming into being it turned out that there was some change prior to the first, so here there will be a change posterior to the last.
οὐ γὰρ ἄμα παύεται κινούμενον καὶ κινητὸν ὄν, οἷον καιόμενον καὶ καυστὸν ὄν (ἐνδέχεται γὰρ καυστὸν εἶναι μὴ καιόμενον), οὐδὲ κινητικὸν καὶ κινοῦν.
For a thing does not cease to be in motion and to be movable at the same time, just as a thing does not cease to be burning and to be burnable at the same time (for it is possible to be burnable without being burned), nor does what is capable of moving cease to be so at the same time as it ceases to move.
καὶ τὸ φθαρτικὸν δὴ δεήσει φθαρῆναι ὅταν φθεί,η· καὶ τὸ τούτου φθαρτικὸν πάλιν ὕστερον·
And that which is destructive will also have to be destroyed when it destroys, and again that which is destructive of this latter.
καὶ γὰρ ἡ φθορὰ μεταβολή τίς ἐστιν.
For destruction is also a certain change.
εἰ δὴ ταῦτʼ ἀδύνατα, δῆλον ὡς ἔστιν ἀΐδιος κίνησις, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὁτὲ μὲν ἦν ὁτὲ δʼ οὔ καὶ γὰρ ἔοικε τὸ οὕτω λέγειν πλάσματι μᾶλλον.
If, then, these things are impossible, it is clear that motion is eternal, and not that it exists at one time and not at another; for to say so seems rather like a mere fiction.
ὁμοίως δὲ
καὶ τὸ λέγειν ὅτι πέφυκεν οὕτως καὶ ταύτην δεῖ νομίζειν εἶναι ἀρχήν, ὅπερ ἔοικεν Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἂν εἰπὲν, ὡς τὸ κρατεῖν καὶ κινεῖν ἐν μέρει τὴν φιλίαν καὶ τὸ νεῖκος ὑπάρχει τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐξ ἀνάγκῆς, ἠρεμεῖν δὲ τὸν μεταξὺ χρόνον.
In like manner, it is also the case with saying that it is so by nature and that one must consider this to be a principle — which Empedocles would seem to say, namely, that Love and Strife rule and cause motion alternately in things by necessity, and that they are at rest during the intermediate time.
τάχα δὲ καὶ οἱ μίαν ἀρχὴν ποιμοῦντες, ὥσπερ Ἀναξαγόρας, οὕτως ἂν εἶποιεν.
And perhaps those who make one principle, like Anaxagoras, would also speak in this way.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδέν γε ἄτακτον τῶν φύσει καὶ κατὰ φύσιν· ἡ γὰρ φύσις αἰτία πᾶσιν τάξεαως.
But indeed, nothing that is by nature or according to nature is without order; for nature is the cause of order in all things.
τὸ δʼ ἄπειρον πρὸς τὸ ἄπειρον οὐδένα λόγον ἔχει· τάξις δὲ πᾶσα λόγος.
But the infinite has no ratio to the infinite; and all order is a ratio.
τὸ δʼ ἄπειρον χρόνον ἠρεμεῖν, εἶτα κινηθῆναί ποτε, τούτου δὲ μηδεμίαν εἶναι διαφοράν, ὅτι νῦν μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον, μηδʼ αὖ τινὰ τάξιν ἔχειν, οὐκέτι φύσεως ἔργον.
But for a thing to be at rest for an infinite time, and then to be moved at some time, without there being any difference in this, as to why now rather than before, and without having any order, is no longer the work of nature.
ἢ γὰρ ἀπλῶς ἔχει τὸ φύσει, καὶ οὐχ ὁτὲ μὲν οὕτως ὁτὲ δʼ ἄλλως, οἶον τὸ πῦρ ἄνω φύσει φέρεται καὶ οὐχ ὁτὲ μὲν ὁτὲ δʼ οὔ· ἢ λόγον ἔχει τὸ μὴ ἀπλοῦν.
For that which is by nature is either simple and not at one time in one way and at another time in another way — as fire is naturally carried upwards and not at one time and not at another — or that which is not simple has a ratio.
διόπερ βέλτιον ὡς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, κἂν εἴ τις ἕτερος εἴρηκεν οὕτως ἔχειν, ἐν μέρει τὸ πᾶν ἠρεμεῖν καὶ κινεῖσθαι πάλιν· τάξιν γὰρ ἤδη τινʼ ἔχει τὸ τοιοῦτον.
Therefore, it is better as Empedocles, and anyone else who has said so, says, namely, that the universe is at rest and in motion alternately; for such a state already has some order.
ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο δεῖ τὸν λέγοντα μὴ φάναι μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν αὐτοῦ λέγειν, καὶ μὴ τίθεσθαι μηδὲν μηδʼ ἀξιοῦν ἀξίωμʼ ἄλογον, ἀλλʼ ἢ ἐπαγωγὴν ἢ ἀπόδειξιν φέρειν·
But even this must not be merely asserted by the speaker, but its cause must also be stated, and he must not assume anything nor claim any unreasonable axiom, but must bring either induction or demonstration.
αὐτὰ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ αἴτια τὰ ὑποτεθέντα, οὐδὲ τοῦτʼ ἦν τὸ φιλότητι ἢ νείκει εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν τὸ συνάγειν, τοῦ δὲ τὸ διακρίνειν.
For the assumptions themselves are not causes, nor was this the essence of Love or Strife, but the essence of the former is to bring together, and of the latter to separate.
εἰ δὲ προσοριεῖται τὸ ἐν μέρει, λεκτέον ἐφʼ ὧν οῦτως, ὥσπερ ὅτι ἔστιν τι ὃ συνάγει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἡ φιλία, καὶ φεύγουσιν οἱ ἐχθροὶ ἀλλήλους·
If, then, the alternating character is to be further defined, it must be stated in what cases it is so — as, for instance, that there is something which brings men together, namely, Love, and enemies avoid one another.
τοῦτο γὰρ ὑποτίθεται καὶ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ εἶναι· φαίνεται γὰρ ἐπί τινων οῦτως.
For this is assumed to exist also in the universe as a whole; for it appears to be so in certain cases.
τὸ δὲ καὶ διʼ ἴσων χρόνων δεῖται λόγου τινός.
But that it occurs also in equal intervals of time requires some explanation.
ὅλως δὲ τὸ νομίζειν ἀρχὴν εἶναι ταύτην κονήν, εἴ τι αἰεὶ ἢ ἔστιν οὕτως ἢ γίγνεται, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔχει ὑπολαβεῖν, ἐφʼ ὃ Δημόκριτος ἀνάγει τὰς περὶ φύσεως αἰτίας, ὡς οὕτω καὶ τὸ πρότερον ἐγίγνετο τοῦ δὲ ἀεὶ οὐκ ἀξιμοῖ ἀρχὴν ζητεῖν, λέγων ἐπί τινων ὀρθῶς, ὅτι δʼ ἐπὶ πάν. τῶν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς.
In general, it is not correct to suppose that this is a sufficient principle, namely, that something is or happens always in this way — to which Democritus refers the causes of nature, saying that it also happened in this way before; but of that which is always he does not think it right to seek a cause, speaking correctly in some cases, but of all cases not correctly.
καὶ γὰρ τὸ τρίγωνον ἔχει δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἀεὶ τὰς γωνίας ἴσας, ἀλλʼ ὅμως ἐστίν τι τῆς ἀίδιότητος ταύτης ἕτερον αἴτιον· τῶν μέντοι ἀρχῶν οὐκ ἔστιν ἕτερον αἴτιον ἀϊ δίων οὐσῶν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐδεὶς ἢν χρόνος οὐδʼ ἔσται ὅτε κίνησις
οὐκ ἢν ἢ οὐκ ἔσται, εἰρήσθω τοσαῦτα.
For even the triangle always has its angles equal to two right angles, yet there is nevertheless some other cause of this eternity; of principles, however, there is no other cause if they are eternal. That, therefore, there never was a time, nor will there be, when motion did not or will not exist, let so much be said.