§8.1#1Πότερον γέγονέ ποτε κίνησις οὐκ οὗσα πρότερον, καὶ φθείρεται πάλιν οὕτως ὥστεκινεῖσθαι μηδέν, ἢ οὔτʼ ἐγένετο οὔτε φθείρεται, ἀλλʼ ἀεὶ ἦν καὶ ἀεὶ ἔσται, καὶ τοῦτʼ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἄπαυστον ὑπάρχει τοῖς οὖσιν, οἷον ζωή τις οὖσα τοῖς φύσει συνεστῶσι πᾶσιν;
Whether did motion once come into being, not having existed before, and is it destroyed again in such a way that nothing moves, or did it neither come into being nor is it destroyed, but always was and always will be, and this belongs to existing things as something deathless and unceasing, being like a kind of life to all things constituted by nature?
εἶναι μὲν οὖν κίνησιν πάντες φασὶν οἱ περὶ φύσεως τι λέγοντες διὰ τὸ κοσμοποιεῖν καὶ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς εἶναι τὴν θεωρίαν πᾶσαν αὐτοῖς, ἣν ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν μὴ κινήσεως οὕσης·
Now, all those who say anything about nature assert that motion exists, because they construct worlds and their entire contemplation is about generation and destruction, which cannot exist if there is no motion.
ἀλλʼ ὅσοι μὲν ἀπείρους τε κόσμους εἶναί φασιν, καὶ τοὺς μὲν γίγνεσθαι τοὺς δὲ φθείρεσθαι τῶν κόσμων, ἀεί φασιν εἶναι κίνησιν (ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ τὰς γενέσεις καὶ τὰς φθορὰς εἶναι μετὰ κινήσεως αὐτῶν)· ὅσοι δʼ ἔνα ἢ ἀεὶ ἢ μὴ ἀεί. καὶ περὶ τῆς κινήσεως ὑποτίθενται κατὰ λόγον.
But those who say that there are infinite worlds, and that some of these worlds are coming into being and others are being destroyed, say that motion is eternal (for it is necessary that their generations and destructions are accompanied by motion); whereas those who say there is one world, whether eternal or not eternal, make their assumptions about motion accordingly.
εἰ δὴ ἐνδέχεταί ποτε μηδὲν κινεῖσθαι, διχῶς ἀνάγκη τοῦτο συμβαίνειν· ἢ γὰρ ὡς Ἀναξαγόρας λέγει (φησὶν γὰρ ἐκεῖνος, ὁμοῦ πάντων ὄντων καὶ ἠρεμούντων τὸν ἄπειρον χρόνον, κίνησιν ἐμποιῆσαι τὸν νοῦν καὶ διακρῖναι), ἢ ὡς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἐν μέρει κινεῖσθαι καὶ πάλιν ἠρεμεῖν, κινεῖσθαι μὲν ὅταν ἢ φιλία ἐκ πολλῶν ποιῇ τὸ ἓν ἢ τὸ νεῖκος πολλὰ ἐξ ἑνός, ἠρεμεῖν δʼ ἐν τοῖς μεταξὺ χρόνοις, λέγων
οὕτως ᾗ μὲν ἔν ἐκ πλεόνων μεμάθηκε φύεσθαι,
δὲ πάλιν διαφύντος ἑνὸς πλέονʼ ἐκτελέθουσιν,
τῇ μὲν γίγνονταί τε καὶ οὕ σφισιν ἔμπεδος αἰών· ἧ δὲ τάδʼ ἀλλάσσοντα διαμπερὲς οὐδαμὰ λήγει,
ταύτη δʼ αἰὲν ἔασιν ἀκίνητοι κατὰ κύκλον. τὸ γὰρ “ᾗ δὲ τάδʼ ἀλλάσσοντα'' ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε λέγειν αὐτὸν ὑποληπτέον.
If, then, it is possible that at some time nothing is in motion, this must happen in one of two ways: either as Anaxagoras says (for he says that, all things being together and at rest for an infinite time, Intellect produced motion and separated them), or as Empedocles says, that they move in turn and rest again — moving when Love makes the one out of many or Strife makes many out of one, and resting in the intermediate times, saying as follows: "In so far as one has learned to grow out of many, and again, as the one is divided, more are brought to completion, in this respect they come into being and their life is not lasting; but in so far as these things never cease changing continuously, in this respect they are always unmoved throughout the cycle." For we must suppose that by "but in so far as these things change" he means from here to there.
σκεπτέον δὴ περὶ τούτων πῶς ἔχει· πρὸ ἔργου γὰρ οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὴν περὶ φύσεως θεωρίαν ἰδεῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὴν μέθοδον τὴν περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς πρώτης.
We must, then, consider how these matters stand; for to see the truth is useful not only for the study of nature, but also for the inquiry concerning the first principle.
ἀρξώμεθα δὲ πρῶτον ἐκ τῶν διωρισμένων μῖν ἐν
τοῖς φυσικοῖς πρότερον.
Let us begin first from what was defined by us in the Physics before.
φαμὲν δὴ τὴν κίνησιν εἶναι ἐνέργειαν τοῦ κινητοῦ ῇ κινητόν.
We say, then, that motion is the actuality of the movable as movable.
ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα ὑπάρχειν τὰ πράγματα τὰ δυνάμενα κινεῖσθαι καθʼ ἑκάστην κίνησιν.
It is necessary, therefore, that there exist things capable of being moved according to each kind of motion.
καὶ χωρὶς δὲ τοῦ τῆς κινήσεως ὁρισμοῦ, πᾶς ἂν ὁμολογήσειεν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι κινεῖσθαι τὸ δυνατὸν κινεῖσθαι καθʼ ἑκάστην κίνησιν, οἶον ἀλλοιοῦσθαι μὲν τὸ ἀλλοιωτόν, φέρεσθαι δὲ τὸ κατὰ τόπον μεταβλητόν, ὥστε δεῖ πρότερον καυστὸν εἶναι πρὶν κάεσθαι καὶ καυστικὸν πρὶν κάειν.
And even apart from the definition of motion, everyone would agree that it is necessary that what is capable of being moved in each motion is moved — for example, that what is alterable is altered, and what is changeable in respect of place is carried — so that there must be that which is burnable before being burned, and that which is capable of burning before burning.
οὐκοῦν καὶ ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖον ἢ γενέσθαι ποτὲ οὐκ ὄντα ἢ ἀΐδια εἶναι.
Consequently, these also must either have come into being at some time, not having existed before, or be eternal.
εἰ μὲν τοίνυν ἐγένετο τῶν κινητῶν ἕκαστον, ἀναγκαῖον πρότερον τῆς ληφθείσης ἄλλην γενέσθαι μεταβολὴν καὶ κίνησιν, καθʼ ἣν ἐγένετο τὸ δυνατὸν κινηθῆναι ἢ κινῆσαι·
If, then, each of the movable things came into being, it is necessary that prior to the assumed change another change and motion took place, by which that which is capable of being moved or of moving came into being.
εἰ δʼ ὄντα προῦπῆρχεν ἀεὶ κινήσεως μὴ οὕσης, ἄλογον μὲν φαίνεται καὶ αὐτόθεν ἐπιστήσασιν, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἔτι προάγουσι τοῦτο συμβαίνειν ἀναγκαῖον.
But if they pre-existed eternally as existing things, while there was no motion, this appears unreasonable even at first glance to those who reflect on it; and moreover, to those who proceed further, it is necessary that this should happen.
εἰ γὰρ τῶν μὲν κινητῶν ὄντων τῶν δὲ κινητικῶν ὁτὲ μὲν ἔσται τι πρῶτον κινοῦν, τὸ δὲ κινούμενον, ὁτὲ δʼ οὐθέν, ἀλλʼ ήρεμεῖ, ἀναγκαῖον τοῦτο μεταβάλλειν πρότερον· ἦν γάρ τι αἴτιον τῆς ἠρεμίας· ἡ γὰρ ἠρέμησις στέρησις κινήσεως.
For if, while there are movable things on the one hand and motive things on the other, at one time there will be a first mover and a thing moved, and at another time there is nothing but they are at rest, this must have changed previously; for there was some cause of the rest (since rest is the privation of motion).
ὥστε πρὸ τῆς πρώτης μεταβολῆς ἔσται μεταβολὴ προτέρα.
Consequently, before the first change there will be a prior change.
τὰ μὲν γὰρ κινεῖ μοναχῶς, τὰ δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐναντίας κινήσεις, οἷον τὸ μὲν πῦρ θερμαίνει, ψύχει δʼ οὔ, ἡ δʼ ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι μία.
For some things move in one way only, while others can also cause the contrary motions — for example, fire warms but does not cool, whereas knowledge is thought to be one and the same for contraries.
φαίνεται μὲν οὖν κἀκεῖ τι εἶναι ὁμοιότροπον· τὸ γὰρ ψυχρὸν θερμαίνει στραφέν πως καὶ ἀπελθόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἁμαρτάνει ἑκών ὁ ἐπιστήμων, ὅταν ἀνάπαλιν· χρήσηται τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ.
Now, even in the former case there seems to be something of a similar character; for the cold warms by being turned in some way and departing, just as the man of knowledge errs voluntarily when he uses his knowledge in the reverse way.
ἀλλʼ οὖν ὅσα γε δυνατὰ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἢ κινεῖν, τὰ δὲ κινεῖσθαι, οὐ πάντως δυνατά ἐστιν, ἀλλʼ ὡδὶ ἔχοντα καὶ πλησιάζοντα ἀλλήλοις.
But at any rate, whatever things are capable of acting and being acted upon, or of moving and others of being moved, are not capable of this in every condition, but only when they are in a certain state and approach one another.
ὥσθʼ ὅταν πλησιάσῃ, κινεῖ, τὸ δὲ κινεῖται, καὶ ὅταν ὑπάρξῃ ὡς ἦν τὸ μὲν κινητικὸν τὸ δὲ κινητόν.
Therefore, when they approach, the one moves and the other is moved, and when they are in such a relation as the one being motive and the other movable.
εἰ τοίνυν μὴ ἀεὶ ἐκινεῖτο, δῆλον ὡς οὐχ οῦτως εἶχον ὡς ἦν δυνάμενα τὸ μὲν κινεῖσθαι τὸ δὲ κινεῖν, ἀλλʼ ἔδει μεταβάλλειν θάτερον αὐτῶν· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρός τι τοῦτο συμβαίνειν, οἷον εἰ μὴ ὂν διπλάσιον νῦν διπλάσιον, μεταβάλλειν, εἰ μὴ ἀμφότερα, θάτερον.
If, then, they were not always in motion, it is clear that they were not in such a state as to be capable, the one of being moved and the other of moving, but one of them had to change; for in the case of relative terms this must happen — for example, if what was not double is now double, one of them, if not both, must have changed.
ἔσται ἄρα τις προτέρα μεταβολὴ τῆς πρώτης.
There will, therefore, be some change prior to the first.