§7.3#1Ὅτι δὲ τὸ ἀλλοιούμενον ἅπαν ἀλλοιοῦται ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, καὶ ἐν μόνοις ὑπάρχει τούτοις ἀλλοίωσις ὅσα καθʼ αὑτὰ λέγεται πάσχειν ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἐκ τῶνδε θεωρητέον.
That everything which is altered is altered by sensible things, and that alteration exists only in those things which are said to be affected in themselves by sensible things, must be observed from the following.
τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων μάλιστʼ ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι ἔν τε τοῖς σχήμασι καὶ ταῖς μορφαῖς καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἕξεσι καὶ ταῖς τούτων λήψεσι καὶ ἀποβολαῖς ἀλλοίωσιν ὑπάρχειν· ἐν οὐδετέροις δʼ ἔστιν.
For among other things, one might especially suppose that alteration exists in shapes and forms, and in states and their acquisitions and losses; but it is in neither of them.
τὸ μὲν γὰρ σχηματιζόμενον καὶ ῥυθμιζόμενον ὅταν ἐπιτελεσθῇ, οὐ λέγομεν ἐκεῖνο ἐξ οὗ ἐστιν, οἷον τὸν ἀνδριάντα χαλκὸν ἢ τὴν πυραμίδα κηρὸν ἢ τὴν κλίνην ξύλον, ἀλλὰ παρωνυμιμμάζοντες τὸ μὲν χαλκοῦν, τὸ δὲ κήρινον, τὸ δὲ ξύλινον.
For when that which is being shaped and structured is completed, we do not call it by the name of that out of which it is made—for example, we do not call the statue bronze or the pyramid wax or the bed wood—but derivatively we call the one brazen, the other waxen, and the other wooden.
τὸ δὲ πεπονθὸς καὶ ἠλλοιωμένον προσαγορεύομεν· ὑγρὸν γὰρ καὶ θερμὸν καὶ σκληρὸν τὸν χαλκὸν λέγομεν καὶ τὸν κηρόν (καὶ οὐ μόνον οὕτως, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ὑγρὸν καὶ τὸ θερμὸν χαλκὸν λέγομεν), ὁμωνύμως τῷ πάθει προσαγορεύοντες τὴν ὕλην.
But that which has been affected and altered we do call by the name of the affection; for we call the bronze and the wax liquid and hot and hard (and not only so, but we also call the liquid and the hot bronze), addressing the matter homonymously with the affection.
ὥστʼ εἰ κατὰ μὲν τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὴν μορφὴν οὐ λέγεται τὸ γεγονὸς ἐν ᾧ ἐστι τὸ σχῆμα, κατὰ δὲ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς ἀλλοιώσεις λέγεται, φανερὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἶεν αἱ γενέσεις ἀλλοιώσεις.
So that if, in respect of the shape and the form, the generated thing is not called by the name of that in which the shape is, whereas in respect of the affections and the alterations it is so called, it is clear that generations would not be alterations.
ἔτι δὲ καὶ εἰπεῖν οὕτως ἄτοπον ἂν δόξειεν, ἠλλοιῶσθαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἢ τὴν οἰκίαν ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τῶν γεγενημένων· ἀλλὰ γίγνεσθαι μὲν ἴσως ἕκαστον ἀναγκαῖον ἀλλοιουμένου τινός, οἶον τῆς ὕλης πυκνουμένης ἢ μανουμένης ἢ θερμαινομένης ἢ ψυχομένης, οὐ μέντοι τὰ γιγνόμενά γε ἀλλοιοῦται, οὐδʼ ἡ γένεσις αὐτῶν ἀλλοίωσίς ἐστιν.
Moreover, to speak in this way would seem absurd, namely, that a man or a house or any other of generated things has been altered; rather, though it is perhaps necessary that each thing is generated while something is altered—for example, the matter being condensed or rarefied or heated or cooled—nevertheless the generated things themselves are not altered, nor is their generation an alteration.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδʼ αἱ ἕξεις οὔθʼ αἱ τοῦ σώματος οὔθʼ αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀλλοιώσεις.
But indeed, neither are states, whether of the body or of the soul, alterations.
αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρεταὶ αἱ δὲ κακίαι τῶν ἕξεων· οὐκ ἔστι δὲ οὔτε ἡ ἀρετὴ οὔτε ἡ κακία ἀλλοίωσις, ἀλλʼ ἡ μὲν ἀρετὴ τελείωσίς τις (ὅταν γὰρ λάβη) τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀρετήν, τότε λέγεται τέλειον ἕκαστον—τότε γὰρ ἔστι μάλιστα κατὰ φύσιν—ὥσπερ κύκλος τέλειος, ὅταν μάλιστα γένηται κύκλος καὶ ὅταν βέλτιστος, ἡ δὲ κακία φθορὰ τούτου καὶ ἔκστασις·
For some are virtues and others are vices among states; and neither virtue nor vice is an alteration, but virtue is a certain perfection (for when a thing has acquired its own virtue, then each thing is said to be perfect—for then it is especially according to nature—just as a circle is perfect when it has especially become a circle and when it is best), while vice is a destruction of this and a departure from it.
ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδὲ τὸ τῆς οἰκίας τελείαωμα λέγομεν ἀλλοίωσιν (ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ ὁ θριγκὸς καὶ ὁ κέραμος ἀλλοίωσις, ἢ εἰ θριγκουμένη καὶ κεραμουμένη ἀλλοιοῦται ἀλλὰ μὴ τελειοῦται ἡ οἰκία), τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν καὶ τῶν κακιῶν καὶ τῶν ἐχόντων ἢ λαμβανόντων· αἱ μὲν γὰρ τελειώσεις αἱ δὲ ἐκστάσεις εἰσίν, ὥστʼ οὐκ ἀλλοιώσεις. ἔτι δὲ καί φαμεν ἁπάσας εἶναι τὰς ἀρετὰς ἐν τῷ
πρός τι πῶς ἔχειν.
Just as, therefore, we do not call the completion of a house an alteration (for it would be absurd if the coping and the tiling were an alteration, or if in being coped and tiled the house were altered and not completed), in the same way also in the case of virtues and vices, and of those who possess or acquire them; for the ones are perfections and the others are departures, so that they are not alterations. Furthermore, we also say that all the virtues consist in being in a certain relation to something.
τὰς μὲν γὰρ τοῦ σώματος, οἷον ὑγίειαν καὶ εὐεξίαν, ἐν κράσει καὶ συμμετρίᾳ θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν τίθεμεν, ἢ αὐτῶν πρὸς αὐτὰ τῶν ἐντὸς ἢ πρὸς τὸ περιυέχον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ κάλλος καὶ τὴν ἰσχὺν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς καὶ κακίας.
For we place those of the body, such as health and fitness, in a mixture and symmetry of hot and cold, either of the internal elements in relation to themselves or in relation to what surrounds them; and similarly beauty and strength, and the other virtues and vices.
ἑκάστη γάρ ἐστι τῷ πρός τι πὼς ἔχειν, καὶ περὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα πάθη εὖ ἢ κακῶς διατίθησι τὸ ἔχον· οἰκεῖα δʼ ὑφ’ ὧν γίγνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι πέφυκεν.
For each consists in being in a certain relation to something, and disposes that which possesses it well or badly in respect of its proper affections; and the proper affections are those by which it is naturally produced and destroyed.
ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ πρός τι οὔτε αὐτά ἐστιν ἀλλοιώσεις, οὔτε ἔστιν αὐτῶν ἀλλοίωσις οὐδὲ γένεσις οὐδʼ ὅλως μεταβολὴ οὐδεμία, φανερὸν ὅτι οὔθʼ αἱ ἔξεις οὔθʼ αἱ τῶν ἕξεων ἀποβολαὶ καὶ λήψεις ἀλλοιώσεις εἰσίν, ἀλλὰ γίγνεσθαι μὲν ἴσως αὐτὰς καὶ φθείρεσθαι ἀλλοιουμένων τινῶν ἀνάγκη, καθάπερ καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὴν μορφήν, οἷον θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν ἢ ξηρῶν καὶ ὑγρῶν, ἢ ἐν οἷς τυγχάνουσιν οὗσαι πρώτοις.
Since, therefore, relations are neither themselves alterations, nor is there alteration of them, nor generation, nor any change at all, it is clear that neither states nor the losses and acquisitions of states are alterations, though it is perhaps necessary that they are generated and destroyed while certain things are altered—just as also the form and the shape—for example, hot and cold things, or dry and wet things, or those primary things in which they happen to exist.
περὶ ταῦτα γὰρ ἑκάστη λέγεται κακία καὶ ἀρετή, ὑφʼ ὧν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι πέφυκεν τὸ ἔχον· ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ ποιεῖ ἢ ἀπαθὲς ἢ ὡδὶ παθητικόν, ἡ δὲ κακία παθητικὸν ἢ ἐναντίως ἀπαθές.
For each vice and virtue is spoken of in relation to those things by which that which possesses them is naturally altered; for virtue makes it either unaffected or affected in a certain way, while vice makes it affected or unaffected in the opposite way.