§7.3#2ὁμοίαως
δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἕξεων· ἄπασαι γὰρ καὶ αὗται τῷ πρός τι πὼς ἔχειν, καὶ αἱ μὲν ἀρεταὶ τελειώσεις, αἱ δὲ κακίαι ἐκστάσεις.
Similarly also in the case of the states of the soul; for these also consist entirely in being in a certain relation to something, and the virtues are perfections, while the vices are departures.
ἔτι δὲ ἡ μὲν ἀρετὴ εὖ διατίθησι πρὸς τὰ οἰκεῖα πάθη, ἡ δὲ κακῖα κακῶς.
Moreover, virtue disposes a thing well in respect of its proper affections, and vice badly.
ὥστʼ οὐδʼ αὔται ἔσονται ἀλλοιώσεις· οὐδὲ δὴ αἱ ἀποβολαὶ καὶ αἱ λήψεις αὐτῶν.
So that neither will these be alterations; nor indeed are the losses and acquisitions of them.
γίγνεσθαι δʼ αὐτὰς ἀναγκαῖον ἀλλοιουμένου τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ μέρους.
But it is necessary that they are generated while the sensitive part is altered.
ἀλλοιωθήσεται δʼ ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν· ἅποσα γὰρ ἡ θικὴ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας τὰς σωματικάς, αὗται δὲ ἢ ἐν τῷ πράττειν ἢ ἐν τῷ μεμνῆσθαι ἢ ἐν τῷ ἐλπίζειν.
And it will be altered by sensible things; for all moral virtue is concerned with bodily pleasures and pains, and these exist either in acting, or in remembering, or in hoping.
αἱ μὲν οὖν ἐν τῇ πράξει κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησίν εἰσιν, ὥσθʼ ὑπʼ αἰσθητοῦ τινὸς κινεῖσθαι, αἱ δʼ ἐν τῇ μνήμῃ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐλπίδι ἀπὸ ταύτης εἰσίν· ἢ γὰρ οἷα ἔπαθον μεμνημένοι ήδονται, ἢ ἐλπίζοντες οἷα μέλλουσιν.
Those in action, therefore, are in accordance with sensation, so as to be moved by some sensible thing, while those in memory and in hope are from this; for they are pleased either remembering what sort of things they suffered, or hoping what sort of things they are going to suffer.
ὥστʼ ἀνάγκη πᾶσαν τὴν τοιαύτην ἡδονὴν ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν γίγνεσθαι.
So that it is necessary that all such pleasure is produced by sensible things.
ἐπεὶ δʼ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἐγγιγνομένης καὶ ἡ κακία καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐγγίγνεται (περὶ ταύτας γάρ εἰσιν), αἱ δʼ ἡδοναὶ καὶ αἱ λῦπαι ἀλλοιώσεις τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ, φανερὸν ὅτι ἀλλοιουμένου τιννὸς ἀνάγκη καὶ ταύτας ἀποβάλλειν καὶ λαμβάνειν.
And since, when pleasure and pain are produced, vice and virtue are also produced (for they are concerned with these), and pleasures and pains are alterations of the sensitive part, it is clear that it is necessary that they lose and acquire these also while something is altered.
ὥσθʼ ἡ μὲν γένεσις αὐτῶν μετʼ ἀλλοιώσεως, αὐταὶ δʼ οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀλλοιώσεις.
So that their generation is with alteration, but they themselves are not alterations.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδʼ αἱ τοῦ νοητικοῦ μέρους ἔξεις ἀλλοιώσεις, οὐδʼ ἔστιν αὐτῶν γένεσις.
But indeed, neither are the states of the intellectual part alterations, nor is there generation of them.
πολὺ γὰρ μάλιστα τὸ ἐπιστῆμον ἐν τῷ πρός τι πῶς ἔχειν λέγομεν.
For we speak of that which has knowledge especially in respect of being in a certain relation to something.
ἔτι δὲ καὶ φανερὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῶν γένεσις· τὸ γὰρ κατὰ δύναμιν ἐπιστῆμον οὐδὲν αὐτὸ κινηθὲν ἀλλὰ τῷ ἄλλο ὑπάρξαι γίγνεται ἐπιστῆμον.
Moreover, it is also clear that there is no generation of them; for that which has knowledge potentially becomes knowing not by being itself moved at all, but by the presence of something else.
ὅταν γὰρ γένηται τὸ κατὰ μέρος, ἐπίσταταί πως τὰ καθόλου τῷ ἐν μέρει.
For when the particular comes to be, one knows in a way the universal by the particular.
πάλιν δὲ τῆς χρήσεως καὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας οὐκ ἔστι γένεσις, εἰ μή τις καὶ τῆς ἀναβλέψεως καὶ τῆς ἁρῆς οἴεται γένεσιν εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ χρῆσθαι καὶτὸ ἐνεργεῖν ὄμοιον τούτοις.
And again, of the use and the activity there is no generation, unless one thinks there is also a generation of looking and of touching; for using and acting are similar to these.
ἡ δʼ ἐξἀρχῆς λῆψις τῆς ἐπιστήμης γένεσις οὐκἔστινοὐδʼ ἀλλοίωσις· τῷγὰρ ήρεμῆσαι καὶ στῆναι τὴν διάνοιαν ίπίστασθαι καὶ φρονεῖν λεγόμεθα, εἰς δὲ τὸ ἠρεμεῖν οὐκ ἔστι γένεσις· ὅλως γὰρ οὐδεμιᾶς μεταβολῆς, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον.
And the initial acquisition of knowledge is not a generation or an alteration; for we are said to know and to understand by the intellect resting and coming to a stand, and there is no generation into resting; for in general there is no generation of any change, as was said before.
ἔτιδʼ ὥσπερ ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ μεθύειν ἢ καθεύδειν ἢ νοσεῖν εἰς τἀναντία μεταστῇ τις, οὔ φαμεν ἐπιστήμονα γεγονέναι πάλιν (καίτοι ἀδύνατος ἦν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ χρῆσθαι πρότερον), οῦτως οὐδʼ ὅταν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λαμβάνῃ τὴν ἔξιν· τῷ γὰρ καθίστασθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῆς φυσικῆς ταραχῆς φρόνιμόν τι γίγνεται καὶ ἐπιστῆμον.
Moreover, just as when someone changes to the opposite states from being drunk, sleeping, or sick, we do not say that he has become knowing again (even though he was previously unable to use his knowledge), so also when he acquires the state from the beginning; for it is by the soul settling down from its natural confusion that it becomes prudent and knowing.
διὸ καὶ τὰ παιδία οὔτε μανθάνειν δύνανται οὔτε κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ὁμοίως κρίνειν τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις· πολλὴ γὰρ ἡ ταραχὴ καὶ ἡ κίνησις.
Therefore children are neither able to learn nor to judge according to their sensations in the same way as their elders; for there is much confusion and motion.
καθίσταται δὲ καὶ ἠρεμίζεται πρὸς ἔνια μὲν ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως αὐτῆς, πρὸς ἔνια δʼ ὑπʼ ἄλλων, ἐν ἀμφοτέροις δὲ ἀλλοιουμένων τινῶν τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῆς χρήσεως καὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας, ὅταν νήφων γένηται καὶ ἐγερθῇ.
And it settles down and is quieted in some respects by nature itself, and in others by other things, but in both cases while certain things in the body are altered, just as in the case of use and activity, when one becomes sober and is awakened.
φανερὸν οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι τὸ ἀλλοίοῦσθαι καὶ ἡ ἀλλοίωσις ἔν τε τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς γίγνεται καὶ ἐν τῷ αἰσθητικῷ μορίῳ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐν ἄλλῳ δʼ οὐδενὶ πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός.
It is clear, therefore, from what has been said, that being altered and alteration occur both in sensible things and in the sensitive part of the soul, but in nothing else except accidentally.