§5.2#1Κατʼ οὐσίαν δʼ οὐκ ἔστιν κίνησις διὰ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι οὐσίᾳ τῶν ὄντων ἐναντίον.
There is no motion in respect of substance, because there is nothing contrary to substance among existing things.
οὐδὲ δὴ τοῦ πρός τι· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ θατέρου μεταβάλλοντος〈ἀληθεύεσθαι καὶ μὴ〉ἀληθεύεσθαι θάτερον μηδὲν μεταβάλλον, ὥστε κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἡ κίνησις αὐτῶν.
Nor indeed is there motion in respect of relation; for it is possible that, while one of the relatives changes, the other does not change at all, and yet [the relation of] the other can be truly asserted or not, so that their motion is accidental.
οὐδὲ δὴ ποιοῦντος καὶ πάσχ οντος, ἢ κινουμένου καὶ κινοῦντος, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι κινήσεως κίνησις οὐδὲ γένεσεαως γένεσις, οὐδʼ ὅλως μεταβολῆς μεταβολή.
Nor indeed is there motion of acting and being acted upon, or of that which is moved and that which moves, because there is no motion of motion, nor coming to be of coming to be, nor generally change of change.
πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ διχῶς ἐνδέχεται κινήσεως εἶναι κίνησιν, ἢ ὡς ὑποκειμένου (οἷον ἅνθρωπος κινεῖται ὅτι ἐκ λευκοῦ εἰς μέλαν μεταβάλλει· ἆρά γε οὕτω καὶ ἡ κίνησις ἢ θερμαίνεται ἢ ψύχεται ἢ τόπον ἀλλάττει ἢ αὐξάνεται ἢ φθίνει;
For, in the first place, it is possible for there to be a motion of motion in two ways: either in the sense of motion being a subject (for instance, a human is moved because he changes from white to black; is it then in this way that motion itself is also heated, or cooled, or changes its place, or increases, or decreases?
τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον· οὐ γὰρ τῶν ὑποκειμένων τι ἡ μεταβολή), ἢ τῷ ἕτερόν τι ὑποκείμενον ἐκ μεταβολῆς μεταβάλλειν εἰς ἕτερον εἶδος ἄνθρωπος ἐκ νόσου εἰς ὑγίειαν.
But this is impossible, for change is not one of the subjects), or by some other subject changing from one change into another form (for instance, a human from sickness to health).
ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ τοῦτο δυνατὸν πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός· αὐτὴ γὰρ ἡ κίνησις ἐξ ἄλλου εἴδους εἰς ἄλλο ἐστὶ μεταβολή οἷον ἀνθρώπου ἐκ νόσου εἰς ὑγίειαν· καὶ ἡ γένεσις δὲ καὶ ἡ φθορὰ ὡσαύτως, πλὴν αἱ μὲν εἰς ἀντικείμενα ὡδί, ἡ δὲ ὡδί, ἡ κίνησις.
But neither is this possible except accidentally; for motion itself is a change from one form to another, as is the change of a human from sickness to health; and coming to be and passing away likewise, except that the former are changes into opposites in this way, while the latter, motion, is in that way.
ἅμα οὖν μεταβάλλει ἐξ ὑγιείας εἰς νόσον καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς ταύτης τῆς μεταβολῆς εἰς ἄλλην.
At the same time, then, the subject changes from health to sickness and from this very change to another.
δῆλον δὴ ὅτι ὅταν νοσήσῃ, μεταβεβληκὸς ἔσται εἰς ὁποιανοῦν(ὲνδέχεται γὰρ ἠρεμεῖν), καὶ ἔτι εἰς μὴ τὴν τυχοῦσαν αἰεί, κἀκείνη ἔκ τινος εἴς τι ἕτερον ἔσται, ὥστεκαὶἡ ἀντι. κειμένη ἔσται ὑγίανσις·
It is clear, then, that when it has fallen sick, it will have changed into some change or other (for it is possible to be at rest), and furthermore, not always into a chance change, and that change too will be from something to something else, so that the opposite change, namely becoming healthy, will also exist.
ἀλλὰ τῷ συμβεβηκέναι, οἶον ἐξ ἀναμνήσεως εἰς λήθην μεταβάλλει, ὅτι ᾧ ὑπάρχει, ἐκεῖνο μεταβάλλει ὁτὲ μὲν εἰς ἐπιστήμην ὁτὲ δʼ εἰς ἄγνοιαν.
But this is by accident; just as one changes from recollection to forgetfulness because that to which these belong changes, now into knowledge, now into ignorance.
εἰς ἄπειρον βαδιεῖται, εἰ ἔσται μεταβολῆς μεταβολὴ καὶ
γενέσεως γένεσις.
And if there is to be a change of change and a coming to be of coming to be, it will proceed to infinity.
ἀνάγκη δὴ καὶ τὴν προτέραν, εἰ ἡ ὑστέρα ἔσται, οἷον εἰ ἡ ἁπλῆ γένεσις ἐγίγνετό ποτε, καὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον ἐγίγνετο, ὥστε οὔπω ἦν τὸ γιγνόμενον ἀπλῶς, ἀλλά τι γιγνόμενον γιγνόμενον ἤδη, καὶ πάλιν τοῦτʼ ἐγίγνετό ποτε, ὥστʼ οὐκ ἦν πω τότε γιγνόμενον γιγνόμενον, ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν ἀπείρων οὐκ ἔστιν τι πρῶτον, οὐκ ἔσται τὸ πρῶτον, ὥστʼ οὐδὲ τὸ ἐχόμενον·
It is necessary, then, that the prior also exists if the posterior is to be; for instance, if simple coming to be was once coming to be, that which is coming to be was also coming to be, so that what was coming to be simply was not yet, but was already something which is coming to be coming to be, and this again was once coming to be, so that even what is coming to be coming to be was not yet then.
οὔτε γίγνεσθαι οὖν οὔτε κινεῖσθαι οἷόν τε οὔεμετ αβάλλειν οὐδέν, ἔτι τοῦ αὐτοῦ κίνησις ἡ ἐναντίαί(καὶ ἔτι ἠρέμησις), καὶ γένεσις καὶ φθορά, ὥστε τὸ γιγνόμενον γιγνόμενον ὅταν γένηται γιγνόμενον, τότε φθείρεται· οὔτε γὰρ εὐθὺς γιγνόμενον οὔθʼ ὕστερον· εἶναι γὰρ δεῖ τὸ φθειρόμενον.
And since there is no first among infinite things, there will be no first, so that neither will there be the next; therefore, it is impossible for anything either to come to be, or to be moved, or to change. Moreover, to the same thing belongs the contrary motion (and also rest), and coming to be and passing away, so that the coming to be coming to be, when it becomes coming to be, is then passing away; for it is not passing away immediately when it is coming to be, nor afterwards; for that which passes away must exist.
ἔτι ὕλην δεῖ ὑπεῖναι καὶ τῷ γιγνομένν καὶ τῷ μεταβάλλοντι.
Moreover, there must be a matter underlying both that which comes to be and that which changes.
τίς οὖν ἔσται—ὥσπερ τὸ ἀλλοιωτὸν σῶμα ἢ ψυχή, οὕτω τί τὸ γιγνόμενον κίνησις ἢ γένεσις;
What, then, will this be? Just as that which is altered is body or soul, so what is that which becomes motion or coming to be?
καὶ πάλιν τί εἰς ὃ κινοῦνται;
And again, what is that into which they are moved?
δεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τὴν τοῦδε ἐκ τοῦδε εἰς τόδε κίνησιν ἢ γένεσιν.
For there must be a motion or coming to be of this from this to this.