§5.1#2ἐπεὶ δὲ
πᾶσα μεταβολή ἐστιν ἔκ τινος εἶς τι (δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ τοὔνομα· μετʼ ἄλλο γάρ τι καὶ τὸ μὲν πρότερον δηλοῖ, τὸ δʼ ὕστερον), μεταβάλλοι ἂν τὸ μεταβάλλον τετραχῶς·
And since every change is from something to something (as the name also indicates; for it signifies "after something else," and the one shows the prior, the other the posterior), that which changes would change in four ways: either from a subject to a subject, or from a subject to a non-subject, or from a non-subject to a subject, or from a non-subject to a non-subject.
ἢ γὰρ ἐξ ὑποκειμένου εἰς ὑποκείμενον, ἢ ἐξ ὑποκειμένου εἰς μὴ ὑποκείμενον, ἢ οὐκ ἐξ ὑποκειμένου εἰς ὑποκείμενον, ἢ οὐκ ἐξ ὑποκειμένου εἰς μὴ ὑποκείμενον· λέγω δὲ ὑποκείμενον τὸ κα· ταφάσει δηλούμενον.
And by "subject" I mean that which is shown by affirmation.
ὥστε ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων τρεῖς εἶναι μεταβολάς, τήν τε ἐξ ὑποκειμένου εἰς ὑποκείμενον, καὶ τὴν ἐξ ὑποκειμένου εἰς μὴ ὑποκείμενον, καὶ τὴν ἐκ μὴ ὑποκειμένου εἰς ὑποκείμενον.
Consequently, it is necessary from what has been said that there are three changes: that from a subject to a subject, that from a subject to a non-subject, and that from a non-subject to a subject.
ἡ γὰρ οὐκ ἐξ ὑποκειμένου εἰς μὴ ὑποκείμενον οὐκ ἔστιν μεταβολὴ διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι κατʼ ἀντίθεσιν· οὔτε γὰρ ἐναντία οὔτε ἀντίφασίς ἐστιν.
For that from a non-subject to a non-subject is not a change because it is not in respect of opposition; for they are neither contraries nor a contradiction.
ἡ μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐξ ὑποκειμένου εἰς ὑποκείμενον μεταβολὴ κατʼ ἀντίφασιν γένεσίς ἐστιν, ἡ μὲν ἀπλῶς ἁπλῆ, ἡ δὲ τὶς τινός (οἶον ἡ μὲν ἐκ μὴ λευκοῦ εἰς λευκὸν γένεσις τούτου, ἡ δʼ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἀπλῶς εἰς οὐσίαν γένεσις ἀπλῶς, καθʼ ἣν ἀπλῶς γίγνεσθαι καὶ οὐ τὶ γίγνεσθαι λέγομεν)·
Now, the change from a non-subject to a subject in respect of contradiction is "coming to be" (generation): simple coming to be is simple, and particular coming to be is of something particular (for instance, the coming to be from non-white to white is a coming to be of this particular thing, whereas that from absolute non-being to substance is absolute coming to be, in respect of which we say "to come to be" simply and not "to come to be something particular").
ἡ δʼ ἐξ ὑποκειμένου εἰς οὐχ ὑποκείμένον φθορά, ἀπλῶς μὲν ἡ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι, τὶς δὲ ἡ εἰς τὴν ἀντικειμένην ἀπόφασιν, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη. καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γενέσεως.
On the other hand, the change from a subject to a non-subject is "passing away" (destruction): absolute passing away is that from substance to non-being, and particular passing away is that into the opposite negation, just as was said also in the case of coming to be.
εἰ δὴ τὸ μὴ ὂν λέγεται πλεοναχῶς,
καὶ μήτε τὸ κατὰ σύνθεσιν ἢ διαίρεσιν ἐνδέχεται κινεῖσθαι μήτε τὸ κατὰ δύναμιν, τὸ τῷ ἁπλῶς κατʼ ἐνέργειαν ὄντι ἀντικείμενον (τὸ μὲν γὰρ μὴ λευκὸν ἢ μὴ ἀγαθὸν ὅμως ἐνδέχεται κινεῖσθαι κατὰ συμβεβηκός, εἴη γὰρ ἄν ἄνθρωπος τὸ μὴ λευκόν· τὸ δʼ ἀπλῶς μὴ τόδε οὐδαμῶς), ἀδύνατον τὸ μὴ ὂν κινεῖσθαι (εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ τὴν γένεσιν κίνησιν εἶναι· γίγνεται γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὄν· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γίγνεται, ἀλλʼ ὅμως ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὅτι ὑπάρχει τὸ μὴ ὂν κατὰ τοῦ γιγνομένου ἀπλῶς)—όμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ἠρεμεῖν.
If indeed the non-existent is said in many ways, and neither that which is according to combination or division can be moved, nor that which is according to potentiality, which is opposite to that which is absolutely in fulfillment (for the non-white or non-good can nevertheless be moved accidentally, since that which is non-white might be a human; but that which is absolutely not a "this" can in no way be moved), it is impossible for the non-existent to be moved (and if this is so, it is also impossible for coming to be to be motion; for that which comes to be is the non-existent; for even if it comes to be accidentally to the highest degree, yet it is still true to say that the non-existent belongs to that which is coming to be absolutely). And likewise also for being at rest.
ταῦτά τε δὴ συμβαίνει δυσχερῆ καὶ εἰ πᾶν τὸ κινούμενον ἐν τόπῳ, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὂν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τόπῳ· εἴη γὰρ ἄν που.
These difficult consequences arise, and further if everything that is moved is in a place, but the non-existent is not in a place; for then it would be somewhere.
οὐδὲ δὴ ἡ φθορὰ κίνησις· ἐναντίον μὲν γὰρ κινήσει ἢ κίνησις ἢ ἠρεμία, ἡ δὲ φθορὰ γενέσει ἐναντίον.
Nor indeed is passing away a motion; for the contrary to a motion is either a motion or rest, but passing away is contrary to coming to be.
ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶσα κίνησις μεταβολή τις, μεταβολαὶ δὲ τρεῖς αἱ εἰρημέναι, τούτων δὲ αἱ κατὰ γένεσιν καὶ φθορὰν οὐ κινήσεις, αὗται δʼ εἰσὶν αἱ κατʼ ἀντίφασιν, ἀνάγκη τὴν ἐξ ὑποκειμένου εἰς ὑποκείμενον μεταβολὴν κίνησιν εἶναι μόνην.
And since every motion is a certain change, and there are three changes which have been mentioned, and of these, those according to coming to be and passing away are not motions, and these are those in respect of contradiction, it is necessary that the change from a subject to a subject is the only motion.
τὰ δʼ ὑποκείμενα ἢ ἐναντία ἢ μεταξύ (καὶ γὰρ ἡ στέρησις κείσθω ἐναντίον, καὶ δηλοῦται καταφάσει, τὸ γυμνὸν καὶ νωδὸν καὶ μέλαν.
And the subjects are either contraries or intermediates (for let privation also be placed as a contrary, and it is shown by affirmation, for instance, the naked, the toothless, and the black).
εἰ οὖν αἱ κατηγορίαι διῄρηνται οὐσίᾳ
καὶ ποιότητι καὶ τῷ ποὺ καὶ τῷ πρός τι καὶ τῷ ποσῷ καὶ τῷ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν, ἀνάγκη τρεῖς εἶναι κινήσεις, τήν τε τοῦ ποιοῦ καὶ τὴν τοῦ ποσοῦ καὶ τὴν κατὰ τόπον.
If, then, the categories are divided into substance, quality, place, relation, quantity, and acting or being acted upon, it is necessary that there are three motions: that of quality, that of quantity, and that in respect of place.