§4.11#1Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδʼ ἄνευ γε μεταβολῆς·
Yet on the other hand, time is not without change either.
ὅταν γὰρ μηδὲν αὐτοὶ μεταβάλλωμεν τὴν διάνοιαν ἢ λάθωμεν μεταβάλλοντες, οὐ δοκεῖ ἡμῖν γεγονέναι χρόνος, καθάπερ οὐδὲ τοῖς ἐν Σαρδοῖ μυθολογουμένοις καθεύδειν παρὰ τοῖς ἥρωσιν, ὅταν ἐγερθῶσι· συνάπτουσι γὰρ τῷ πρότερον νῦν τὸ ὕστερον νῦν καὶ ἓν ποιοῦσιν; ἐξαιροῦντες διὰ τὴν ἀναισθησίαν τὸ μεταξύ.
For when we ourselves do not change in our thought, or are unaware of our changing, no time seems to have passed, just as it is with those who are mythologically said to sleep in Sardinia beside the heroes, when they awake; for they connect the prior "now" with the posterior "now" and make them one, eliminating the interval between them due to their lack of sensation.
ὥσπερ οὖν εἰ μὴ ἦν ἕτερον τὸ νῦν ἀλλὰ ταὐτὸ καὶ ἕν, οὐκ ἂν ἦν χρόνος, οὕτως καὶ ἐπεὶ λανθάνει ἕτερον ὄν, οὐ δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ μεταξὺ χρόνος.
Just as, then, if the "now" were not different but one and the same, there would be no time, so also when it is not noticed that the "now" is different, the intervening interval does not seem to be time.
εἰ δὴ τὸ μὴ οἴεσθαι εἶναι χρόνον τότε συμβαίνει ἡμῖν, ὅταν μὴ ὁρίσωμεν μηδεμίαν μεταβολήν, ἀλλʼ ἐν ἑνὶ καὶ ἀδιαιρέτῳ φαίνηται ἡ ψυχὴ μένειν, ὅταν δʼ αἰσθώμεθα καὶ ὁρίσωμεν, τότε φαμὲν γεγονέναι χρόνον, φανερὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ κινήσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς χρόνος.
Since, then, our not thinking that time exists happens when we do not limit any change, but the soul seems to remain in one indivisible state, while when we perceive and limit change, we then say that time has passed, it is clear that time is not without motion and change.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὔτε κίνησις οὔτʼ ἄνευ κινήσεως ὁ χρόνος ἐστί, φανερόν· ληπτέον δέ, ἐπεὶ ζητοῦμεν τί ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος, ἐντεῦθεν ἀρχομένοις, τί τῆς κινήσεώς ἐστιν.
It is clear, therefore, that time is neither motion nor without motion; and we must take it up, since we are seeking what time is, by starting from this point: what is it of motion?
ἅμα γὰρ κινήσεως αἰσθανόμεθα καὶ χρόνου· καὶ γὰρ ἐὰν ᾖ σκότος καὶ μηδὲν διὰ τοῦ σώματος πάσχωμεν, κίνησις δέ τις ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐνῇ, εὐθὺς ἅμα δοκεῖ τις γεγονέναι καὶ χρόνος.
For we perceive motion and time together; even if it is dark and we experience nothing through the body, but some motion is present in the soul, immediately some time also seems to have passed.
ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ὅταν γε χρόνος δοκῇ γεγονέναι τις, ἅμα καὶ κίνησίς τις δοκεῖ γεγονέναι.
Moreover, whenever any time seems to have passed, some motion also seems to have occurred at the same time.
ὥστε ἤτοι κίνησις ἢ τῆς κινήσεως τί ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος. ἐπεὶ οὖν οὐ κίνησις, ἀνάγκη τῆς κινήσεώς τι εἶναι αὐτόν.
Hence time is either motion or something belonging to motion; and since it is not motion, it must be something belonging to motion.
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ κινούμενον κινεῖται ἔκ τινος εἴς τι καὶ πᾶν μέγεθος συνεχές, ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ μεγέθει ἡ κίνησις· διὰ γὰρ τὸ τὸ μέγεθος εἶναι συνεχὲς καὶ ἡ κίνησίς ἐστιν συνεχής, διὰ δὲ τὴν κίνησιν ὁ χρόνος· ὅση γὰρ ἡ κίνησις, τοσοῦτος καὶ ὁ χρόνος αἰεὶ δοκεῖ γεγονέναι.
Now, since that which is moved moves from something to something, and every magnitude is continuous, motion follows magnitude; for because magnitude is continuous, motion is also continuous, and because of motion, time is; for as much as the motion is, so much time also always seems to have passed.
τὸ δὴ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἐν τόπῳ πρῶτόν ἐστιν.
Indeed, the prior and posterior are primarily in place.
ἐνταῦθα μὲν δὴ τῇ θέσει· ἐπεὶ δʼ ἐν τῷ μεγέθει ἔστι τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν κινήσει εἶναι τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, ἀνάλογον τοῖς ἐκεῖ.
There, indeed, they are so by position; but since there is prior and posterior in magnitude, there must also be prior and posterior in motion, analogous to those there.
ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ ἔστιν τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθεῖν ἀεὶ θατέρῳ θάτερον αὐτῶν.
Furthermore, there is prior and posterior in time as well, because one of them always follows the other.
ἔστι δὲ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἐν τῇ κινήσει μέν ποτε ὂν κίνησις τὸ μέντοι εἶναι αὐτῷ ἕτερον καὶ οὐ κίνησις.
And the prior and posterior in motion, while being motion in respect of its underlying subject, is nevertheless different from motion in its essence, and is not motion.
ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸν χρόνον γε γνωρίζομεν ὅταν ὁρίσωμεν τὴν κίνησιν, τῷ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ὁρίζοντες· καὶ τότε φαμὲν γεγονέναι χρόνον, ὅταν τοῦ προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου ἐν τῇ κινήσει αἴσθησιν λάβωμεν.
But indeed, we also know time when we limit motion, defining it by the prior and posterior; and we say that time has passed when we receive the perception of the prior and posterior in motion.
ὁρίζομεν δὲ τῷ ἄλλο καὶ ἂλλο ὑπολαβεῖν αὐτά, καὶ μεταξύ τι αὐτῶν ἕτερον· ὅταν γὰρ ἕτερα τὰ ἄκρα τοῦ μέσου νοήσωμεν, καὶ δύο εἴπῃ ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ νῦν, τὸ μὲν πρότερον τὸ δʼ ὕστερον, τότε καὶ τοῦτό φαμεν εἶναι χρόνον· τὸ γὰρ ὁριζόμενον τῷ νῦν χρόνος εἶναι δοκεῖ· καὶ ὑποκείσθω.
And we limit it by conceiving them to be different, and some third thing between them; for when we conceive the extremes as different from the middle, and the soul says that the "nows" are two, the one prior and the other posterior, then we say that this is time; for that which is limited by the "now" is thought to be time, and let this be assumed.
ὅταν μὲν οὖν ὡς ἓν τὸ νῦν αἰσθανώμεθα, καὶ μὴ ἤτοι ὡς πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἐν τῇ κινήσει ἢ ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν προτέρου δὲ καὶ ὑστέρου τινός, οὐ δοκεῖ χρόνος γεγονέναι οὐδείς, ὅτι οὐδὲ κίνησις.
When, therefore, we perceive the "now" as one, and not either as prior and posterior in the motion, or as the same "now" but belonging to a prior and a posterior, no time seems to have passed, because neither does any motion.
ὅταν δὲ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, τότε λέγομεν χρόνον· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος, ἀριθμὸς κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον.
But when we perceive the prior and posterior, then we speak of time; for this is time: the number of motion in respect of before and after.