§4.10Ἐχόμενον δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων ἐστὶν ἐπελθεῖν περὶ χρόνου·
Next in order after what has been said is to discuss time.
πρῶτον δὲ καλῶς ἔχει διαπορῆσαι περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν λόγων, πότερον τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἢ τῶν μὴ ὄντων, εἶτα τίς ἡ φύσις αὐτοῦ, ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἢ ὅλως οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ μόλις καὶ ἀμυδρῶς, ἐκ τῶνδέ τις ἂν ὑποπτεύσειεν.
First, it is well to raise difficulties about it, even by means of popular arguments, as to whether it belongs to the class of things that exist or of things that do not exist, and next, what its nature is. That it either does not exist at all or only barely and obscurely, one might suspect from the following.
τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ γέγονε καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν, τὸ δὲ μέλλει καὶ οὔπω ἔστιν.
For one part of it has been and is no more, while the other is to be and is not yet.
ἐκ δὲ τούτων καὶ ὁ ἄπειρος καὶ ὁ ἀεὶ λαμβανόμενος χρόνος σύγκειται.
And from these both infinite time and any time continually taken are composed.
τὸ δʼ ἐκ μὴ ὄντων συγκείμενον ἀδύνατον ἂν εἶναι δόξειε μετέχειν οὐσίας.
But that which is composed of things that do not exist would seem to be incapable of participating in substance.
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις παντὸς μεριστοῦ,
ἄνπερ ᾖ. ἀνάγκη, ὅτε ἔστιν, ἤτοι πάντα τὰ μέρη εἶναι ἢ ἔνια·
Furthermore, for any divisible thing, if indeed it exists, it is necessary that, when it is, either all of its parts or some of them should exist.
τοῦ δὲ χρόνου τὰ μὲν γέγονε τὰ δὲ μέλλει, ἔστι δʼ οὐδέν, ὄντος μεριστοῦ.
But of time, while it is divisible, some parts have been and some are to be, and none is.
τὸ δὲ νῦν οὐ μέρος· μετρεῖ τε γὰρ τὸ μέρος, καὶ συγκεῖσθαι δεῖ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν· ὁ δὲ χρόνος οὐ δοκεῖ συγκεῖσθαι ἐκ τῶν νῦν.
And the 'now' is not a part; for a part measures the whole, and the whole must be composed of the parts, but time does not seem to be composed of 'nows'.
ἔτι δὲ τὸ νῦν, ὃ φαίνεται διορίζειν τὸ παρελθὸν καὶ τὸ μέλλον, πότερον ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν ἀεὶ διαμένει ἢ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο, οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἰδεῖν.
Moreover, regarding the 'now', which appears to bound the past and the future, whether it always remains one and the same or is always different and different, it is not easy to see.
εἰ μὲν γὰρ αἰεὶ ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον, μηδὲν δʼ ἐστὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο μίρος ἅμα (ὃ μὴ περιέχει. τὸ δὲ περιέχεται, ὥσπερ ὁ ἐλάττων χρόνος ὑπὸ τοῦ πλείονος), τὸ δὲ νῦν μὴ ὂν πρότερον δὲ ὂν ἀνάγκη ἐφθάρθαι ποτέ, καὶ τὰ νῦν ἅμα μὲν ἀλλήλοις οὐκ ἔσται, ἐφθάρθαι δὲ ἀνάγκη ἀεὶ τὸ πρότερον.
For if it is always different and different, and no different parts of what is in time can exist simultaneously (unless one contains and the other is contained, as the shorter time is by the longer), and if the 'now' which is not, but was before, must have perished at some time, then the 'nows' will not exist simultaneously with one another, and the prior must always have perished.
ἐν αὑτῷ μὲν οὖν ἐφθάρθαι οὐχ οἷόν τε διὰ τὸ εἶναι τότε, ἐν ἄλλῳ δὲ νῦν ἐφθάρθαι τὸ πρότερον νῦν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται.
Now, that it perished in itself is impossible because it was existing then; but that the prior 'now' perished in another 'now' is also not possible.
ἔστω γὰρ ἀδύνατον ἐχόμενα εἶναι ἀλλήλων τὰ νῦν, ὥσπερ στιγμὴν στιγμῆς.
For let it be impossible for 'nows' to be adjacent to one another, just as a point to a point.
εἴπερ οὖν ἐν τῷ ἐφεξῆς οὐκ ἔφθαρται ἀλλʼ ἐν ἄλλῳ, ἐν τοῖς μεταξὺ νῦν ἀπείροις οὖσιν ἅμα ἂν εἴη· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον.
If, then, it did not perish in the next successive 'now' but in another, it would exist simultaneously with the infinitely many 'nows' that lie between; but this is impossible.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδʼ αἰεὶ τὸ αὐτὸ διαμένειν δυνατόν·
Yet on the other hand, it is not possible for it to remain always the same either.
οὐδενὸς γὰρ διαιρετοῦ πεπερασμένου ἓν πέρας ἔστιν, οὔτε ἂν ἐφʼ ἓν ᾖ συνεχὲς οὔτε ἂν ἐπὶ πλείω· τὸ δὲ νῦν πέρας ἐστίν, καὶ χρόνον ἔστι λαβεῖν πεπερασμένον.
For of no divisible and finite thing is there only one limit, whether it is continuous in one dimension or in more; but the 'now' is a limit, and it is possible to take a finite time.
ἔτι εἰ τὸ ἅμα εἶναι κατὰ χρόνον καὶ μήτε πρότερον μήτε ὕστερον τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἶναι καὶ ἑνὶ νῦν ἐστιν, εἰ τά τε πρότερον καὶ τὰ ὕστερον ἐν τῷ νῦν τῳδί ἐστιν, ἅμα ἂν εἴη τὰ ἔτος γενόμενα μυριοστὸν τοῖς γενομένοις τήμερον, καὶ οὔτε πρότερον οὔτε ὕστερον οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἄλλου.
Moreover, if to be simultaneous in time, that is, to be neither prior nor posterior, is to be in one and the same 'now', then if both the prior and the posterior are in this single 'now', things that happened ten thousand years ago would be simultaneous with those that happen today, and nothing would be either prior or posterior to anything else.
περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αὐτῷ τοσαῦτʼ ἔστω διηπορημένα·
Let so many difficulties, then, be raised about the properties belonging to it.
τί δʼ ἐστὶν ὁ χρόνος καὶ τίς αὐτοῦ ἡ φύσις, ὁμοίως ἔκ τε τῶν παραδεδομένων ἄδηλόν ἐστιν, καὶ περὶ ὧν τυγχάνομεν διεληλυθότες πρότερον.
But what time is and what its nature is, is equally obscure both from what has been handed down to us and from what we have recently discussed.
οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὴν τοῦ ὅλου κίνησιν εἶναί φασιν, οἱ δὲ τὴν σφαῖραν αὐτήν.
For some say that it is the motion of the whole, while others say that it is the sphere itself.
καίτοι τῆς περιφορᾶς καὶ τὸ μέρος χρόνος τίς ἐστι, περιφορὰ δέ γε οὔ· μέρος γὰρ περιφορᾶς τὸ ληφθέν, ἀλλʼ οὐ περιφορά.
And yet even a part of the revolution is a certain time, but it is certainly not a revolution; for what is taken is a part of a revolution, but not a revolution.
ἔτι δʼ εἰ πλείους ἦσαν οἱ οὐρανοί, ὁμοίως ἂν ἦν ὁ χρόνος ἡ ὁτουοῦν αὐτῶν κίνησις, ὥστε πολλοὶ χρόνοι ἅμα.
Moreover, if there were more heavens than one, the motion of any one of them would equally be time, so that there would be many times simultaneously.
ἡ δὲ τοῦ ὅλου σφαῖρα ἔδοξε μὲν τοῖς εἰποῦσιν εἶναι ὁ χρόνος, ὅτι ἔν τε τῷ χρόνῳ πάντα ἐστὶν καὶ ἐν τῇ τοῦ ὅλου σφαίρᾳ· ἔστιν δʼ εὐηθικώτερον τὸ εἰρημένον ἢ ὥστε περὶ αὐτοῦ τὰ ἀδύνατα ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἐπεὶ δὲ δοκεῖ μάλιστα κίνησις εἶναι καὶ μεταβολή τις ὁ χρόνος, τοῦτʼ ἂν εἴη σκεπτέον.
But the sphere of the whole seemed to those who said it was time to be so because all things are both in time and in the sphere of the whole; however, this assertion is too naive for us to examine the impossibilities that follow from it. Since, however, time is thought above all to be a motion and a certain change, this is what we must examine.
ἡ μὲν οὖν ἑκάστου μεταβολὴ καὶ κίνησις ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ μεταβάλλοντι μόνον ἐστίν, ἢ οὗ ἂν τύχῃ ὂν αὐτὸ τὸ κινούμενον καὶ μεταβάλλον· ὁ δὲ χρόνος ὁμοίως καὶ πανταχοῦ καὶ παρὰ πᾶσιν.
Now, the change and motion of each thing is only in the changing thing itself, or where the moving and changing thing itself happens to be; but time is equally present everywhere and with all things.
ἔτι δὲ μεταβολὴ μέν ἐστι θάττων καὶ βραδυτέρα, χρόνος δʼ οὐκ ἔστιν· τὸ γὰρ βραδὺ καὶ ταχὺ χρόνῳ ὥρισται, ταχὺ μὲν τὸ ἐν ὀλίγῳ πολὺ κινούμενον, βραδὺ δὲ τὸ ἐν πολλῷ ὀλίγον· ὁ δὲ χρόνος οὐχ ὥρισται χρόνῳ, οὔτε τῷ ποσός τις εἶναι οὔτε τῷ ποιός.
Moreover, change is faster or slower, but time is not; for the slow and the fast are defined by time—fast being that which moves much in a short time, and slow being that which moves little in a long time—but time is not defined by time, either in being of a certain quantity or of a certain quality.
ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν οὐκ ἔστιν κίνησις, φανερόν· μηδὲν δὲ διαφερέτω λέγειν ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ παρόντι κίνησιν ἢ μεταβολήν.
That it is not motion, then, is clear; and let it make no difference to us for the present whether we say motion or change.