§4.11#2οὐκ ἄρα κίνησις
ὁ χρόνος ἀλλʼ ᾗ ἀριθμὸν ἔχει ἡ κίνησις.
Time, then, is not motion, but motion in so far as it has a number.
σημεῖον δέ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλεῖον καὶ ἔλαττον κρίνομεν ἀριθμῷ, κίνησιν δὲ πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω χρόνῳ· ἀριθμὸς ἄρα τις ὁ χρόνος.
And this is a sign: for we judge more and less by number, but we judge more and less motion by time; therefore, time is a kind of number.
ἐπεὶ δʼ ἀριθμός ἐστι διχῶς (καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἀριθμούμενον καὶ τὸ ἀριθμητὸν ἀριθμὸν λέγομεν, καὶ ᾧ ἀριθμοῦμεν), ὁ δὴ χρόνος ἐστὶν τὸ ἀριθμούμενον καὶ οὐχ ᾧ ἀριθμοῦμεν.
Since, however, number is spoken of in two ways (for we call both that which is numbered and the countable a number, and also that by which we number), time is indeed that which is numbered and not that by which we number.
ἔστι δʼ ἕτερον ᾧ ἀριθμοῦμεν καὶ τὸ ἀριθμούμενον.
And that by which we number is different from that which is numbered.
καὶ ὥσπερ ἡ κίνησις αἰεὶ ἄλλη καὶ ἄλλη, καὶ ὁ χρόνος (ὁ δʼ ἅμα πᾶς χρόνος ὁ αὐτός· τὸ γὰρ νῦν τὸ αὐτὸ ὅ ποτʼ ἦν—τὸ δʼ εἶναι αὐτῷ ἕτερον—τὸ δὲ νῦν τὸν χρόνον ὁρίζει, πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον).
And just as motion is always different and different, so also is time (though all time existing together is the same; for the "now" is the same in respect of what it is as an underlying subject—though its essence is different—and the "now" defines time in respect of prior and posterior).
τὸ δὲ νῦν ἔστι μὲν ὡς τὸ αὐτό, ἔστι δʼ ὡς οὐ τὸ αὐτό· ᾗ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ ἄλλῳ, ἕτερον (τοῦτο δʼ ἦν αὐτῷ τὸ νῦν εἶναι), ὃ δέ ποτε ὄν ἐστι τὸ νῦν, τὸ αὐτό.
And the "now" is in one sense the same, and in another sense not the same; for in so far as it is in one thing and then in another, it is different (and this was its essence to be "now"), but in respect of what the "now" is as an underlying subject, it is the same.
ἀκολουθεῖ γάρ, ὡς ἐλέχθη, τῷ μὲν μεγέθει ἡ κίνησις, ταύτῃ δʼ ὁ χρόνος, ὥς φαμεν· καὶ ὁμοίως δὴ τῇ στιγμῇ τὸ φερόμενον, τὴν κίνησιν γνωρίζομεν καὶ τὸ πρότερον ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ τὸ ὕστερον.
For motion, as was said, follows magnitude, and time follows motion, as we say; and likewise, the moving body follows the point, by which we know motion and the prior and posterior in it.
τοῦτο δὲ ὃ μέν ποτε ὂν τὸ αὐτό (ἢ στιγμὴ γὰρ ἢ λίθος ἤ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτόν ἐστι), τῷ λόγῳ δὲ ἄλλο, ὥσπερ οἱ σοφισταὶ λαμβάνουσιν ἕτερον τὸ Κορίσκον ἐν Λυκείῳ εἶναι καὶ τὸ Κορίσκον ἐν ἀγορᾷ.
And this moving body, while being the same in respect of what it is as an underlying subject (for it is either a point or a stone or something else of the sort), is different in definition, just as the sophists assume that Coriscus being in the Lyceum is different from Coriscus being in the market-place.
καὶ τοῦτο δὴ τῷ ἄλλοθι καὶ ἄλλοθι εἶναι ἕτερον· τῷ δὲ φερομένῳ ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ νῦν, ὥσπερ ὁ χρόνος τῇ κινήσει (τῷ γὰρ φερομένῳ γνωρίζομεν τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἐν κινήσει, ᾗ δʼ ἀριθμητὸν τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, τὸ νῦν ἔστιν)· ὥστε καὶ ἐν τούτοις ὃ μέν ποτε ὂν νῦν ἐστι, τὸ αὐτό (τὸ πρότερον γὰρ καὶ ὕστερόν ἐστι τὸ ἐν κινήσει, τὸ δʼ εἶναι ἔτερον (ᾗ ἀριθμητὸν γὰρ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, τὸ νῦν ἔστιν).
And this, indeed, is different by being in different places; and the "now" follows the moving body, just as time follows motion (for by the moving body we know the prior and posterior in motion, and in so far as the prior and posterior are countable, the "now" exists); so that in these cases too, what the "now" is as an underlying subject is the same (for it is the prior and posterior in motion), but its essence is different (for in so far as the prior and posterior are countable, the "now" exists).
καὶ γνώριμον δὲ μάλιστα τοῦτʼ ἔστιν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ κίνησις διὰ το κινούμενον καὶ ἡ φορὰ διὰ τὸ φερόμενον· τόδε γάρ τι τὸ φερόμενον, ἡ δὲ κίνησις οὔ.
And this is most of all knowable; for motion is because of that which is moved, and locomotion because of the moving body; for the moving body is a "this," but motion is not.
ἔστι μὲν οὖν ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ νῦν αἰεί, ἔστι δʼ ὡς οὐ τὸ αὐτό· καὶ γὰρ τὸ φερόμενον.
Thus, in one sense the "now" is always the same, and in another sense it is not the same; for the moving body is also so.
φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι εἴτε χρόνος μὴ εἴη, τὸ νῦν οὐκ ἂν εἴη, εἴτε τὸ νῦν μὴ εἴη, χρόνος οὐκ ἄν εἴη· ἅμα γὰρ ὥσπερ τὸ φερόμενον καὶ ἡ φορά, οὕτως καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς ὁ τοῦ φερομένου καὶ ὁ τῆς φορᾶς.
It is also clear that if time were not, the "now" would not be, and if the "now" were not, time would not be; for just as the moving body and locomotion are together, so also are the number of the moving body and that of locomotion.
χρόνος μὲν γὰρ ὁ τῆς φορᾶς ἀριθμός, τὸ νῦν δὲ ὡς τὸ φερόμενον, οἷον μονὰς ἀριθμοῦ.
For time is the number of locomotion, and the "now" is like the moving body, as a unit of number.
καὶ συνεχής τε δὴ ὁ χρόνος τῷ νῦν, καὶ διῄρηται κατὰ τὸ νῦν· ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο τῇ φορᾷ καὶ τῷ φερομένῳ.
And indeed, time is continuous by the "now," and is divided according to the "now"; for this too follows locomotion and the moving body.
καὶ γὰρ ἡ κίνησις καὶ ἡ φορὰ μία τῷ φερομένῳ, ὅτι ἕν (καὶ οὐχ ὅ ποτε ὄν—καὶ γὰρ ἂν διαλίποι—ἀλλὰ τῷ λόγῳ)· καὶ ὁρίζει δὲ τὴν πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον κίνησιν τοῦτο.
For motion and locomotion are one because of the moving body, because it is one (and not in respect of what it is as an underlying subject—for then it might leave a gap—but in definition); and this defines the prior and posterior motion.
ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ καὶ τοῦτό πως τῇ στιγμῇ· καὶ γὰρ ἡ στιγμὴ καὶ συνέχει τὸ μῆκος καὶ ὁρίζει· ἔστι γὰρ τοῦ μὲν ἀρχὴ τοῦ δὲ τελευτή.
And this also in a way follows the point; for the point both holds the length together and defines it; for it is the beginning of one part and the end of another.
ἀλλʼ ὅταν μὲν οὕτω λαμβάνῃ τις ὡς δυσὶ χρώμενος τῇ μιᾷ, ἀνάγκη ἵστασθαι, εἰ ἔσται ἀρχὴ καὶ τελευτὴ ἡ αὐτὴ στιγμή· τὸ δὲ νῦν διὰ τὸ κινεῖσθαι τὸ φερόμενον αἰεὶ ἕτερον.
But when one takes it in this way, using the single point as two, it is necessary to stand still, if the same point is to be the beginning and the end; but the "now" is always different because the moving body is moved.
ὥσθʼ ὁ χρόνος ἀριθμὸς οὐχ ὡς τῆς αὐτῆς στιγμῆς, ὅτι ἀρχὴ καὶ τελευτή, ἀλλʼ ὡς τὰ ἔσχατα τῆς γραμμῆς μᾶλλον—καὶ οὐχ ὡς τὰ μέρη, διά τε τὸ εἰρημένον (τῇ γὰρ μέσῃ στιγμῇ ὡς δυσὶ χρήσεται, ὥστε ἠρεμεῖν συμβήσεται), καὶ ἔτι φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδὲν μόριον τὸ νῦν τοῦ χρόνου, οὐδʼ ἡ διαίρεσις τῆς κινήσεως, ὥσπερ οὐδʼ ἡ στιγμὴ τῆς γραμμῆς· αἱ δὲ γραμμαὶ αἱ δύο τῆς μιᾶς μόρια.
Hence time is a number not as of the same point, because it is beginning and end, but rather as the extremities of the line—and not as the parts, both because of what has been said (for one will use the middle point as two, so that it will result in resting), and further it is clear that the "now" is no part of time, nor is the division a part of motion, just as the point is not a part of the line; but two lines are parts of one line.
ᾗ μὲν οὖν πέρας τὸ νῦν, οὐ χρόνος, ἀλλὰ συμβέβηκεν· ᾗ δʼ ἀριθμεῖ, ἀριθμός· τὰ μὲν γὰρ πέρατα ἐκείνου μόνον ἐστὶν οὗ ἐστιν πέρατα, ὁ δʼ ἀριθμὸς ὁ τῶνδε τῶν ἵππων, ἡ δεκάς, καὶ ἄλλοθι.
So in so far as the "now" is a limit, it is not time, but is so by accident; but in so far as it numbers, it is a number; for limits belong only to that of which they are limits, but the number of these horses, the decade, is also elsewhere.
ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ὁ χρόνος ἀριθμός ἐστιν κινήσεαως κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, καὶ συνεχής (συνεχοῦς γάρ), φανερόν.
That time, then, is the number of motion in respect of prior and posterior, and is continuous, is clear.