§2.8#2μάλιστα δὲ φανερὸν ἐπὶ τῶν ζῴων τῶν ἄλλων,
ἃ οὔτε τέχνῃ οὔτε ζητήσαντα οὔτε βουλευσάμενα ποιεῖ·
This is most apparent in the case of the other animals, which act neither by art nor after inquiry or deliberation.
ὅθεν διαποροῦσί τινες πότερον νῷ ἤ τινι ἄλλῳ ἐργάζονται οἵ τʼ ἄρἄχναι καὶ οἱ μύρμηκες καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα.
Hence some people are puzzled whether it is by intellect or by something else that spiders, ants, and suchlike things work.
κατὰ μικρὸν δʼ οὕτω προϊόντι καὶ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς φαίνεται τὰ συμφέροντα γιγνόμενα πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οἷον τὰ φύλλα τῆς τοῦ καρποῦ ἕνεκα σκέπης.
And to one proceeding thus by small steps, even in plants things appear to come to be which are advantageous for the end, as leaves are for the sake of the protection of the fruit.
ὥστʼ εἰ φύσει τε ποιεῖ καὶ ἕνεκά του ἡ χελιδὼν τὴν νεοττιὰν καὶ ὁ ἀράχνης τὸ ἀράχνιον, καὶ τὰ φυτὰ τὰ φύλλα ἕνεκα τῶν καρπῶν καὶ τὰς ῥίζας οὐκ ἄνω ἀλλὰ κάτω τῆς τροφῆς, φανερὸν ὅτι ἔστιν ἡ αἰτία ἢ τοιαύτη ἐν τοῖς φύσει γιγνομένοις καὶ οὖσιν.
So that if it is both by nature and for the sake of something that the swallow makes its nest and the spider its web, and that plants produce leaves for the sake of the fruits and roots not upwards but downwards for the sake of nourishment, it is clear that this sort of cause exists in things which come to be and exist by nature.
καὶ ἐπεὶ ἡ φύσις διττή, ἡ μὲν ὡς ὕλη ἡ δʼ ὡς μορφή, τέλος δʼ αὕτη, τοῦ τέλους δὲ ἕνεκα τἆλλα, αὕτη ἂν εἴη ἡ αἰτία, ἡ οὗ ἕνεκα.
And since nature is twofold, on the one hand as matter and on the other as form, and the latter is the end, and the other things are for the sake of the end, this would be the cause, namely, that for the sake of which.
ἁμαρτία δὲ γίγνεται καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην (ἔγραψε γὰρ
οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὁ γραμματικός, καὶ ἐπότισεν ὁ ἰατρὸς τὸ φάρμακον).
But mistakes occur even in things according to art (for the grammarian has written incorrectly, and the doctor has administered the draft incorrectly).
ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν.
So that it is clear that it is possible also in things according to nature.
εἰ δὴ ἔστιν ἔνια κατὰ τέχνην ἐν οἷς τὸ ὀρθῶς ἕνεκά του, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἁμαρτανομένοις ἕνεκα μέν τινος ἐπιχειρεῖται ἀλλʼ ἀποτυγχάνεται, ὁμοίως ἂν ἔχοι καὶ ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς, καὶ τὰ τέρατα ἁμαρτήματα ἐκείνου τοῦ ἕνεκά του.
If, then, there are some things according to art in which the 'correct' is for the sake of something, and in those that are failed, it is indeed attempted for the sake of something but failed, it would be similarly in physical things, and monstrosities are mistakes of that 'for the sake of something'.
καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἄρα συστάσεσι τὰ βουγενῆ, εἰ μὴ πρός τινα ὅρον καὶ τέλος δυνατὰ ἦν ἐλθεῖν, διαφθειρομένης ἂν ἀρχῆς τινὸς ἐγίγνετο, ὥσπερ νῦν τοῦ σπέρματος.
And so in the original combinations, the 'ox-faced offspring of men', if they were unable to reach some limit and end, would have come to be by the corruption of some principle, just as now happens by the corruption of the seed.
ἔτι
ἀνάγκη σπέρμα γενέσθαι πρῶτον, ἀλλὰ μὴ εὐθὺς τὰ ζῶα· καὶ τὸ “οὐλοφυὲς μὲν πρῶτα” σπέρμα ἦν.
Moreover, seed must come to be first, and not the animals immediately; and 'first the undifferentiated' was seed.
ἔτι καὶ ἐν τοῖς
φυτοῖς ἔνεστι τὸ ἕνεκά του, ἦττον δὲ διήρθρωται·
Moreover, in plants also there is that which is for the sake of something, though it is less articulated.
πότερον οὖν καὶ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς ἐγίγνετο, ὥσπερ τὰ βουγενῆ ἀνδρόπρῳρα, οὕτω καὶ ἀμπελογενῆ ἐλαιόπρῳρα, ἢ οὔ;
Did there, then, come to be in plants also, just as the 'ox-faced offspring of men', so also 'olive-faced offspring of vines', or not?
ἄτοπον γάρ· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔδει γε, εἴπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις.
For that is absurd; yet surely it must have been so, if indeed it was so in the case of animals.
ἔτι ἔδει
καὶ ἐν τοῖς σπέρμασι γίγνεσθαι ὅπως ἔτυχεν·
Moreover, in the seeds also, things must have come to be just as it chanced.
ὅλως δʼ ἀναιρεῖ ὁ οὕτως λέγων τὰ φύσει τε καὶ φύσιν·
And in general, he who says this abolishes both things by nature and nature itself.
φύσει γάρ, ὅσα ἀπό τινος ἐν αὑτοῖς ἀρχῆς συνεχῶς κινούμενα ἀφικνεῖται εἴς τι τέλος·
For those things are by nature which, starting from some principle in themselves, by a continuous movement arrive at some end.
ἀφʼ ἑκάστης δὲ οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ ἑκάστοις οὐδὲ τὸ τυχόν, ἀεὶ μέντοι ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτό, ἂν μή τι ἐμποδίσῃ.
And from each principle there does not come to be the same thing for each, nor yet just any chance thing, but always indeed towards the same, unless something stands in the way.
τὸ δὲ οὗ ἕνεκα, καὶ ὃ τούτου ἕνεκα, γένοιτο ἂν καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης, οἷον λέγομεν ὅτι ἀπὸ τύχης ἦλθεν ὁ ξένος καὶ λυσάμενος ἀπῆλθεν, ὅταν ὥσπερ ἕνεκα τούτου ἐλθὼν πράξῃ, μὴ ἕνεκα δὲ τούτου ἔλθῃ.
Now that for the sake of which, and that which is for the sake of this, might also come to be by luck; as we say that the stranger came by luck and went away after ransoming, when he acted as if he had come for this purpose, though he did not come for this purpose.
καὶ τοῦτο κατὰ συμβεβηκός (ἡ γὰρ τύχη τῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἰτίων, καθάπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴπομεν), ἀλλʼ ὅταν τοῦτο αἰεὶ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γένηται, οὐ συμβεβηκὸς οὐδʼ ἀπὸ τύχης· ἐν δὲ τοῖς φυσικοῖς ἀεὶ οὕτως, ἂν μή τι ἐμποδίσῃ.
And this is by coincidence (for luck is among the coincidental causes, as we said before); but when this happens always or for the most part, it is not a coincidence nor by luck; and in physical things it is always so, unless something stands in the way.
ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ μὴ οἴεσθαι
ἕνεκά του γίγνεσθαι, ἐὰν μὴ ἴδωσι τὸ κινοῦν βουλευσάμενον.
And it is absurd to suppose that there is no coming to be for the sake of something, if they do not see the moving agent deliberating.
καίτοι καὶ ἡ τέχνη οὐ βουλεύεται» καὶ εἰ ἐνῆν ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ ἡ ναυπηγική, ὁμοίως ἂν τῇ φύσει ἐποίει· ὥστʼ εἰ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ ἔνεστι τὸ ἕνεκά του, καὶ ἐν τῇ φύσει.
And yet even art does not deliberate. And if the ship-building art were in the wood, it would produce in the same way as nature; so that if that which is for the sake of something is present in art, it is also in nature.
μάλιστα δὲ δῆλον, ὅταν τις ἰατρεύῃ αὐτὸς ἑαυτόν· τούτῳ γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ φύσις.
This is most apparent when someone doctoring himself; for nature is like that.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν αἰτία ἡ φύσις, καὶ οὕτως ὡς ἕνεκά του, φανερόν.
It is clear, then, that nature is a cause, and in this way, namely, as that for the sake of which.