§2.9Τὸ δʼ ἐξ ἀνάγκης πότερον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ὑπάρχει ἢ καὶ ἁπλῶς;
Does the necessary exist on hypothesis or also absolutely?
νῦν μὲν γὰρ οἴονται τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι ἐν τῇ γενέσει ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις τὸν τοῖχον ἐξ ἀνάγκης γεγενῆσθαι νομίζοι, ὅτι τὰ μὲν βαρέα κάτω πέφυκε φέρεσθαι τὰ δὲ κοῦφα ἐπιπολῆς, διὸ οἱ λίθοι μὲν κάτω καὶ τὰ θεμέλια, ἡ δὲ γῆ ἄνω διὰ κουφότητα, ἐπιπολῆς δὲ μάλιστα τὰ ξύλα·
For currently people think that the necessary is in coming to be, just as if someone were to think that the wall had come to be of necessity, because heavy things are naturally carried downwards and light things to the surface, and so the stones and the foundations are below, and the earth is above because of its lightness, and the wood is on the very surface, being the lightest.
κουφότατα γάρ. ἀλλʼ ὅμως οὐκ ἄνευ μὲν τούτων γέγονεν, οὐ μέντοι διὰ ταῦτα πλὴν ὡς διʼ ὕλην, ἀλλʼ ἕνεκα τοῦ κρύπτειν ἄττα καὶ σώζειν.
But still, though it has not come to be without these things, it has not come to be because of them (except in the sense of 'as matter'), but for the sake of sheltering and preserving certain things.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν, ἐν ὅσοις τὸ ἕνεκά του ἔστιν, οὐκ ἄνευ μὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίαν ἐχόντων τὴν φύσιν, οὐ μέντοι γε διά ταῦτα ἀλλʼ ἢ ὡς ὕλην, ἀλλʼ ἕνεκά του, οἷον διὰ τί ὁ πρίων τοιοσδί;
And similarly in all other cases, in which there is that which is for the sake of something, though they do not exist without things having a necessary nature, yet they do not exist because of these (except as matter), but for the sake of something. For instance, why is a saw such-and-such?
ὅπως τοδὶ καὶ ἕνεκα τουδί.
In order that it may be this and for the sake of this.
τοῦτο μέντοι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι, ἂν μὴ σιδηροῦς ᾖ· ἀνάγκη ἄρα σιδηροῦν εἶναι, εἰ πρίων ἔσται καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ.
However, this 'that for the sake of which' cannot come to be unless it is of iron; it is therefore necessary for it to be of iron, if there is to be a saw and its work.
ἐξ ὑποθέσεως δὴ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὡς τέλος· ἐν γὰρ τῇ ὕλῃ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, τὸ δʼ οὗ ἕνεκα ἐν τῷ λόγῳ.
The necessary is then on hypothesis, and not as an end; for the necessary is in the matter, and 'that for the sake of which' is in the definition.
ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἔν τε τοῖς μαθήμασι καὶ ἐν
τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν γιγνομένοις τρόπον τινὰ παραπλησίως·
The necessary is present in mathematics and in things which come to be according to nature in a somewhat similar way.
ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ εὐθὺ τοδί ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη τὸ τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθαῖς ἴσας ἔχειν· ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐπεὶ τοῦτο, ἐκεῖνο·
For since the straight is such-and-such, it is necessary that a triangle should have its angles equal to two right angles; but it is not because the latter is so that the former is so.
ἀλλʼ εἴ γε τοῦτο μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ τὸ εὐθὺ ἔστιν.
But if the latter is not, neither is the straight.
ἐν δὲ τοῖς γιγνομένοις ἕνεκά του ἀνάπαλιν, εἰ τὸ τέλος ἔσται ἢ ἔστι, καὶ τὸ ἔμπροσθεν ἔσται ἢ ἔστιν· εἰ δὲ μή, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ μὴ ὄντος τοῦ συμπεράσματος ἡ ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἔσται, καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα.
But in things which come to be for the sake of something, it is the reverse: if the end will be or is, that which precedes will also be or is; and if not, just as there, if the conclusion is not, the principle will not be, so here also the end and 'that for the sake of which' will not be.
ἀρχὴ γὰρ καὶ αὕτη, οὐ τῆς πράξεως ἀλλὰ τοῦ λογισμοῦ (ἐκεῖ δὲ τοῦ λογισμοῦ· πράξεις γὰρ οὐκ εἰσίν).
For this also is a principle, not of the action but of the reasoning (and there, of the reasoning; for actions do not exist).
ὥστʼ εἰ ἔσται οἰκία, ἀνάγκη ταῦτα γενέσθαι ἢ ὑπάρχειν, ἢ εἶναι ὅλως τὴν ὕλην τὴν ἕνεκά του, οἷον πλίνθους καὶ λίθους, εἰ οἰκία· οὐ μέντοι διὰ ταῦτά ἐστι τὸ τέλος ἀλλʼ ἢ ὡς ὕλην, οὐδʼ ἔσται διὰ ταῦτα.
So that if there is to be a house, it is necessary for these things to come to be or to be present, or generally the matter which is for the sake of something, such as bricks and stones, if it is to be a house; yet the end does not exist because of these (except as matter), nor will it come to be because of them.
ὅλως μέντοι μὴ ὄντων οὐκ ἔσται οὔθʼ ἡ οἰκία οὔθʼ ὁ πρίων, ἡ μὲν εἰ μὴ οἱ λίθοι, ὁ δʼ εἰ μὴ ὁ σίδηρος· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκεῖ αἱ ἀρχαί, εἰ μὴ τὸ τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθαί.
Generally, however, if they do not exist, neither the house nor the saw will exist—the former if there are no stones, the latter if there is no iron; for neither in the other case are there principles, if the triangle is not equal to two right angles.
φανερὸν δὴ ὅτι τὸ
ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς τὸ ὡς ὕλη λεγόμενον καὶ αἱ κινήσεις αἱ ταύτης.
It is clear, then, that the necessary in physical things is what is called matter and its movements.
καὶ ἄμφω μὲν τῷ φυσικῷ λεκτέαι αἱ αἰτίαι, μᾶλλον δὲ ἡ τίνος ἕνεκα· αἴτιον γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς ὕλης, ἀλλʼ οὐχ αὕτη τοῦ τέλους·
And both causes must be spoken of by the physicist, but more especially that for the sake of which; for this is the cause of the matter, and not the matter of the end.
καὶ τὸ τέλος τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὁρισμοῦ καὶ τοῦ λόγου, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην, ἐπεὶ ἡ οἰκία τοιόνδε, τάδε δεῖ γενέσθαι καὶ ὑπάρχειν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ ἐπεὶ ἡ ὑγίεια τοδί, τάδε δεῖ γενέσθαι ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ὑπάρχειντ—οὕτως καὶ εἰ ἄνθρωπος τοδί, ταδί· εἰ δὲ ταδί, ταδί.
And the end is 'that for the sake of which', and the principle starts from the definition and the account, just as in things according to art: since the house is such-and-such, these things must of necessity come to be and be present, and since health is such-and-such, these things must of necessity come to be and be present—so also if man is such-and-such, then these things; and if these things, then these.
ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἔστιν τὸ ἀναγκαῖον.
Perhaps the necessary is also in the definition.
ὁρισαμένῳ γὰρ τὸ ἔργον τοῦ πρίειν ὅτι διαίρεσις τοιαδί, αὕτη γʼ οὐκ ἔσται, εἰ μὴ ἕξει ὀδόντας τοιουσδί· οὗτοι δʼ οὔ, εἰ μὴ σιδηροῦς.
For if one defines the work of sawing as such-and-such a division, this at least will not be unless it has teeth of such-and-such a kind; and these will not be so unless it is of iron.
ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἔνια μόρια ὡς ὕλη τοῦ λόγου.
For there are also in the definition some parts which are like the matter of the definition.