§2.7Ὅτι δὲ ἔστιν αἴτια, καὶ ὅτι τοσαῦτα τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὅσα φαμέν, δῆλον· τοσαῦτα γὰρ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τὸ διὰ τί περιείληφεν·
That they are causes, and that they are as many in number as we say, is clear; for the 'why' encompasses just so many in number.
ἢ γὰρ εἰς τὸ τί ἐστιν ἀνάγεται τὸ διὰ τί ἔσχατον, ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις (οἷον ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν· εἰς ὁρισμὸν γὰρ τοῦ εὐθέος ἢ συμμέτρου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς ἀνάγεται ἔσχατον), ἢ εἰς τὸ κινῆσαν πρῶτον (οἷον διὰ τί ἐπολέμησαν;
For either the 'why' is referred ultimately to the 'what it is', in the case of things that are changeless (for example, in mathematics; for it is referred ultimately to the definition of straight or commensurate or something else), or to what first initiated motion (for example, 'Why did they go to war?
ὅτι ἐσύλησαν), ἢ τίνος ἕνεκα (ἵνα ἄρξωσιν), ἢ ἐν τοῖς γιγνομένοις ἡ ὕλη.
Because they had been raided'), or for the sake of what (in order that they might rule), or, in the case of things that come to be, the matter.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὰ αἴτια ταῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτα, φανερόν·
It is clear, then, that the causes are these and this many.
ἐπεὶ δʼ αἱ αἰτίαι τέτταρες, περὶ πασῶν τοῦ φυσικοῦ εἰδέναι, καὶ εἰς πάσας ἀνάγων τὸ διὰ τί ἀποδώσει φυσικῶς, τὴν ὕλην, τὸ εἶδος, τὸ κινῆσαν, τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα.
And since the causes are four, it belongs to the physicist to know about them all, and by referring the 'why' to them all, he will render his explanation in the manner of a physicist—namely, the matter, the form, the initiator of motion, and that for the sake of which.
ἔρχεται δὲ τὰ τρία εἰς ἓν πολλάκις· τὸ μὲν γὰρ τί ἐστι καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἕν ἐστι, τὸ δʼ ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις πρῶτον τῷ εἴδει ταὐτὸ τούτοις· ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ—καὶ ὅλως ὅσα κινούμενα κινεῖ (ὅσα δὲ μή, οὐκέτι φυσικῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἐν αὑτοῖς ἔχοντα κίνησιν οὐδʼ ἀρχὴν κινήσεως κινεῖ, ἀλλʼ ἀκίνητα ὄντα· διὸ τρεῖς αἱ πραγματεῖαι, ἡ μὲν περὶ ἀκινήτων, ἡ δὲ περὶ κινουμένων μὲν ἀφθάρτων δέ, ἡ δὲ περὶ τὰ φθαρτά).
But the three often come to one; for the 'what it is' and 'that for the sake of which' are one, and that from which the motion first begins is the same in form as these; for man generates man—and in general, whatever things initiate motion while being themselves moved (but those that do not are no longer within the province of physics; for they initiate motion not because they possess motion or a principle of motion in themselves, but being themselves changeless; wherefore there are three branches of study, one concerning changeless things, another concerning things that are moved but are imperishable, and a third concerning perishable things).
ὥστε τὸ διὰ τί καὶ εἰς τὴν ὕλην ἀνάγοντι ἀποδίδοται, καὶ εἰς τὸ τί ἐστιν, καὶ εἰς τὸ πρῶτον κινῆσαν.
So that the 'why' is answered by referring it to the matter, to the 'what it is', and to the primary initiator of motion.
περὶ γενέσεως γὰρ μάλιστα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τὰς αἰτίας σκοποῦσι, τί μετὰ τί γίγνεται, καὶ τί πρῶτον ἐποίησεν ἢ τί ἔπαθεν, καὶ οὕτως αἰεὶ τὸ ἐφεξῆς.
For concerning coming to be, they investigate the causes in this way especially—what comes to be after what, and what first acted or what was acted upon, and so always in succession.
διτταὶ δὲ αἱ ἀρχαὶ αἱ κινοῦσαι φυσικῶς, ὧν ἡ ἑτέρα οὐ φυσική· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει κινήσεως ἀρχὴν ἐν αὑτῇ.
But the principles that initiate motion in a physical way are twofold, of which one is not physical; for it does not possess a principle of motion in itself.
τοιοῦτον δʼ ἐστὶν εἴ τι κινεῖ μὴ κινούμενον, ὥσπερ τό τε παντελῶς ἀκίνητον καὶ πάντων πρῶτον καὶ τὸ τί ἐστιν καὶ ἡ μορφή· τέλος γὰρ καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα·
And such is anything that initiates motion without being moved, just as that which is completely changeless and first of all, and also the 'what it is' and the form; for this is the end and that for the sake of which.
ὥστε ἐπεὶ ἡ φύσις ἕνεκά του, καὶ ταύτην εἰδέναι δεῖ, καὶ πάντως ἀποδοτέον τὸ διὰ τί, οἷον ὅτι ἐκ τοῦδε ἀνάγκη τόδε (τὸ δὲ ἐκ τοῦδε ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ), καὶ εἰ μέλλει τοδὶ ἔσεσθαι (ὥσπερ ἐκ τῶν προτάσεων τὸ συμπέρασμα), καὶ ὅτι τοῦτʼ ἦν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, καὶ διότι βέλτιον οὕτως, οὐχ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς τὴν ἑκάστου οὐσίαν.
So that since nature is for the sake of something, one must also know this, and the 'why' must be rendered in every way, for instance, that from this, this other thing follows of necessity (and 'from this' means either absolutely or for the most part), and if this is to be (just as the conclusion follows from the premises), and because this was the essence (the 'what it was to be'), and because it is better so, not absolutely, but in relation to the substance of each.