§2.6Διαφέρει δʼ ὅτι τὸ αὐτόματον ἐπὶ πλεῖόν ἐστι·
Spontaneity differs [from chance] in that it is of wider extension.
τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τύχης πᾶν ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου, τοῦτο δʼ οὐ πᾶν ἀπὸ τύχης.
For everything that is from chance is also from spontaneity, but not everything from spontaneity is from chance.
ἡ μὲν γὰρ τύχη καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης ἐστὶν ὅσοις καὶ τὸ εὐτυχῆσαι ἂν ὑπάρξειεν καὶ ὅλως πρᾶξις.
For chance and what is from chance belong to those to whom also being fortunate might belong, and in general, action.
διὸ καὶ ἀνάγκη περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ εἶναι τὴν τύχην (σημεῖον δʼ ὅτι δοκεῖ ἤτοι ταὐτὸν εἶναι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ ἡ εὐτυχία ἢ ἐγγύς, ἡ δʼ εὐδαιμονία πρᾶξίς τις· εὐπραξία γάρ), ὥσθ᾿ ὁπόσοις μὴ ἐνδέχεται πρᾶξαι, οὐδὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης τι ποιῆσαι.
Therefore also it is necessary that chance is about things doable in action (a sign of this is that good fortune is thought to be either the same as happiness or close to it, and happiness is a kind of action; for it is well-doing), so that for as many as cannot act, neither can they do anything from chance.
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε ἄψυχον οὐδὲν οὔτε θηρίον οὔτε παιδίον οὐδὲν ποιεῖ ἀπὸ τύχης, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει προαίρεσιν· οὐδʼ εὐτυχία οὐδʼ ἀτυχία ὑπάρχει τούτοις, εἰ μὴ καθʼ ὁμοιότητα, ὥσπερ ἔφη Πρώταρχος εὐτυχεῖς εἶναι τοὺς λίθους ἐξ ὧν οἱ βωμοί, ὅτι τιμῶνται, οἱ δὲ ὁμόζυγες αὐτῶν καταπατοῦνται.
And for this reason, neither any inanimate thing nor beast nor child does anything from chance, because they do not have choice; nor does good fortune or bad fortune belong to them, except by way of similarity, as Protarchus said that the stones from which altars are made are fortunate because they are honored, while their fellows are trampled underfoot.
τὸ δὲ πάσχειν ἀπὸ τύχης ὑπάρξει πως καὶ τούτοις, ὅταν ὁ πραττων τι περὶ αὐτὰ πράξῃ ἀπὸ τύχης, ἄλλως δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν·
But being affected by chance will belong to these too in a way, when he who does something concerning them acts from chance, but otherwise it is not so.
τὸ δʼ αὐτόματον καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν ἀψύ. χων, οἷον ὁ ἵππος αὐτόματος, φαμέν, ἦλθεν, ὅτι ἐσώθη μὲν ἐλθών, οὐ τοῦ σωθῆναι δὲ ἕνεκα ἦλθε· καὶ ὁ τρίπους αὐτόματος κατέπεσεν· ἔστη μὲν γὰρ τοῦ καθῆσθαι ἕνεκα, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ τοῦ καθῆσθαι ἕνεκα κατέπεσεν.
Spontaneity, however, belongs both to the other animals and to many inanimate things; for instance, we say the horse came spontaneously, because he was saved by coming, but he did not come for the sake of being saved; and the tripod fell spontaneously; for it stood for the sake of being sat on, but it did not fall for the sake of being sat on.
ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἁπλῶς ἕνεκά του γιγνομένοις, ὅταν μὴ τοῦ συμβάντος ἕνεκα γένηται ὧν ἔξω τὸ αἴτιον, τότε ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου λέγομεν· ἀπὸ τύχης δέ, τούτων ὅσα ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου γίγνεται τῶν προαιρετῶν τοῖς ἔχουσι προαίρεσιν.
So it is clear that among things which come to be simply for the sake of something, when that of which the cause is external does not come to be for the sake of what actually happened, then we say it is from spontaneity; and from chance, of these, such as come to be from spontaneity and are objects of choice for those who have choice.
σημεῖον δὲ τὸ μάτην, ὅτι λέγεται ὅταν μὴ γένηται τὸ ἕνεκα ἄλλου ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, οἶον εἰ τὸ βαδίσαι λαπάξεως ἕνεκά ἐστιν, εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐγένετο βαδίσαντι, μάτην φαμὲν βαδίσαι καὶ ἡ βάδισις ματαία, ὡς τοῦτο ὂν τὸ μάτην, τὸ πεφυκὸς ἄλλου ἕνεκα, ὅταν μὴ περαίνῃ ἐκεῖνο οὗ ἕνεκα ἦν καὶ ἐπεφύκει, ἐπεὶ εἴ τις λούσασθαι φαίη μάτην ὅτι οὐκ ἐξέλιπεν ὁ ἥλιος, γελοῖος ἂν εἴη· οὐ γὰρ ἦν τοῦτο ἐκείνου ἕνεκα.
A sign of this is the word "in vain", because it is said when that which is for the sake of another does not come to be for the sake of that other; for instance, if walking is for the sake of evacuation, but this did not happen to the one who walked, we say that he walked in vain and the walking was in vain, since this is what "in vain" is: that which is by nature for the sake of another, when it does not accomplish that for the sake of which it was and was by nature intended; since if someone should say he bathed in vain because the sun was not eclipsed, he would be ridiculous; for the one was not for the sake of the other.
οὕτω δὴ τὸ αὐτόματον καὶ κατὰ τὸ ὄνομα ὅταν αὐτὸ μάτην γένηται· κατέπεσεν γὰρ οὐ τοῦ πατάξαι ἕνεκεν ὁ λίθος· ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ἄρα κατέπεσεν ὁ λίθος, ὅτι πέσοι ἂν ὑπὸ τινὸς καὶ τοῦ πατάξαι ἕνεκα.
Thus indeed spontaneity [automaton] is so called, even according to its name, when it itself comes to be in vain [auto matēn]; for the stone fell not for the sake of striking; therefore the stone fell spontaneously, because it might have fallen by someone's agency and for the sake of striking.
μάλιστα δʼ
ἐστὶ χωριζόμενον τοῦ ἀπὸ τύχης ἐν τοῖς φύσει γιγνομένοις· ὅταν γὰρ γένηταί τι παρὰ φύσιν, τότε οὐκ ἀπὸ τύχης ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου γεγονέναι φαμέν.
It is especially separated from what is from chance in things which come to be by nature; for when something comes to be contrary to nature, we say then that it has come to be not from chance but rather from spontaneity.
ἔστι δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἕτερον· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἔξω τὸ αἴτιον, τοῦ δʼ ἐντός.
And there is also this other difference: of the one, the cause is external, of the other, internal.
τί μὲν οὖν ἐστιν τὸ αὐτόματον καὶ τί ἡ τύχη, εἴρηται, καὶ τί διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων.
What spontaneity is, then, and what chance is, has been said, and how they differ from each other.
τῶν δὲ τρόπων τῆς αἰτίας ἐν τοῖς ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν· ἢ γὰρ τῶν φύσει τι ἢ τῶν ἀπὸ διανοίας αἰτίων ἀεί ἐστιν·
As for the modes of cause, each of them is among those from which is the starting-point of motion; for it is always either one of the things that are causes by nature or from thought.
ἀλλὰ τούτων τὸ πλῆθος ἀόριστον.
But the number of these is indefinite.
ἐπεὶ δʼ ἐστὶ τὸ αὐτόματον καὶ ἡ τύχη αἴτια ὧν ἂν ἢ νοῦς γένοιτο αἴτιος ἢ φύσις, ὅταν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἴτιόν τι γένηται τούτων αὐτῶν, οὐδὲν δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἐστι πρότερον τῶν καθʼ αὑτό, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἴτιον πρότερον τοῦ καθʼ αὑτό, ὕστερον ἄρα τὸ αὐτόματον καὶ ἡ τύχη καὶ νοῦ καὶ φύσεως·
And since spontaneity and chance are causes of things of which either intellect or nature might be the cause, whenever something becomes an accidental cause of these very things, and since nothing accidental is prior to that which is in itself, it is clear that neither is the accidental cause prior to the cause in itself.
ὥστʼ εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ αἴτιον τὸ αὐτόματον, ἀνάγκη πρότερον νοῦν αἴτιον καὶ φύσιν εἶναι καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν καὶ τοῦδε τοῦ παντός.
Spontaneity and chance, therefore, are posterior to intellect and nature; so that even if spontaneity is cause of the heavens to the highest degree, it is necessary that intellect and nature be prior causes both of many other things and of this universe itself.