§2.5Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν, ἐπειδὴ ὁρῶμεν τὰ μὲν ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως γιγνόμενα τὰ δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδετέρου τούτων αἰτία ἡ τύχη λέγεται οὐδὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης, οὔτε τοῦ ἔξ ἀνάγκης καὶ αἰεὶ οὔτε τοῦ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ.
First, then, since we see that some things come to be always in the same way and others for the most part, it is clear that chance is not said to be the cause of either of these—neither of that which is of necessity and always, nor of that which is for the most part.
ἀλλʼ ἐπειδὴ ἔστιν ἃ γίγνεται καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα, καὶ ταῦτα πάντες φασὶν εἶναι ἀπὸ τύχης, φανερὸν ὅτι ἔστι τι ἡ τύχη καὶ τὸ αὐτόματον· τά τε γὰρ τοιαῦτα ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης τοιαῦτα ὄντα ἴσμεν.
But since there are some things that come to be besides these, and all say that these are from chance, it is clear that chance and spontaneity are something; for we know both that such things are from chance and that things from chance are of this sort.
τῶν δὲ γιγνομένων τὰ μὲν ἕνεκά του γίγνεται τὰ δʼ οὔ (τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν κατὰ προαίρεσιν, τὰ δʼ οὐ κατὰ προαίρεσιν, ἄμφω δʼ ἐν τοῖς ἕνεκά του), ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐν τοῖς παρὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἔστιν ἔνια περί ἃ ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἕνεκά του.
Now, of things that come to be, some come to be for the sake of something and others do not (and of these, some are in accordance with choice and others not in accordance with choice, but both are among things for the sake of something), so that it is clear that even among things besides the necessary and that which is for the most part, there are some in which the "for the sake of something" can obtain.
ἔστι δʼ ἕνεκά του ὅσα τε ἀπὸ διανοίας ἂν πραχθείη καὶ ὅσα ἀπὸ φύσεως.
And things which are for the sake of something are all those that might be done as a result of thought, and all those that might come to be as a result of nature.
τὰ δὴ τοιαῦτα ὅταν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γένηται, ἀπὸ τύ. χης φαμὲν εἶναι (ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ ὄν ἐστι τὸ μὲν καθʼ αὑτὸ τὸ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οὕτω καὶ αἴτιον ἐνδέχεται εἶναι, οἷον οἰκίας καθʼ αὑτὸ μὲν αἴτιον τὸ οἰκοδομικόν, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ τὸ λευκὸν ἢ τὸ μουσικόν·
Now, when such things come to be accidentally, we say that they are from chance (for just as being is either in itself or accidental, so also a cause can be so; for instance, of a house, the builder's art is a cause in itself, but the white or the musical is an accidental cause.
τὸ μὲν οὖν καθʼ αὑτὸ αἴτιον ὡρισμένον, τὸ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἀόριστον· ἄπειρα γὰρ ἂν τῷ ἑνὶ συμβαίη).
Now the cause in itself is definite, but the accidental cause is indefinite, for infinitely many things might happen to be accidental to the one).
καθάπερ οὖν ἐλέχθη, ὅταν ἐν τοῖς ἕνεκά του γιγνομένοις τοῦτο γένηται, τότε λέγεται ἀπὸ ταὐ τομάτου καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης (αὐτῶν δὲ πρὸς ἄλληλα τὴν διαφορὰν τούτων ὕστερον διοριστέον· νῦν δὲ τοῦτο ἔστω φανερόν, ὅτι ἄμφω ἐν τοῖς ἕνεκά τού ἐστιν)· οἶον ἕνεκα τοῦ ἀπολαβεῖν τὸ ἀργύριον ἦλθεν ἂν κομιζομένου τὸν ἔρανον, εἰ ᾔδει· ἦλθε δʼ οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα, ἀλλὰ συνέβη αὐτῷ ἐλθεῖν, καὶ ποιῆσαι τοῦτο τοῦ κομίσασθαι ἕνεκα· τοῦτο δὲ οὔθ’ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ φοιτῶν εἰς τὸ χωρίον οὔτʼ ἐξ ἀνάγκης· ἔστι δὲ τὸ τέλος, ἡ κομιδή, οὐ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ αἰτίων, ἀλλὰ τῶν προαιρετῶν καὶ ἀπὸ διανοίας· καὶ λέγεταί γε τότε ἀπὸ τύχης ἐλθεῖν, εἰ δὲ προελόμενος καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα ἢ ἀεὶ φοιτῶν ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, οὐκ ἀπὸ τύχης.
Just as was said, then, when this happens among things which come to be for the sake of something, then it is said to be from spontaneity and from chance (and the difference between them must be defined later, but for now let this be clear, that both are among things which are for the sake of something); for instance, he would have come for the sake of getting the money back when [the other] was collecting the contribution, if he had known; but he did not come for the sake of this, but it happened to him to come and to do this for the sake of getting [it] back; and this, though he neither frequented the place for the most part nor of necessity; and the end, the getting back of the money, is not among the causes in him, but among things that are objects of choice and from thought; and indeed he is said then to have come from chance, but if he had chosen to come and for the sake of this, or if he always or for the most part frequented the place, it would not be from chance.
δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι ἡ τύχη αἰτία κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐν τοῖς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τῶν ἕνεκά του.
It is clear, then, that chance is an accidental cause among things which are for the sake of something in accordance with choice.
διὸ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ διάνοια καὶ τύχη· ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις οὐκ ἄνευ διανοίας.
Therefore thought and chance are about the same thing; for choice is not without thought.
ἀόριστα μὲν οὖν τὰ αἴτια ἀνάγκη εἶναι ἀφʼ ὧν
ἂν γένοιτο τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης.
The causes, then, from which that which is from chance might come to be, must be indefinite.
ὅθεν καὶ ἡ τύχη τοῦ ἀορίστου εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ ἄδηλος ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ἔστιν ὡς οὐδὲν ἀπὸ τύχης δόξειεν ἂν γίγνεσθαι.
Hence chance too seems to belong to the indefinite and to be hidden from man, and there is a sense in which nothing would seem to come to be from chance.
πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα ὀρθῶς λέγεται, εὐλόγως.
For all these things are said correctly, as is reasonable.
ἔστιν μὲν γὰρ ὡς γίγνεται ἀπὸ τύχης· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γὰρ γίγνεται, καὶ ἔστιν αἴτιον ὡς συμβεβηκὸς ἡ τύχη· ὡς δʼ ἁπλῶς οὐδενός· οἷον οἰκίας οἰκοδόμος μὲν αἴτιος, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ αὐλητής, καὶ τοῦ ἐλθόντα κομίσασθαι τὸ ἀργύριον, μὴ τούτου ἕνεκα ἐλθόντα, ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος· καὶ γὰρ ἰδεῖν τινὰ βουλόμενος καὶ διώκων καὶ φεύγων καὶ θεασόμενος.
For there is a sense in which things come to be from chance, for they come to be accidentally, and chance is a cause as something accidental; but absolutely, it is the cause of nothing; for instance, of a house, a builder is the cause, but accidentally a flute-player; and of the man coming and getting the money, when he did not come for the sake of this, the causes are infinite in number: for instance, wishing to see someone, or pursuing, or fleeing, or going to look at a spectacle.
καὶ τὸ φάναι εἶναί πι παράλογον τὴν τύχην ὀρθῶς· ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἢ τῶν ἀεὶ ὄντων ἢ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ἡ δὲ τύχη ἐν τοῖς γιγνομένοις παρὰ ταῦτα.
And to say that chance is something contrary to reason is correct; for reason is either of things that are always or for the most part, whereas chance is among things that come to be besides these.
ὥστʼ ἐπεὶ ἀόριστα τὰ οὕτως αἴτια, καὶ ἡ τύχη ἀόριστον.
So, since causes of this sort are indefinite, chance too is indefinite.
ὅμως δʼ ἐπʼ ἐνίων ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις, ἆῤ οὖν τὰ τυχόντα αἴτι᾿ ἂν γένοιτο τῆς τύχης·
Yet, nevertheless, one might raise a question in some cases: can, then, just any chance things become causes of chance?
οἷον ὑγιείας ἢ πνεῦμα ἢ εἵλησις, ἀλλʼ οὐ τὸ ἀποκεκάρθαι·
For instance, of health, is it wind or warming sun, but not having one's hair cut?
ἔστιν γὰρ ἄλλα ἄλλων ἐγγύτερα τῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἰτίων.
For some of the accidental causes are closer than others.
τύχη δὲ ἀγαθὴ μὲν λέγεται ὅταν ἀγαθόν τι ἀποβῇ, φαύλη δὲ ὅταν φαῦλόν τι, εὐτυχία δὲ καὶ δυστυχία ὅταν μέγεθος ἔχοντα ταῦτα· διὸ καὶ τὸ παρὰ μικρὸν κακὸν ἢ ἀγαθὸν λαβεῖν μέγα ἢ εὐτυχεῖν ἢ ἀτυχεῖν ἐστίν, ὅτι ὡς ὑπάρχον λέγει ἢ διάνοια· τὸ γὰρ παρὰ μικρὸν ὥσπερ οὐδὲν ἀπέχειν δοκεῖ.
Now, chance is said to be good when something good turns out, and bad when something bad, and good fortune or bad fortune when these have magnitude; wherefore even to escape a great evil or to get a great good by a hair's breadth is to be fortunate or unfortunate, because thought speaks of [the result] as belonging [to us already]; for what is by a hair's breadth seems to be at no distance at all.
ἔτι ἀβέβαιον ἡ εὐτυχία εὐλόγως· ἡ γὰρ τύχη ἀβέβαιος· οὔτε γὰρ ἀεὶ οὔθʼ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ οἷόν τʼ εἶναι τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης οὐθέν.
Moreover, good fortune is unstable, as is reasonable; for chance is unstable; for it is impossible for any of the things from chance to be either always or for the most part.
ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἄμφω αἴτια, καθάπερ εἴρηται, κατὰ συμβεβηκός—καὶ ἡ τύχη καὶ τὸ αὐτόματον—ἐν τοῖς ἐνδεχομένοις γίγνεσθαι μὴ ἁπλῶς μηδʼ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, καὶ τούτων ὅσʼ ἂν γένοιτο ἕνεκά του.
Thus both are indeed accidental causes, as has been said—both chance and spontaneity—among things that can come to be neither absolutely nor for the most part, and of these, such as might come to be for the sake of something.