§2.1#2δοκεῖ δʼ ἡ φύσις καὶ ἡ
οὐσία τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἐνίοις εἶναι τὸ πρῶτον ἐνυπάρχον ἑκάστῳ, ἀρρύθμιστον ὀν καθʼ ἑαυτό, οἷον κλίνης φύσις τὸ ξύλον, ἀνδριάντος δʼ ὁ χαλκός.
Some think that the nature and substance of things that exist by nature is the primary constituent present in each, being unformed in itself—for instance, the wood of a bed, and the bronze of a statue.
σημεῖον δέ φησιν Ἀντιφῶν ὅτι, εἴ τις κατορύξειε κλίνην καὶ λάβοι δύναμιν ἡ σηπεδὼν ὥστε ἀνεῖναι βλαστόν, οὐκ ἂν γενέσθαι κλίνην ἀλλὰ ξύλον, ὡς τὸ μὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὑπάρχον, τὴν κατὰ νόμον διάθεσιν καὶ τὴν τέχνην, τὴν δʼ οὐσίαν οὖσαν ἐκείνην ἣ καὶ διαμένει ταῦτα πάσχουσα συνεχῶς.
As an indication of this, Antiphon says that if one were to bury a bed, and the rotting wood should gain the power to send up a shoot, what would come up would not be a bed but wood; which shows that the arrangement according to custom and art belongs to it by accident, whereas the substance is that which also persists continuously while undergoing these changes.
εἰ δὲ καὶ τούτων ἕκαστον πρὸς ἕτερόν τι ταὐτὸ τοῦτο πέπονθεν (οἷον ὁ μὲν χαλκὸς καὶ ὁ χρυσὸς πρὸς ὕδωρ, τὰ δʼ ὀστᾶ καὶ ξύλα πρὸς γῆν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁτιοῦν), ἐκεῖνο τὴν φύσιν εἶναι καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῶν.
And if each of these [e.g., wood or bronze] also stands in this same relation to something else (as bronze and gold to water, and bones and wood to earth, and likewise any other of the things that exist), that other thing is their nature and substance.
διόπερ οἱ μὲν πῦρ, οἱ δὲ γῆν, οἱ δʼ ἀέρα φασίν, οἱ δἒ ὕδωρ, οἱ δʼ ἔνια τούτων, οἱ δὲ πάντα ταῦτα τὴν φύσιν εἶναι τὴν τῶν ὄντων.
This is why some say fire, some earth, some air, some water, some some of these, and others all of these, to be the nature of things that exist.
ὃ γάρ τις αὐτῶν ὑπέλαβε τοιοῦτον, εἴτε ἓν εἴτε πλείω, τοῦτο καὶ τοσαῦτά φησιν εἶναι τὴν ἅπασαν οὐσίαν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα πάθη τούτων καὶ ἕξεις καὶ διαθέσεις, καὶ τούτων μὲν ὁτιοῦν ἀΐδιν (οὐ γὰρ εἶναι μεταβολὴν αὐτοῖς ἐξ αὐτῶν), τὰ δʼ ἄλλα γίγνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι ἀπειράκις. ἕνα μὲν οὖν τρόπον οὕτως ἡ φύσις λέγεται,
ἡ πρώτη ἑκάστῳ ὑποκειμένη ὕλη τῶν ἐχόντων ἐν αὑτοῖς ἀρχὴν κινήσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς, ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἡ μορφὴ καὶ τὸ εἶδος τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον.
For whatever of these anyone supposed to be of this sort, whether one or more, this and so many they say to be the whole of substance, and all other things to be affections, states, and dispositions of these, and that any of these [elements] is eternal (for there is no change for them out of themselves), but other things come to be and pass away infinitely.¦28 In one way, then, nature is spoken of in this manner: the primary underlying matter in each of the things that have in themselves a principle of motion and change. In another way, it is the shape and the form which is according to the definition.
ὥσπερ γὰρ τέχνη λέγεται τὸ κατὰ τέχνην καὶ τὸ τεχνικόν, οὕτω καὶ φύσις τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τὸ φυσικόν, οὔτε δὲ ἐκεῖ πω φαῖμεν ἂν ἔχειν κατὰ τὴν τέχνην οὐδέν, εἰ δυνάμει μόνον ἐστὶ κλίνη, μή πω δ᾿ ἔχει τὸ εἶδος τῆς κλίνης, οὐδ᾿ εἶναι τέχνην, οὔτ᾿ ἐν τοῖς φύσει συνισταμένοις·
For just as "art" is applied to what is according to art and the artistic, so also "nature" is applied to what is according to nature and the natural. And we would not say in the former case that anything yet has according to art, if it is a bed only potentially, and does not yet have the form of the bed, nor that it is art; nor is it so in things constituted by nature.
τὸ γὰρ δυνάμει σὰρξ ἢ ὀστοῦν οὔτ᾿ ἔχει πω τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν, πρὶν ἂν λάβῃ τὸ εἶδος τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον, ᾧ ὁριζόμενοι λέγομεν τί ἐστι σὰρξ ἢ ὀστοῦν, οὔτε φύσει ἐστίν.
For that which is potentially flesh or bone does not yet have its own nature, until it acquires the form which is according to the definition, by defining which we say what flesh or bone is, nor does it exist by nature.
ὥστε ἄλλον τρόπον ἡ φύσις ἂν εἴη τῶν ἐχόντων ἐν αὑτοῖς κινήσεως ἀρχὴν ἡ μορφὴ καὶ τὸ εἶδος, οὐ χωρισιὸν ὂν ἀλλ᾿ ἢ κατὰ τὸν λόγον. (τὸ δ᾿ ἐκ τούτων φύσις μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, φύσει δέ, οἷον ἄνθρωπος. ) καὶ μᾶλλον αὕτη φύσις τῆς ὕλης· ἕκαστον γὰρ τότε λέγεται ὅταν ἐντελεχείᾳ ᾖ, μᾶλλον ἢ ὅταν δυνάμει.
So, in another way, nature would be, of things that have in themselves a principle of motion, the shape and the form, which is not separable except in definition. (What is composed of these is not nature, but exists by nature, for example, a man.) And this is nature more than matter is; for each thing is said to be when it is in actuality, more than when it is in potentiality.
ἔτι γίγνεται ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ κλίνη ἐκ κλίνης·
Furthermore, a man is generated from a man, but a bed is not from a bed.
διὸ καί φασιν οὐ τὸ σχῆμα εἶναι τὴν φύσιν ἀλλὰ τὸ ξύλον, ὅτι γένοιτ᾿ ἄν, εἰ βλαστάνοι, οὐ κλίνη ἀλλὰ ξύλον.
This is also why they say that the shape is not the nature, but the wood, because if it should sprout, it would become not a bed but wood.
εἰ δ᾿ ἄρα τοῦτο φύσις, καὶ ἡ μορφὴ φύσις· γίγνεται γὰρ ἐξ ἀνθρώπου ἄνθρωπος.
But if, then, this is nature, the shape also is nature; for a man is generated from a man.
ἔτι δ᾿ ἡ φύσις ἡ λεγομένη ὡς γένεσις ὁδός ἐστιν εἰς φύσιν.
Furthermore, nature spoken of as generation is a path to nature.
οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἡ ἰάτρευσις λέγεται οὐκ εἰς ἰατρικὴν ὁδὸς ἀλλ᾿ εἰς ὑγίειαν· ἀνάγκη μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ ἰατρικῆς οὐκ εἰς ἰατρικὴν εἶναι τὴν ἰάτρευσιν, οὐχ οὕτω δ᾿ ἡ φύσις ἔχει πρὸς τὴν φύσιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ φυόμενον ἐκ τινὸς εἰς τὶ ἔρχεται ᾗ φύεται.
For it is not like doctoring, which is called a path not to the medical art but to health; for while doctoring must proceed from the medical art, not to the medical art, nature [as generation] does not stand in this relation to nature, but that which grows goes from something to something, insofar as it grows.
τί σὖν φύεται;
What, then, grows?
οὐχὶ ἐξ οὗ, ἀλλʼ εἰς ὅ.
Not that from which, but that into which.
ἡ ἄρα μορφὴ φύσις.
The shape, therefore, is nature.
ἡ δὲ μορφὴ καὶ ἡ φύσις διχῶς λέγεται· καὶ γὰρ ἡ στέρησις εἶδός πώς ἐστιν.
But shape and nature are spoken of in two ways; for privation also is in some way form.
εἰ δ᾿ ἔστιν στέρησις καὶ ἐναντίον τι περὶ τὴν ἁπλῆν γένεσιν ἢ μὴ ἔστιν, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον.
But whether there is a privation and some contrary in simple generation, or there is not, must be investigated later.