§2.2Ἐπεὶ δὲ διώρισται ποσαχῶς ἡ φύσις, μετὰ τοῦτο θεωρητέον τίνι διαφέρει ὁ μαθηματικὸς τοῦ φυσικοῦ (καὶ γὰρ ἐπίπεδα καὶ στερεὰ ἔχει τὰ φυσικὰ σώματα καὶ μήκη καὶ στιγμάς, περὶ ὧν σκοπεῖ ὁ μαθηματικός)· ἔτι εἰ ἡ ἀστρολογία ἑτέρα ἢ μέρος τῆς φυσικῆς·
Since nature has been distinguished in how many ways it is spoken of, after this we must consider in what the mathematician differs from the physicist (for indeed physical bodies have surfaces and solids and lengths and points, about which the mathematician speculates); and furthermore, whether astrology is different from or a part of physics.
εἰ γὰρ τοῦ φυσικοῦ τὸ τί ἐστιν ἥλιος ἢ σελήνη εἰδέναι, τῶν δὲ συμβεβηκότων καθ᾿ αὑτὰ μηδέν, ἄτοπον, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὅτι φαίνονται λέγοντες οἱ περὶ φύσεως καὶ περὶ σχήματος σελήνης καὶ ἡλίου, καὶ δὴ καὶ πότερον σφαιροειδὴς ἡ γῆ καὶ ὁ κόσμος ἢ οὔ.
For if it is the business of the physicist to know what the sun or the moon is, but none of their essential attributes, it is absurd, especially since those who speak about nature also clearly speak about the shape of the moon and the sun, and indeed whether the earth and the universe are spherical or not.
περὶ τούτων μὲν οὖν πραγματεύεται καὶ ὁ μαθηματικός, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ᾗ φυσικοῦ σώματος πέρας ἕκαστον· οὐδὲ τὰ συμβεβηκότα θεωρεῖ ᾗ τοιούτοις οὖσι συμβέβηκεν·
Now, the mathematician also busies himself with these, but not insofar as each is a limit of a physical body; nor does he speculate on their attributes insofar as they belong to such things.
διὸ καὶ χωρίζει· χωριστὰ γὰρ τῇ νοήσει κινήσεώς ἐστι, καὶ οὐδὲν διαφέρει, οὐδὲ γίγνεται ψεῦδος χωριζόντων.
This is why he also separates them; for they are separable in thought from motion, and it makes no difference, nor does any falsehood result for those who separate them.
λανθάνουσι δὲ τοῦτο ποιοῦντες καὶ οἱ τὰς ἰδέας λέγοντες· τὰ γὰρ φυσικὰ χωρίζουσιν ἡττον ὄντα χωριστὰ τῶν μαθηματικῶν.
Those who assert the Ideas also do this without realizing it; for they separate physical things, though these are less separable than mathematical ones.
γίγνοιτο δ᾿ ἂν τοῦτο δῆλον, εἴ τις ἑκατέρων πειρῷτο λέγειν τοὺς ὅρους, καὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν συμβεβηκότων.
This would become clear if one should try to state the definitions of both, of the things themselves and of their attributes.
τὸ μὲν γὰρ περιττὸν ἔσται καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον καὶ τὸ εὐθὺ καὶ τὸ καμπύλον, ἔτι δὲ ἀριθμὸς καὶ γραμμὴ καὶ σχῆμα, ἄνευ κινήσεως, σὰρξ δὲ καὶ ὀστοῦν καὶ ἄνθρωπος οὐκέτι, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ὥσπερ ῥὶς σιμὴ ἀλλ᾿ οὐχ ὡς τὸ καμπύλον λέγεται.
For the odd, the even, the straight, and the curved, and furthermore number, line, and figure, will exist without motion, but flesh, bone, and man no longer so, but these are spoken of like a snub nose, and not as the curved is spoken of.
δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ φυσικώτερα τῶν μαθημάτων, οἷον ὀπτικὴ καὶ ἁρμονικὴ καὶ ἀστρολογία· ἀνάπαλιν γὰρ τρόπον τινʼ ἔχουσιν τῇ γεωμετρίᾳ.
This is also shown by the more physical of the mathematical sciences, such as optics, harmonics, and astrology; for they stand in an inverse relation to geometry.
ἡ μὲν γὰρ γεωμετρία περὶ γραμμῆς φυσικῆς σκοπεῖ, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ᾗ φυσική, ἡ δʼ ὀπτικὴ μαθηματιυκὴν μὲν γραμμήν, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ᾗ μαθηματικὴ ἀλλʼ ᾗ φυσική. ἐπεὶ δʼ ἡ φύσις διχῶς, τό τε
εἶδος καὶ ἡ ὕλη, ὡς ἂν εἰ περὶ σιμότητος σκοποῖμεν τί ἐστιν, οὕτω θεωρητέον· ὥστʼ οὔτʼ ἄνευ ὕλης τὰ τοιαῦτα οὔτε κατὰ τὴν ὕλην.
For geometry speculates about a physical line, but not insofar as it is physical, while optics speculates about a mathematical line, but not insofar as it is mathematical but insofar as it is physical. Since nature is twofold, both the form and the matter, we must speculate just as if we were considering what snub-nosedness is; so that such things are neither without matter nor according to the matter alone.
καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ περὶ τούτου ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις, ἐπεὶ δύο αἱ φύσεις, περὶ ποτέρας τοῦ φυσικοῦ.
Indeed, one might also raise a puzzle about this, since there are two natures, which of the two is the concern of the physicist.
ἢ περὶ τοῦ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν;
Or is it the concern of that which is composed of both?
ἀλλʼ εἰ περὶ τοῦ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, καὶ περὶ ἑκατέρας.
But if of that which is composed of both, then also of each of the two.
πότερον οὖν τῆς αὐτῆς ἢ ἄλλης ἑκατέραν γνωρίζειν;
Is it, then, the task of the same science or of different sciences to know each?
εἰς μὲν γὰρ τοὺς ἀρχαίους ἀποβλέψαντι δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι τῆς ὕλης (ἐπὶ μικρὸν γάρ τι μέρος Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ Δημόκριτος τοῦ εἴδους καὶ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι ἤψαντο)· εἰ δὲ ἡ τέχνη μιμεῖται τὴν φύσιν, τῆς δὲ αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης εἰδέναι τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὴν ὕλην μέχρι του (οἷον ἰατροῦ ὑγίειαν καὶ χολὴν καὶ φλέγμα, ἐν οἶς ἡ ὑγίεια, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἰκοδόμου τό τε εἶδος τῆς οἰκίας καὶ τὴν ὕλην, ὅτι πλίνθοι καὶ ξύλα· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων), καὶ τῆς φυσικῆς ἂν εἶη τὸ γνωρίζειν ἀμφοτέρας τὰς φύσεις.
If one looks at the ancients, it would seem to be the concern of matter (for Empedocles and Democritus touched upon form and the essence only to a small extent); but if art imitates nature, and it belongs to the same science to know the form and the matter up to a certain point (for example, the doctor knows health, and also the bile and phlegm in which health resides, and likewise the builder knows the form of the house and also the matter, that it is bricks and timber; and similarly in other cases), then it would also belong to physics to know both natures.
ἔτι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ τέλος τῆς αὐτῆς, καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἕνεκα.
Furthermore, that for the sake of which and the end belong to the same science, as well as whatever is for the sake of these.
ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα (ὧν γὰρ συνεχοῦς τῆς κινήσεως οὔσης ἔστι τι τέλος, τοῦτο τὸ ἔσχατον καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα· διὸ καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς γελοίως προήχθη εἰπεῖν “ἔχει τελευτήν, ἧσπερ οὕνεκ᾿ ἐγένετο”· βούλεται γὰρ οὐ πᾶν εἶναι τὸ ἔσχατον τέλος, ἀλλὰ τὸ βέλτιστον)·
And nature is an end and that for the sake of which (for in things where there is a continuous motion and there is some end, this last thing is also that for the sake of which; which is why the poet was ridiculously led to say "he has an end, for the sake of which he was born"; for he does not want every last thing to be an end, but only the best).
ἐπεὶ καὶ ποιοῦσιν αἱ τέχναι τὴν ὕλην αἱ μὲν ἁπλῶς αἱ δὲ εὐεργόν, καὶ χρώμεθα ὡς ἡμῶν ἕνεκα πάντων ὑπαρχόντων (ἐσμὲν γάρ πως καὶ ἡμεῖς τέλος· διχῶς γὰρ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα· εἴρηται δʼ ἐν τοῖς περὶ φιλοσοφίας.
Furthermore, the arts also make their matter, some simply and others making it workable, and we use all things as existing for our sake (for we too are in a way an end; for that for the sake of which is spoken of in two ways, as has been said in *On Philosophy*).
δύο δὲ αἱ ἄρχουσαι τῆς ὕλης καὶ γνωρίζουσαι τέχναι, ἥ χρωμένη καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἡ ἀρχιτεκτονική.
And there are two arts which rule over matter and know it: the one that uses it and the architectonic art of the productive ones.
διὸ καὶ ἡ χρωμένη ἀρχιτεκτονική πως, διαφέρει δὲ ᾗ ἡ μὲν τοῦ εἴδους γνωριστική, ἡ ἀρχιτεκτονική, ἡ δὲ ὡς ποιητική, τῆς ὕλης· ὁ μὲν γὰρ κυβερνήτης ποῖόν τι τὸ εἶδος τοῦ πηδαλίου γνωρίζει καὶ ἐπιτάττει, ὁ δʼ ἐκ ποίου ξύλου καὶ ποίων κινήσεων ἔσται.
This is why the using art is also in a way architectonic, but they differ insofar as the one is cognitive of the form, namely the architectonic, while the other is productive, namely of the matter; for the helmsman knows and prescribes what sort of form the rudder should have, while the other knows from what kind of wood and by what motions it will be made.
ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην ἡμεῖς ποιοῦμεν τὴν ὕλην τοῦ ἔργου ἕνεκα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς φυσικοῖς ὑπάρχει οὖσα.
In things according to art, therefore, we make the matter for the sake of the work, but in physical things it is already present.
ἔτι τῶν πρός τι ἡ ὕλη· ἄλλῳ γὰρ εἴδει ἄλλη ὕλη. μέχρι δὴ
πόσου τὸν φυσικὸν δεῖ εἰδέναι τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ τί ἐστιν;
Furthermore, matter is among relative things; for a different form requires a different matter. To what extent, then, must the physicist know the form and the essence?
ἢ ὥσπερ ἰατρὸν νεῦρον ἢ χαλκία χαλκόν, μέχρι τοῦ τίνος ἕνεκα ἕκαστον, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα ἅ ἐστι χωριστὰ μὲν εἴδει, ἐν ὕλῃ δέ;
Is it as the doctor knows tendon or the smith bronze, up to knowing what each is for the sake of, and concerning those things which are separable in form but exist in matter?
ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ καὶ ἥλιος.
For man generates man, and so does the sun.
πῶς δʼ ἔχει τὰ χωριστὸν καὶ τί ἐστι, φιλοσοφίας ἔργον διορίσαι τῆς πρώτης.
But how it is with that which is separable and what it is, is the task of first philosophy to determine.