§2.1#1Τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστι φύσει, τὰ δὲ διʼ ἄλλας αἰτίας, φύσει μὲν τά τε ζῷα καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ ἀπλᾶ τῶν σωμάτων, οἷον γῆ καὶ πῦρ καὶ ἀὴρ καὶ ὕδωρ (ταῦτα γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα φύσει φαμέν, πάντα δὲ ταῦτα φαίνεται διαφέροντα πρὸς τὰ μὴ φύσει συνεστῶτα.
Of things that exist, some exist by nature, and others through other causes. By nature are animals and their parts, and plants, and the simple bodies, such as earth, fire, air, and water (for we say that these and things of this sort exist by nature). And all these clearly differ from things that are not constituted by nature.
τούτων μὲν γὰρ ἕκαστον ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀρχὴν ἔχει κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως, τὰ μὲν κατὰ τόπον, τὰ δὲ κατʼ αὔξησι. καὶ φθίσιν, τὰ δὲ κατʼ ἀλλοίωσιν·
For each of these has in itself a principle of motion and of stationariness, some in respect of place, others in respect of growth and decrease, and others in respect of alteration.
κλίνη δὲ καὶ ἱμάτιον, καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἄλλο γένος ἐστίν, ᾗ μὲν τετύχηκε τῆς κατηγορίας ἑκάστης καὶ καθʼ ὅσον ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τέχνης, οὐδεμίαν ὁρμὴν ἔχει μεταβολῆς ἔμφυτον, ᾗ δὲ συμβέβηκεν αὐτοῖς εἶναι λιθίνοις ἢ γηίνοις ἢ μικτοῖς ἐκ τούτων, ἔχει, καὶ κατὰ τοσοῦτον, ὡς οὔσης τῆς φύσεως ἀρχῆς τινὸς καὶ αἰτίας τοῦ κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἠρεμεῖν ἐν ᾧ ὑπάρχει πρώτως καθʼ αὑτὸ καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός (λέγω δὲ τὸ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὅτι γένοιτʼ ἂν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ τις αἴτιος ὑγιείας ὢν ἰατρός· ἀλλʼ ὅμως οὐ καθὸ ὑγιάζεται τὴν ἰατρικὴν ἔχει, ἀλλὰ συμβέβηκεν τὸν αὐτὸν ἰατρὸν εἶναι καὶ ὑγιαζόμενον· διὸ καὶ χωρίζεταί ποτʼ ἀπʼ ἀλλήλων).
But a bed and a cloak, and if there is any other such class of things, insofar as they have met with each designation and insofar as they are products of art, have no innate impulse for change; but insofar as it happens to them to be of stone or of earth or of a mixture of these, they do have it, and just to that extent; since nature is a certain principle and cause of motion and of remaining at rest in that in which it belongs primarily in itself, and not by accident. (And I say "not by accident," because a doctor, being himself the cause of health to himself, might become so; but nevertheless it is not insofar as he is healed that he has the medical art, but it has happened that the same person is a doctor and is being healed; wherefore these are also at some time separated from each other).
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον τῶν ποιουμένων· οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἔχει τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ τῆς ποιήσεως, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἐν ἄλλοις καὶ ἔξωθεν, οἷον οἰκία καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν χειροκμήτων ἕκαστον, τὰ δʼ ἐν αὐτοῖς μὲν ἀλλʼ οὐ καθʼ αὐτά, ὅσα κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἴτια γένοιτʼ ἂν αὐτοῖς.
And likewise with each of the other things that are made; for none of them has in itself the principle of its making, but some have it in other things and from without, such as a house and each of the other handmade things, while others have it in themselves indeed but not in themselves, namely those which might become causes to themselves by accident.
φύσις μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ ῥηθέν· φύσιν δὲ ἔχει ὅσα τοιαύτην ἔχει ἀρχήν.
Nature, then, is what has been said; and those things have nature which have such a principle.
καὶ ἔστιν πάντα ταῦτα οὐσία· ὑποκείμενον γάρ τι, καὶ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις ἀεί.
And all these are substance; for it is a certain underlying subject, and nature is always in an underlying subject.
κατὰ φύσιν δὲ ταῦτά τε καὶ ὅσα τούτοις ὑπάρχει καθʼ αὐτά, οἷον τῷ πυρὶ φέρεσθαι ἄνω· τοῦτο γὰρ φύσις μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδʼ ἔχει φύσιν, φύσει δὲ καὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἐστίν.
And "according to nature" are both these things and whatever belongs to them in themselves, such as for fire to be carried upward; for this is not nature, nor does it have nature, but it is by nature and according to nature.
τί μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἡ φύσις, εἴρηται, καὶ τί τὸ φύσει καὶ κατὰ φύσιν.
What, then, nature is, has been said, and what "by nature" and "according to nature" are.
ὡς δʼ ἔστιν ἡ φύσις, πειρᾶσθαι δεικνύναι γελοῖον· φανερὸν γὰρ ὅτι τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν πολλά.
But to try to show that nature exists is ridiculous; for it is manifest that there are many such things among those that exist.
τὸ δὲ δεικνύναι τὰ φανερὰ διὰ τῶν ἀφανῶν οὐ δυναμένου κρίνειν ἐστὶ τὸ διʼ αὐτὸ καὶ μὴ διʼ αὑτὸ γνώριμον (ὅτι δʼ ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο πάσχειν, οὐκ ἄδηλον· συλλογίσαιτο γὰρ ἄν τις ἐκ γενετῆς ὢν τυφλὸς περὶ χρωμάτων), ὥστε ἀνάγκη τοῖς τοιούτοις περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων εἶναι τὸν λόγου, νοεῖν δὲ μηδέν.
And to show what is manifest through what is unmanifest belongs to one who is unable to distinguish what is known through itself from what is not known through itself (and that it is possible to suffer this is not unclear; for one who is blind from birth might syllogize about colors), so that for such people it is necessary that their talk is about names, but that they understand nothing.