§1.3#2ὅτι δὲ διαιρεῖται τὸ ὅπερ ὂν εἰς ὅπερ ὄν τι
ἄλλο, καὶ τῷ λόγῳ φανερόν, οἶον ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰ ἔστιν ὅπερ ὄν τι, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ζῷον ὅπερ ὄν τι εἶναι καὶ τὸ δίπουν.
That "essentially being" is divided into something else which is also "essentially being," is clear also from the definition. For example, if man is "essentially being" something, animal and two-footed must also be "essentially being" something.
εἰ γὰρ μὴ ὅπερ ὄν τι, συμβεβηκότα ἔσται.
For if they are not "essentially being" something, they will be accidents.
ἢ οὖν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἢ ἄλλῳ τινὶ ὑποκειμένῳ.
And they must be accidents either to man or to some other subject.
ἀλλʼ ἀδύνατον·
But this is impossible.
συμβεβηκός τε γὰρ λέγεται τοῦτο, ἢ ὃ ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, ἢ οὗ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ὑπάρχει τὸ ὧ συμβέβηκεν (οἶον τὸ μὲν καθῆσθαι ὡς χαωριζόμενον, ἐν δὲ τῷ σιμῷ ὑπάρχει ὁ λόγος ὁ τῆς ῥινὸς ᾗ φαμὲν συμβεβηκέναι τὸ σιμόν)·
For that is said to be an accident which either can belong and not belong, or in whose definition there is present that to which it is an accident (for example, "sitting" is like the separable kind, while in "snub" there is present the definition of the nose, to which we say snubness is an accident).
ἔτι ὅσα ἐν τῷ ὁριστικῷ λόγῳ ἔνεστιν ἢ ἐξ ὧν ἐστιν, ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ τούτων οὐκ ἐνυπάρχει ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ ὄλου, οἷον ἐν τῷ δίποδι ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἢ ἐν τῷ λευκῷ ὁ τοῦ λευκοῦ ἀνθρώπου.
Furthermore, as for those things which are in the defining formula or of which it consists, the formula of the whole does not inhere in the formula of these parts, for instance, the formula of man in "two-footed", or the formula of white man in "white".
εἰ τοίνυν ταῦτα τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ συμβέβηκε τὸ δίπουν, ἀνάγκη χωριστὸν εἶναι αὐτό, ὥστε ἐνδέχοιτο ἂν μὴ δίπουν εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἢ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ τοῦ δίποδος ἐνέσται ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου λόγος.
If, then, these things are so, and "two-footed" is an accident of "man", it must be separable, so that it would be possible for man not to be two-footed, or the formula of man will be in the formula of two-footed.
ἀλλʼ ἀδύνατον· ἐκεῖνο γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἐκείνου λόγῳ ἔνεστιν.
But this is impossible; for the former is in the formula of the latter.
εἰ δʼ ἄλλῳ συμβέβηκε τὸ δίπουν καὶ τὸ ζῷον, καὶ μὴ ἔστιν ἑκάτερον ὅπερ ὄν τι, καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἂν εἴη τῶν συμβεβηκότων ἑτέρῳ.
But if "two-footed" and "animal" are accidents of something else, and each is not "essentially being" something, then "man" too would be among the things that are accidents of something else.
ἀλλὰ τὸ ὅπερ ὄν ἔστω μηδενὶ συμβεβηκός, καὶ καθʼ οὗ ἄμφω, καὶ τὸ ἐκ τούτων λεγέσθω·
But let "essentially being" be an accident to nothing, and let that of which both are predicated, and that which is composed of these, be said to be essentially being.
ἐξ ἀδιαιρέτων ἄρα τὸ πᾶν;
Is the universe then composed of indivisibles?
ἔνιοι δʼ ἐνέδοσαν τοῖς λόγοις ἀμφοτέροις, τῷ μὲν ὅτι πάντα ἕν, εἰ τὸ ὂν ἓν σημαίνει, ὅτι ἔστι τὸ μὴ ὄν, τῷ δὲ ἐκ τῆς διχοτομίας, ἄτομα ποιήσαντες μεγέθη.
Some, however, gave in to both arguments: to the one, that all things are one if "being" signifies one thing, by saying that "not-being" exists; and to the other, from dichotomy, by making magnitudes indivisible.
φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθὲς ὡς, εἰ ἓν σημαίνει τὸ ὂν καὶ μὴ οἷόν τε ἅμα τὴν ἀντίφασιν, οὐκ ἔσται οὐθὲν μὴ ὄν· οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύει, μὴ ἁπλῶς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὄν τι εἶναι τὸ μὴ ὄν. τὸ δὲ δὴ φάναι, παρʼ αὐτὸ τὸ ὂν εἰ μή τι ἔσται ἄλλο, ἓν πάντα ἔσεσθαι, ἄτοπον.
But it is also clear that it is not true that, if "being" signifies one thing and it is not possible for the contradiction to be true at the same time, there will be no "not-being"; for nothing prevents "not-being" from, not being simply, but being some "not-being." And indeed, to say that, if there is to be nothing else besides "being itself", all things will be one, is absurd.
τίς γὰρ μανθάνει αὐτὸ τὸ ὂν εἰ μὴ τὸ ὅπερ ὄν τι εἶναι;
For who understands "being itself" other than to be "essentially being" something?
εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐδὲν ὅμως κωλύει πολλὰ εἶναι τὰ ὄντα, ὥσπερ εἴρηται.
And if so, nothing nevertheless prevents beings from being many, as has been said.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἓν εἶναι τὸ ὂν ἀδύνατον, δῆλον.
That, therefore, it is impossible for being to be one in this way, is clear.