§1.4#1Ὡς δʼ οἱ φυσικοὶ λέγουσι, δύο τρόποι εἰσίν.
As the physicists say, there are two ways.
οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ποιήσαντες τὸ σῶμα τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ἢ τῶν τριῶν τι ἢ ἄλλο ὅ ἐστι πυρὸς μὲν πυκνότερον ἀέρος δὲ λεπτότερον, τἆλλα γεννῶσι πυκνότητι καὶ μανότητι πολλὰ ποι. οῦντες (ταῦτα δʼ ἐστὶν ἐναντία, καθόλου δʼ ὑπεροχὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις, ὥσπερ τὸ μέγα φησὶ Πλάτων καὶ τὸ μικρόν, πλὴν ὅτι ὁ μὲν ταῦτα ποιεῖ ὕλην τὸ δὲ ἓν τὸ εἶδος, οἱ δὲ τὸ μὲν ἓν τὸ ὑποκείμενον ὕλην, τὰ δʼ ἐναντία διαφορὰς καὶ εἴδη)· οἱ δʼ ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐνούσας τὰς ἐναντιότητας ἐκκρίνεσθαι, ὥσπερ Ἀναξίμανδρός φησι, καὶ ὅσοι δʼ ἓν καὶ πολλά φασιν εἶναι, ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας· ἐκ τοῦ μίγματος γὰρ καὶ οὗτοι ἐκκρίνουσι τἆλλα, διαφέρουσι δὲ ἀλλήλων τῷ τὸν μὲν περίοδον ποιεῖν τούτων, τὸν δʼ ἅπαξ, καὶ τὸν μὲν ἄπειρα, τά τε ὁμοιομερῆ καὶ τἀναντία, τὸν δὲ τὰ καλούμενα στοιχεῖα μόνον.
For some, having made the underlying body one—either one of the three or something else which is denser than fire but rarer than air—generate other things by density and rarity, making them many (and these are contraries, and universally excess and defect, just as Plato speaks of the great and the small, except that he makes these matter and the one form, while they make the one underlying thing matter, and the contraries differences and forms); while others say that the contraries, being present in the one, are separated out, as Anaximander says, and as many as say that there are one and many, as Empedocles and Anaxagoras; for these too separate other things out of the mixture, but they differ from each other in that the former makes a cycle of these, the latter once for all, and the former makes them infinite—both the homoeomerous parts and the contraries—while the latter makes them only the so-called elements.
ἔοικε δὲ Ἀναξαγόρας ἄπειρα οὕτως οἰηθῆναι διὰ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν τὴν κοινὴν δόξαν τῶν φυσικῶν εἶναι ἀληθῆ, ὡς οὐ γιγνομένου οὐδενὸς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος (διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ οὕτω λέγουσιν, ἦν ὁμοῦ πάντα, καὶ τὸ γίγνεσθαι τοιόνδε καθέστηκεν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, οἱ δὲ σύγκρισιν καὶ διάκρισιν· ἔτι δʼ ἐκ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι ἐξ ἀλλήλων τἀναντία· ἐνυπῆρχεν ἄρα· εἰ γὰρ πᾶν μὲν τὸ γιγνόμενον ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι ἢ ἐξ ὄντων ἢ ἐκ μὴ ὄντων, τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐκ μὴ ὄντων γίγνεσθαι ἀδύνατον (περὶ γὰρ ταύτης ὁμογνωμονοῦσι τῆς δόξης ἄπαντες οἱ περὶ φύσεως. τὸ λοιπὸν ἤδη συμβαίνειν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐνόμισαν, ἐξ ὄντων μὲν καὶ ἐνυπαρχόντων γίγνεσθαι, διὰ μικρότητα δὲ τῶν ὄγκων ἐξ ἀναισθήτων ἡμῖν.
And Anaxagoras seems to have thought that they are infinite in this way because he assumed the common opinion of the physicists to be true, that nothing comes to be from not-being (for because of this they say 'all things were together', and coming to be is established as being altered in such a way, while others say it is combination and separation); and furthermore because contraries come to be from each other; they were present, therefore; for if everything that comes to be must come to be either from beings or from not-beings, and of these, coming to be from not-beings is impossible (for concerning this opinion all who speak about nature are of one mind), they thought that the remaining alternative already followed of necessity, namely, that they come to be from beings and from things already present, but because of the smallness of their bulks they are imperceptible to us.
διό φασι πᾶν ἐν παντὶ μεμῖχθαι, διότι πᾶν ἐκ παντὸς ἑώρων γιγνόμενον· φαίνεσθαι δὲ διαφέροντα καὶ προσαγορεύεσθαι ἕτερα ἀλλήλων ἐκ τοῦ μάλισθʼ ὑπερέχοντος διὰ πλῆθος ἐν τῇ μίξει τῶν ἀπείρων· εἰλικρινῶς μὲν γὰρ ὅλον λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν ἢ γλυκὺ ἢ σάρκα ἢ ὀστοῦν οὐκ εἶναι, ὅτου δὲ πλεῖστον ἕκαστον ἔχει, τοῦτο δοκεῖν εἶναι τὴν φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος.
For this reason they say that everything is mixed in everything, because they saw everything coming to be from everything; and they appear different and are called other than one another from that which most exceeds in quantity in the mixture of the infinites; for there is no whole that is purely white or black or sweet or flesh or bone, but that of which each thing has the most, this is thought to be the nature of the thing.
εἰ δὴ τὸ μὲν ἄπειρον ᾗ ἄπειρον ἄγνωστον,
τὸ μὲν κατὰ πλῆθος ἢ κατὰ μέγεθος ἄπειρον ἄγνωστον πόσον τι, τὸ δὲ κατʼ εἶδος ἄπειρον ἄγνωστον ποῖόν τι.
If, then, the infinite as infinite is unknowable, that which is infinite in quantity or magnitude is unknowable in how much it is, and that which is infinite in form is unknowable in what kind it is.
τῶν δʼ ἀρχῶν ἀπείρων οὐσῶν καὶ κατὰ πλῆθος καὶ κατʼ εἶδος, ἀδύνατον εἰδέναι τὰ ἐκ τούτων.
And since the principles are infinite both in quantity and in form, it is impossible to know the things composed of them.
οὕτω γὰρ εἰδέναι τὸ σύνθετον ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὅταν εἰδῶμεν ἐκ τίνων καὶ πόσων ἐστίν.
For we assume that we know the composite in this way, when we know of what things and of how many it consists.