§1.3#1Τόν τε δὴ τρόπον τοῦτον ἐπιοῦσιν ἀδύνατον φαίνεται τὰ ὄντα ἓν εἶναι, καὶ ἐξ ὧν ἐπιδεικνύουσι, λύειν οὐ χαλεπόν.
Thus, to those who proceed in this way, it appears impossible for beings to be one, and it is not difficult to solve [their arguments] from the premises by which they demonstrate.
ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἐριστικῶς συλλογίζονται, καὶ Μέλισσος καὶ Παρμενίδης μὲν οὖν παραλογίζεται Μέλισσος, δῆλον· οἴεται γὰρ εἰληφέναι, εἰ τὸ γενόμενον ἔχει ἀρχὴν ἅπαν, ὅτι καὶ τὸ μὴ γενόμενον οὐκ ἔχει.
For both of them reason eristically, both Melissus and Parmenides. Indeed, that Melissus paralogizes is clear; for he thinks he has assumed that, if everything that has come to be has a beginning, that which has not come to be does not have one.
εἶτα καὶ τοῦτο ἄτοπον, τὸ παντὸς εἶναι ἀρχήντοῦ πράγματος καὶ μὴ τοῦ χρόνου, καὶ γενέσεως μὴ τῆς ἁπλῆς ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀλλοιώσεως, ὥσπερ οὐκ ἀθρόας γιγνομένης μεταβολῆς.
Furthermore, this also is absurd, to hold that there is a beginning of everything—meaning of the thing and not of the time, and of coming to be not only in the simple sense but also as alteration, as if change does not happen all at once.
ἔπειτα διὰ τί ἀκίνητον, εἰ ἕν;
Next, why is it motionless if it is one?
ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὸ μέρος ἓν ὄν, τοδὶ τὸ ὕδωρ, κινεῖται ἐν ἑαυτῶ, διὰ τί οὐ καὶ τὸ πᾶν;
For just as the part, being one—for instance, this water here—moves within itself, why not the whole too?
ἔπειτα ἀλλοίωσις διὰ τί οὐκ ἂν εἴη;
Further, why should there not be alteration?
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῷ εἴδει οἷόν τε ἓν εἶναι, πλὴν τῷ ἐξ οὗ (οὕτως δὲ ἓν καὶ τῶν φυσικῶν τινες λέγουσιν, ἐκείνως δʼ οὔ)· ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἵππου ἕτερον τῷ εἴδει καὶ τἀναντία ἀλλήλων. καὶ πρὸς Παρμενίδην δὲ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος τῶν λόγων,
καὶ εἴ τινες ἄλλοι εἰσὶν ἴδιοι· καὶ ἡ λύσις τῇ μὲν ὅτι ψευδὴς τῇ δὲ ὅτι οὐ συμπεραίνεται, ψευδὴς μὲν ᾗ ἁπλῶς λαμβάνει τὸ ὂν λέγεσθαι, λεγομένου πολλαχῶς, ἀσυμπέραντος δὲ ὅτι, εἰ μόνα τὰ λευκὰ ληφθείη, σημαίνοντος ἓν τοῦ λευκοῦ, οὐθὲν ἧττον πολλὰ τὰ λευκὰ καὶ οὐχ ἕν· οὔτε γὰρ τῇ συνεχείᾳ ἓν ἔσται τὸ λευκὸν οὔτε τῷ λόγῳ.
But indeed, neither is it possible for being to be one in form, except in respect of that from which it is made (in which way some of the natural philosophers say it is one, but in that other way they do not); for man is different in form from horse, and contraries are different from one another.\nAnd the same mode of argument applies also against Parmenides, even if there are some other arguments peculiar to him; and the solution is in one respect because his premise is false, and in another because his conclusion does not follow; false, on the one hand, insofar as he assumes that 'being' is said simply, whereas it is said in many ways; and his conclusion does not follow because, even if only white things were assumed, and 'white' signified one thing, white things would nonetheless be many and not one; for the white will be one neither by continuity nor in definition.
ἄλλο γὰρ ἔσται τὸ εἶναι λευκῷ καὶ τῷ δεδεγμένῳ.
For to be white and to be that which has received it will be different.
καὶ οὐκ ἔσται παρὰ τὸ λευκὸν οὐθὲν χωριστόν· οὐ γὰρ ᾗ χωριστὸν ἀλλὰ τῷ εἶναι ἕτερον τὸ λευκὸν καὶ ᾧ ὑπάρχει.
And there will not be anything separable apart from the white; for it is not because it is separable, but because to be white and that in which it inheres are different in being.
ἀλλὰ τοῦτο Παρμενίδης οὔπω συνεώρα.
But Parmenides had not yet seen this.
ἀνάγκη δὴ λαβεῖν μὴ μόνον ἓν σημαίνειν τὸ ὄν, καθʼ οὗ ἂν κατηγορηθῇ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅπερ ὂν καὶ ὅπερ ἕν.
Thus, it is necessary to assume not only that 'being' signifies one thing, concerning whatever it may be predicated of, but also what is 'essentially being' and 'essentially one'.
τὸ γὰρ συμβεβηκὸς καθʼ ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται, ὥστε ᾧ συμβέβηκε τὸ ὄν, οὐκ ἔσται (ἕτερον γὰρ τοῦ ὄντος)· ἔσται τι ἄρα οὐκ ὄν.
For an accident is said of some subject, so that that to which being has happened as an accident will not be (for it is other than being); therefore there will be something which is not-being.
οὐ δὴ ἔσται ἄλλῳ ὑπάρχον τὸ ὅπερ ὄν.
Therefore, 'essentially being' cannot belong to another.
οὐ γὰρ ἔσται ὄν τι αὐτὸ εἶναι, εἰ μὴ πολλὰ τὸ ὂν σημαίνει οὕτως ὥστε εἶναί τι ἕκαστον.
For it cannot be that something itself is a being, unless 'being' signifies many things in such a way that each is something.
ἀλλʼ ὑπόκειται τὸ ὂν σημαίνειν ἕν.
But it is assumed that 'being' signifies one thing.
εἰ οὖν τὸ ὅπερ ὄν μηδενὶ συμβέβηκεν ἀλλὰ τὰ ἄλλα ἐκείνῳ, τί μᾶλλον τὸ ὅπερ ὂν σημαίνει τὸ ὂν ἢ μὴ ὄν;
If, then, 'essentially being' is an accident to nothing, but other things are accidents to it, why does 'essentially being' signify being any more than not-being?
εἰ γὰρ ἔσται τὸ ὅπερ ὂν καὶ λευκόν, τὸ λευκῷ δʼ εἶναι μὴ ἔστιν ὅπερ ὄν (οὐδὲ γὰρ συμβεβηκέναι αὐτῷ οἷόν τε τὸ ὄν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ὂν ὃ οὐχ ὅπερ ὄν), οὐκ ἄρα ἄν τὸ λευκόν· οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ὥσπερ τι μὴ ὄν, ἀλλʼ ὅλως μὴ ὄν.
For if 'essentially being' is also white, but 'to be white' is not 'essentially being' (for neither can being belong to it as an accident, since there is no being which is not 'essentially being'), then the white will not be being; and not in the sense of being some particular not-being, but as totally not-being.
τὸ ἄρα ὅπερ ὂν οὐκ ὄν· ἀληθὲς γὰρ εἰπεῖν ὅτι λευκόν, τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ὄν ἐσήμαινεν.
Therefore, 'essentially being' is not-being; for it is true to say that it is white, but this signified what is not-being.
ὥστε καὶ τὸ λευκὸν σημαίνει ὅπερ ὄν· πλείω ἄρα σημαίνει τὸ ὄν.
Consequently, even 'white' signifies 'essentially being'; and thus 'being' signifies more things than one.
οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ μέγεθος ἔξει τὸ ὄν, εἴπερ ὅπερ ὂν τὸ ὄν· ἑκατέρῳ γὰρ ἕτερον τὸ εἶναι τῶν μορίαων.
Therefore, being will not even have magnitude, if being is 'essentially being'; for to be is different for each of its parts.