§1.2#2οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων χωριστόν ἐστι παρὰ τὴν οὐσίαν· πάντα γὰρ καθʼ ὑποκειμένου λέγεται τῆς οὐσίας.
For none of the others is separable apart from substance; for all are said of substance as a subject.
Μέλισσος δὲ τὸ ὂ ἄπειρον εἶναί φησιν.
But Melissus says that being is infinite.
ποσὸν ἄρα τι τὸ ὄν· τὸ γὰρ ἄπειρον ἐν τῷ ποσῷ, οὐσίαν δὲ ἄπειρον εἶναι ἢ ποιότητα ἢ πάθος οὐκ ἐνδέχεται εἰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, εἰ ἅμα καὶ ποσὰ ἄττα εἶεν· ὁ γὰρ τοῦ ἀπείρου λόγος τῷ ποσῷ προσχρῆται, ἀλλʼ οὐκ οὐσίᾳ οὐδὲ τῷ ποιῶ.
Therefore, being is some quantity; for the infinite is in quantity, and it is not possible for substance or quality or affection to be infinite except by accident, if at the same time they should also be some quantities; for the definition of the infinite makes use of quantity, but not of substance or quality.
εἰ μὲν τοίνυν καὶ οὐσία ἔστι καὶ ποσόν, δύο καὶ οὐχ ἓν τὸ ὄν· εἰ δʼ οὐσία μόνον, οὐκ ἄπειρον, οὐδὲ μέγεθος ἕξει οὐδέν· ποσὸν γάρ τι ἔσται.
If, then, there is both substance and quantity, being is two and not one; but if there is substance only, it is not infinite, nor will it have any magnitude; for it will be some quantity.
ἔτι
ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν πολλαχῶς λέγεται ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὄν, σκεπτέον τίνα τρόπον λέγουσιν εἶναι ἓν τὸ πᾶν.
Furthermore, since 'one' itself is said in many ways just as 'being' is, we must consider in what way they say that the whole is one.
λέγεται δʼ ἓν ἢ τὸ συνεχὲς ἢ τὸ ἀδιαίρετον ἢ ὧν ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ εἶς ὁ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι, ὥσπερ μέθυ καὶ οἶνος.
Now, 'one' is said of either the continuous, or the indivisible, or those of which the definition is the same and one, namely that of the essence, as for example wine and must.
εἰ μὲν τοίνυν συνεχές, πολλὰ τὸ ἕν· εἰς ἄπειρον γὰρ διαιρετὸν τὸ συνεχές.
If, then, it is continuous, the one is many; for the continuous is divisible to infinity.
(ἔχει δʼ ἀπορίαν περὶ τοῦ μέρους καὶ τοῦ ὅλου, ἴσως δὲ οὐ πρὸς τὸν λόγον ἀλλʼ αὐτὴν καθʼ αὐτήν, πότερον ἓν ἢ πλείω τὸ μέρος καὶ τὸ ὅλον, καὶ πῶς ἓν ἢ πλείω, καὶ εἰ πλεία, πῶς πλείω, καὶ περὶ τῶν μερῶν τῶν μὴ συνεχῶν· καὶ εἰ τῷ ὅλῳ ἓν ἑκάτερον ὡς ἀδιαίρετον, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὰ αὑτοῖς. ) ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ ὡς ἀδιαίρετον, οὐθὲν ἔσται ποσὸν οὐδὲ ποιόν, οὐδὲ δὴ ἄπειρον τὸ ὄν, ὥσπερ Μέλισσός φησιν, οὐδὲ πεπερασμένον, ὥσπερ Παρμενίδης· τὸ γὰρ πέρας ἀδιαίρετον, οὐ τὸ πεπερασμένον.
(And there is a difficulty concerning the part and the whole—though perhaps not relevant to the argument but on its own account—whether the part and the whole are one or more, and how they are one or more, and if more, how more, and concerning the parts that are not continuous; and if each is one with the whole as indivisible, whether they are also one with themselves.) But indeed, if it is as indivisible, there will be no quantity nor quality, nor indeed will being be infinite, as Melissus says, nor finite, as Parmenides says; for the limit is indivisible, not the limited.
ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τῷ λόγῳ ἓν τὰ ὄντα πάντα ὡς λώπιον καὶ μάτιον, τὸν Ἡρακλείτου λόγον συμβαίνει λέγειν αὐτοῖς· ταὐτὸν γὰρ ἔσται ἀγαθῷ καὶ κακῷ εἶναι, καὶ ἀγαθῷ καὶ μὴ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι—ὥστε ταὐτὸν ἔσται ἀγαθὸν καὶ οὐκ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἵππος, καὶ οὐ περὶ τοῦ ἓν εἶναι τὰ ὄντα ὁ λόγος ἔσται ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ μηδέν—καὶ τὸ τοιῳδὶ εἶναι καὶ τοσῳδὶ ταὐτόν.
But indeed, if all beings are one in definition as cloak and mantle, it happens that they maintain the thesis of Heraclitus; for it will be the same to be good and to be bad, and to be good and to be not-good—so that the same thing will be good and not-good, and man and horse, and their argument will not be about beings being one, but about nothing—and to be of such a quality and to be of such a quantity will be the same.
ἐθορυβοῦντο δὲ καὶ οἱ ὕστεροι τῶν ἀρχαίων ὅπως μὴ ἄμα γένηται αὐτοῖς τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν καὶ πολλά.
And even the later of the ancients were troubled lest the same thing should become both one and many at the same time.
διὸ οἱ μὲν τὸ ἐστὶν ἀφεῖλον, ὥσπερ Λυκόφρων, οἱ δὲ τὴν λέξιν μετερρύθμιζον, ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὐ λευκός ἐστιν ἀλλὰ λελεύκωται, οὐδὲ βαδίζων ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ βαδίζει, ἵνα μή ποτε τὸ ἐστὶ προσάπτοντες πολλὰ εἶναι ποιῶσι τὸ ἕν, ὡς μοναχῶς λεγομένου τοῦ ἑνὸς ἢ τοῦ ὄντος.
Therefore, some took away the 'is', as Lycophron did, while others changed the expression, saying that a man is not 'white' but 'has been whitened', and is not 'walking' but 'walks', lest by attaching the 'is' they should make the one to be many, as if 'one' or 'being' were said in only one way.
πολλὰ δὲ τὰ ὄντα ἢ λόγῳ (οἷον ἄλλο τὸ λευκῷ εἶναι καὶ μουσικῷ, τὸ δʼ αὐτὸ ἄμφω· πολλὰ ἄρα τὸ ἕν) ἢ διαιρέσει, ὥσπερ τὸ ὅλον καὶ τὰ μέρη.
But beings are many either in definition (as it is different to be white and to be musical, yet the same thing is both; therefore the one is many) or by division, as the whole and the parts.
ἐνταῦθα δὲ ἤδη ἠπόρουν, καὶ ὡμολόγουν τὸ ἓν πολλὰ εἶναι—ὥσπερ οὐκ ἐνδεχόμενον ταὐτὸν ἕν τε καὶ πολλὰ εἶναι, μὴ τἀντικείμενα δέ· ἔστι γὰρ τὸ ἓν καὶ δυνάμει καὶ ἐντελεχείᾳ.
Here, then, they were already at a loss, and admitted that the one is many—as if it were not possible for the same thing to be both one and many, provided they are not opposites; for what is one is so both potentially and actually.