§1.2#1Ἀνάγκη δʼ ἤτοι μίαν εἶναι τὴν ἀρχὴν ἢ πλείους, καὶ εἰ μίαν, ἤτοι ἀκίνητον, ὥς φησι Παρμενίδης καὶ Μέλισσος, ἢ κινουμένην, ὥσπερ οἱ φυσικοί, οἱ μὲν ἀέρα φάσκοντες εἶναι οἱ δʼ ὕδωρ τὴν πρώτην ἀρχήν· εῖ δὲ πλείους, ἢ πεπερασμένας ἢ ἀπείρους, καὶ εἰ πεπερασμένας πλείους δὲ μιᾶς, ἢ δύο ἢ τρεῖς ἢ τέτταρας ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ ἀριθμόν, καὶ εἰ ἀπείρους, ἢ οὕτως ὥσπερ Δημόκριτος, τὸ γένος ἔν, σχήματι δὲ (διαφερούσας), ἢ εἴδει διαφερούσας ἢ καὶ ἐναντίας.
It is necessary that there is either one principle or more than one, and if one, either motionless, as Parmenides and Melissus say, or in motion, as the physicists say, some declaring air to be the first principle, others water; but if more than one, either finite or infinite, and if finite but more than one, either two or three or four or some other number, and if infinite, either in the way Democritus says, the genus being one, but differing in shape, or differing in species or even contrary.
ὁμοίως δὲ ζητοῦσι καὶ οἱ τὰ ὄντα ζητοῦντες πόσα· ἐξὧν γὰρ τὰ ὄντα ἐστὶ πρώτων, ζητοῦσιταῦτα πότερον ἓν ἢ πολλά, καὶ εἰ πολλά, πεπερασμένα ἢ ἄπειρα, ὥστε τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὸ στοιχεῖον ζητοῦσι πότερον ἓν ἢ πολλά.
In the same way also those who inquire how many beings there are make their inquiry; for they inquire whether those first things from which beings are composed are one or many, and if many, whether finite or infinite, so that they are inquiring whether the principle and the element are one or many.
τὸ μὲν
οὖν εἰ ἓν καὶ ἀκίνητον τὸ ὂν σκοπεῖν οὐ περὶ φύσεος ἐστι σκοπεῖν· ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τῷ γεωμέτρῃ οὐκέτι λόγος ἔστι πρὸς τὸν ἀνελόντα τὰς ἀρχάς, ἀλλʼ ἤτοι ἑτέρας ἐπιστήμης ἢ πασῶν κοινῆς, οὕτως οὐδὲ τῷ περὶ ἀρχῶν· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἀρχὴ ἔστιν, εἰ ἓν μόνον καὶ οὕτως ἓν ἔστιν.
Now, to examine whether being is one and motionless is not to examine about nature; for just as the geometer no longer has any argument against one who denies the principles, but this belongs either to another science or to one common to all, so it is also for the inquirer about principles; for there is no longer a principle if there is only one, and if it is one in this way.
γὰρ ἀρχὴ τινὸς ἢ τινῶν.
For a principle is of something or of some things.
ὅμοιον δὴ τὸ σκοπεῖν εἰ οὕτως ἓν καὶ πρὸς ἄλλην θέσιν ὁποιανοῦν διαλέγεσθαι τῶν λόγου ἕνεκα λεγομένων (οἷον τὴν Ἡρακλείτειον, ἢ εἴ τις φαίη ἄνθρωπον ἕνα τὸ ὂ εἶναι), ἢ λύειν λόγον ἐριστικόν, ὅπερ ἀμφότεροι μὲν ἔχουσιν οἱ λόγοι, καὶ ὁ Μελίσσου καὶ ὁ Παρμενίδου· καὶ γὰρ ψευδῆ λαμβάνουσι καὶ ἀσυλλόγιστοί εἰσιν·
To examine whether it is one in this way is like arguing against any other thesis of those maintained for the sake of argument (such as that of Heraclitus, or if someone were to say that being is one man), or like refuting an eristic argument, which both of their arguments are, both that of Melissus and that of Parmenides; for they both assume false premises and are invalid in reasoning.
μᾶλλον δʼ ὁ Μελίσσου φορτικὸς καὶ οὐκ ἔχων ἀπορίαν, ἀλλʼ ἑνὸς ἀτόπου δοθέντος τὰ ἄλλα συμβαίνει· τοῦτο δὲ οὐδὲν χαλεπόν.
Or rather, that of Melissus is crude and offers no difficulty, but one absurdity having been granted, the rest follows; and this is nothing difficult.
ἡμῖν δʼ ὑποκείσθω τὰ φύσει ἢ πάντα ἢ ἔνια κινούμενα εἶναι· δῆλον δʼ ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς.
But let it be assumed by us that things by nature are either all or some of them in motion; and this is clear from induction.
ἅμα δʼ οὐδὲ λύειν ἅπαντα προσήκει, ἀλλʼ ἢ ὅσα ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν τις ἐπιδεικνὺς ψεύδεται, ὅσα δὲ μή, οὔ, οἷον τὸν τετραγωνισμὸν τὸν μὲν διὰ τῶν τμημάτων γεωμετρικοῦ διαλῦσαι, τὸν δὲ Ἀντιφῶντος οὐ γεωμετρικοῦ·
At the same time, it is not proper to refute everything, but only as many as someone, while demonstrating from the principles, falsely concludes, but as many as do not, not; for example, to refute the squaring of the circle by segments is the task of a geometer, but that of Antiphon is not the task of a geometer.
οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ ἐπειδὴ περὶ φύσεως μὲν οὔ, φυσικὰς δὲ ἀπορίας συμβαίνει λέγειν αὐτοῖς, ἴσως ἔχει καλῶς ἐπὶ μικρὸν διαλεχθῆναι περὶ αὐτῶν· ἔχει γὰρ φιλοσοφίαν ἡ σκέψις.
Nevertheless, since, though not about nature, it happens that they speak of physical difficulties, it is perhaps well to discuss them a little; for the inquiry has philosophical interest.
ἀρχὴ
δὲ οἰκειοτάτη πασῶν, ἐπειδὴ πολλαχῶς λέγεται τὸ ὄν, πῶς λέγουσιν οἱ λέγοντες εἶναι ἓν τὰ πάντα, πότερον οὐσίαν τὰ πάντα ἢ ποσὰ ἢ ποιά, καὶ πάλιν πότερον οὐσίαν μίαν τὰ πάντα, οἷον ἄνθρωπον ἕνα ἢ ἵππον ἕνα ἢ ψυχὴν μίαν, ἢ ποιὸν ἓν δὲ τοῦτο, οἷον λευκὸν ἢ θερμὸν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τι τῶν τοιούτων.
The most appropriate principle of all, since 'being' is said in many ways, is to ask how those who say that all things are one are speaking: whether all things are substance, or quantities, or qualities; and again, whether all things are one substance, as for example one man or one horse or one soul, or one quality, such as white or hot or some other such thing.
ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα διαφέρει τε πολὺ καὶ ἀδύνατα λέγειν.
For all these are very different and impossible to say.
εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἔσται καὶ οὐσία καὶ ποιὸν καὶ ποσόν, καὶ ταῦτα εἴτʼ ἀπολελυμένα ἀπʼ ἀλλήλων εἴτε μή, πολλὰ τὰ ὄντα· εἰ δὲ πάντα ποιὸν ἢ ποσόν, εἶτʼ οὕσης οὐσίας εἴτε μὴ οὔσης, ἄτοπον, εἰ δεῖ ἄτοπον λέγειν τὸ ἀδύνατον.
For if there will be both substance and quality and quantity, whether these are separated from each other or not, beings are many; but if all things are quality or quantity, whether substance exists or does not, it is absurd, if indeed we must call the impossible absurd.