§1.1.17καὶ ὅτι λεκτέον ὡς τοιοῦτον τὸ ζῴον, καὶ περὶ ἐκείνου, καὶ τί καὶ ποῖόν τι, καὶ τῶν μορίων ἕκαστον, ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τοῦ εἴδους τῆς κλίνης.
And that we must state that the animal is of such-and-such a kind, and about that [entire animal], both what it is and of what kind, and each of its parts, just as also about the form of the bed.
εἰ δὴ τοῦτό ἐστι ψυχὴ ἢ ψυχῆς μέρος ἢ μὴ ἄνευ ψυχῆς (ἀπελθούσης γοῦν οὐκέτι ζῷόν ἐστιν, οὐδὲ τῶν μορίων οὐδὲν τὸ αὐτὸ λείπεται, πλὴν τῷ σχήματι μόνον, καθάπερ τὰ μυθευόμενα λιθοῦσθαι), εἰ δὴ ταῦτα οὕτως, τού φυσικοῦ περὶ ψυχῆς ἂν εἴη λέγειν καὶ εἰδέναι, καὶ εἰ μὴ πάσης, κατ᾿ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καθʼ ὃ τοιοῦτο τὸ ζῷον, καὶ τί ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ, ἢ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ μόριον, καὶ περὶ τῶν συμβεβηκότων κατὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αὐτῆς οὐσίαν, ἄλλως τε καὶ τῆς φύσεως διχῶς λεγομένης καὶ οὔσης, τῆς μὲν ὡς ὕλης, τῆς δʼ ὡς οὐσίας.
If, then, this is the soul, or a part of the soul, or not without the soul (at any rate, when the soul has departed, it is no longer an animal, nor does any of its parts remain the same, except in shape alone, just like those in myths said to be turned into stone), if, then, these things are so, it would belong to the natural philosopher to speak about and know the soul—and if not all of it, yet in respect of this very point according to which the animal is of such-and-such a kind—and what the soul is, or this very part of it, and about the attributes that belong to it according to such an essence of it, especially since nature is spoken of in two ways and exists in two ways, the one as matter, and the other as essence.
καὶ ἔστιν αὕτη καὶ ὡς ἡ κινοῦσα καὶ ὡς τὸ τέλος.
And this latter exists both as that which moves and as the end.
τοιοῦτον δὲ τοῦ ζ´ ωου ἤτοι πάσα ἡ ψυχὴ ἢ μέρος τι αὐτῆς.
And such a thing for the animal is either the whole soul or some part of it.
ὥστε καὶ οὕτως ἂν λεκτέον εἴη τῷ περὶ φύσεως θεωρητικῷ περὶ ψυχῆς μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ τῆς ὕλης, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον ἡ ὕλῃ διʼ ἐκείνην φύσις ἐστὶν ἢ ἀνάπαλιν.
So that in this way too, it would be the task of the student of nature to speak about the soul rather than about the matter, inasmuch as matter is nature because of the soul (the former) rather than the reverse.
καὶ γὰρ κλίνη καὶ τρίπους τὸ ξύλον ἐστίν, ὅτι δυνάμει ταῦτά ἐστιν.
For wood is a bed and a tripod because it is these potentially.
§1.1.18ἀπορήσειε δʼ ἄν τις 18 εἰς τὸ νῦν λεχθὲν ἐπιβλέψας, πότερον περὶ πάσης ψυχῆς τῆς φυσικῆς ἐστὶ τὸ εἰπεῖν ἢ περί τινος.
But someone might be puzzled, looking at what has just been said, whether it is the task of natural science to speak about the whole soul or about some part.
εἰ γὰρ περὶ πάσης, οὐδεμία λείπεται παρὰ τὴν φυσικὴν ἐπιστήμην φιλοσοφία.
For if about all, no philosophy is left besides natural science.
ὁ γὰρ νοῦς τῶν νοητῶν.
For intellect belongs to the objects of thought.
ὥστε περὶ πάντων ἡ φυσικὴ γνῶσις ἂν εἴη· τῆς γὰρ αὐτῆς περὶ νοῦ καὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ θεωρῆσαι, εἴπερ πρὸς ἄλληλα, καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ θεωρία τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα πάντων, καθάπερ καὶ περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν.
So that natural knowledge would be about all things; for it belongs to the same science to contemplate both intellect and the object of thought, if indeed they are relative to each other, and the contemplation of all relative terms is the same, just as it is also about sensation and sensible objects.
ἢ οὐκ ἔστι πᾶσα ἡ ψυχὴ κινήσεως ἀρχὴ, οὐδὲ τὰ μόρια ἅπαντα, ἀλλʼ αὐξήσεως μὲν ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς, ἀλλοιώσεως δὲ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, φορᾶς δʼ ἔτερόν τι καὶ οὐ τὸ νοητικόν·
Or is it that not the whole soul is the principle of motion, nor all its parts, but [the principle] of growth is that which is also in plants, and of alteration is the sensitive part, and of locomotion is some other part and not the intellectual part?
ὑπάρχει γὰρ ἡ φορὰ καὶ ἐν ἑτέροις τῶν ζῴων, διάνοια δʼ οὐδενί.
For locomotion belongs also to others of the animals, but thought to none.
§1.1.19δῆλον οὖν ὡς οὐ 19 περὶ πάσης ψυχῆς λεκτέον· οὐδὲ γὰρ πᾶσα ψυχὴ φύσις, ἀλλά τι μόριον αὐτῆς ἓν ἢ καὶ πλείω.
It is clear, then, that we must not speak about the whole soul; for not even the whole soul is nature, but some one part of it, or even more.
ἕτι δὲ τῶν ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως οὐδενὸς οἷόν τʼ εἶναι τὴν φυσικὴν θεωρητικὴν, ἐπειδὴ ἡ φύσις ἕνεκά του ποιεῖ πάντα.
And further, it is impossible for natural science to be contemplative of any of the things [derived] from abstraction, since nature does everything for the sake of something.
φαίνεται γάρ, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς τεχναστοῖς ἐστὶν ἡ τέχνη, οὕτως ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς πράγμασιν ἄλλη τις ἀρχὴ καὶ αἰτία τοιαύτη, ἣν ἔχομεν καθάπερ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν ἐκ τοῦ παντὸς.
For it seems that, just as in things made by art there is art, so in the things themselves there is another such principle and cause, which we have [derived] from the universe, just as we have the hot and the cold.
διὸ μᾶλλον εἰκὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν γεγενῆσθαι ὑπὸ τοιαύτης αἰτίας, εἰ γέγονε, καὶ εἶναι διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ ζῷα τὰ θνητά· τὸ γοῦν τεταγμένον καὶ τὸ ὡρισμένον πολὺ μᾶλλον φαίνεται ἐν τοῖς οὐρανίοις ἢ περὶ ἡμᾶς, τὸ· δʼ ἄλλοτʼ ἄλλως καὶ ὡς ἔτυχε περὶ τὰ θνητὰ μάλλον.
Therefore, it is more reasonable that the heaven has been generated by such a cause, if it has been generated, and exists because of such a cause, rather than the mortal animals; at any rate, the ordered and the defined appear much more in the heavenly things than around us, whereas the fluctuating and the chance-like appear rather in the mortal things.
§1.1.2020 οἱ δὲ τῶν μὲν ζῴων ἕκαστον φύσει φασὶν εἶναι καὶ γενέσθαι, τὸν δʼ οὐρανὸν ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ τοῦ αὐτομάτου τοιοῦτον συστῆναι, ἐν ᾧ ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ ἀταξίας οὐδʼ ὁτιοῦν φαίνεται.
But they say that each of the animals exists and has been generated by nature, but that the heaven was constituted in such a way by chance and spontaneity, in which not even anything whatsoever of chance and disorder appears.
πανταχοῦ δὲ λέγομεν τόδε τοῦδʼ ἕνεκα, ὅπου ἂν φαίνηται τέλος τι πρὸς ὃ ἡ κίνησις περαίνει μηδενὸς ἐμποδίζοντος.
And we say everywhere that this is for the sake of that, wherever there appears some end toward which the motion terminates when nothing impedes.
ὥστε εἶναι φανερὸν ὅτι ἔστι τι τοιοῦτον, ὃ δὴ καὶ καλοῦμεν φύσιν.
So that it is clear that there exists something of this kind, which we indeed call nature.
οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὅ τι ἔτυχεν ἐξ ἑκάστου γίνεται σπέρματος, ἀλλὰ τόδε ἐκ τοῦδε, οὐδὲ σπέρμα τὸ τυχὸν ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντος σήματος.
For surely not whatever happens comes to be from each seed, but this from this, nor does any chance seed come from any chance body.