§1.1.2121 ἀρχὴ ἄρα καὶ ποιητικὸν τοῦ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τὸ σπέρμα.
21 Therefore, the seed is a principle and productive of that which comes from it.
φύσει γὰρ ταῦτα· φύεται γοῦν ἐκ τούτου.
For these things are by nature; at any rate, they grow from this.
ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔτι τούτου πρότερον τὸ σὗ τὸ σπέρμα· γένεσις μὲν γὰρ τὸ σπέρμα, οὐσία δὲ τὸ τέλος.
But yet, prior to this is that of which it is the seed; for the seed is generation, but the end is essence.
ἀμφοῖν δʼ ἔτι πρότερον, ἀφʼ οὗ ἐστὶ τὸ σπέρμα.
And prior to both of these is that from which the seed is.
ἔστι γὰρ τὸ σπέρμα διχῶς, ἐξ οὗ τε καὶ οὗ· καὶ γὰρ ἀφʼ οὗ ἀπῆλθε, τούτου σπέρμα, οἷον ἵππου, καὶ τούτου ὃ ἔσται ἐξ αὐτοῦ, οἷον ὀρέως, τρόπον δʼ οὐ τὸν αὐτόν, ἀλλʼ ἑκατέρου τὸν εἰρημένον.
For the seed is in two ways, both "that from which" and "that of which"; for it is the seed both of that from which it departed, such as a horse, and of that which will be from it, such as a mule, though not in the same way, but each in the way mentioned.
§1.1.2222 ἔτι δὲ δυνάμει τὸ σπέρμα· δύναμις δʼ ὡς ἔχει πρὸς ἐντελέχειαν, ἴσμεν.
22 And further, the seed is potentially; and we know how potentiality stands to actuality.
εἰσὶν ἄρα δύʼ αἰτίαι αὗται, τό θʼ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης· πολλὰ γὰρ γίνεται, ὅτι ἀνάγκη.
Therefore, there are these two causes: that for the sake of which, and that from necessity; for many things come to be because it is necessary.
ἴσως δʼ ἄν τις ἀπορήσειε ποίαν λέγουσιν ἀνάγκην οἱ λέγντες ἐξ ἀνάγκης· τῶν μὲν γὰρ δύο τρόπων οὐδέτερον οἷόν θʼ ὑπάρχειν, τῶν διωρισμένων ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν.
But perhaps someone might be puzzled as to what kind of necessity those who say "from necessity" are speaking of; for of the two ways, neither can belong, of those defined in the writings on philosophy.
ἔστι δʼ ἔν γε τοῖς ἔχουσι γένεσιν ἡ τρίτη· λέγομεν γὰρ τὴν τρογὴν φὴν ἀναγκαῖόν τι κατ᾿ οὐδέτερον τούτων τῶν τρπων, ἀλλʼ ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τʼ ἄνευ ταύτης εἶναι.
But in things that have generation, there is a third kind; for we say that food is something necessary, not according to either of these two ways, but because it is impossible to be without it.
τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἐξ ὑπσθέσεως· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐπεὶ δεῖ σχίζειν τῷ πελέκει, ἀνάγκη σκληρὸν εἶναι, εἰ δὲ σκληρόν χαλκοῦν σιδηροῦν, οὕτω καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ σῶμα ὄργανον (ἕνεκά τινος γὰρ ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ὅλον), ἀνάγκη ἄρα τοιονδὶ εἶναι καὶ ἐκ τοιωνδί, εἰ ἐκεῖνο ἔσται.
And this is, as it were, hypothetical; for just as since it is necessary to split with the axe, it is necessary for it to be hard, and if hard, of bronze or iron, so also since the body is an instrument (for each of the parts is for the sake of something, and likewise also the whole), it is therefore necessary for it to be of such-and-such a kind and from such-and-such things, if that [end] is to be.
§1.1.23ὅτι μὲν οὖν δύο τρόποι τῆς 23 αἰτίας, καὶ δεῖ λέγοντας τυγχάνειν μάλιστα μὲν ἀμφοῖν, εἰ δὲ μὴ, δῆλόν γε πειρᾶσθαι ποιεῖν, καὶ ὅτι πάντες οἱ τοῦτο μὴ λέγοντες οὐδὲν ὡς εἰπεῖν περὶ φύσεως λέγουσιν· ἀρχὴ γὰρ ἡ φύσις μᾶλλον τῆς ὕλης.
That there are, then, two ways of 23 cause, and that those who speak must succeed in hitting upon both if possible, or if not, must clearly attempt to do so, and that all those who do not speak of this say virtually nothing about nature, is clear; for nature is a principle more than matter.
ἐνιαχοῦ δέ που αὐτῇ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς περιπίπτει, ἀγόμενος ὑπʼ αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας, καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὴν φύσιν ἀναγκάζεται φάναι τὸν λόγον εἶναι, οἷον ὀστοῦν ἀποδιδοὺς τί ἐστιν· οὔτε γὰρ ἕν τι τῶν στοιχείων λέγει αὐτὸ οὔτε δύο ἢ τρία οὔτε πάντα, ἀλλὰ λόγον τῆς μίξεως αὐτῶν.
And even Empedocles occasionally stumbles upon this, led by truth itself, and is forced to say that the essence and nature is the ratio, as when he defines what bone is; for he does not say that it is any one of the elements, nor two or three, nor all, but the ratio of their mixture.
§1.1.24δῆλον τοίνυν 24 ὅτι καὶ ἡ σὰρξ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐστί, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων μορίῶν ἕκαστον.
It is clear, then, 24 that flesh also is in the same way, and each of the other such parts.
σἴτιον δὲ τοῦ μὴ ἐλθεῖν τοὺς προγενεστέρους ἐπὶ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, ὅτι τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὸ ὁρίσασθαι τὴν οὐσίαν οὐκ ἦν, ἀλλʼ ἥψατο μὲν Δημόκριτος πρῶτος, ὡς οὐκ ἀναγκαίου δὲ τῇ φυσικῇ θεωρίᾳ, ἀλλʼ ἐκφερόμενος ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος· ἐπὶ Σωκράτους δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ηὐξήθη, τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν τὰ περὶ φύσεως ἔληξε, πρὸς δὲ τὴν χρήσιμον ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀπέκλιναν οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες.
And the cause why our predecessors did not arrive at this way is that the essence (what it is to be) and the defining of essence did not exist, but Democritus touched upon it first, yet not as being necessary for natural contemplation, but being carried away by the thing itself; and in the time of Socrates this [inquiry] increased, but the seeking after nature ceased, and those who philosophized turned aside toward useful virtue and politics.
§1.1.25δεικτέον δʼ οὕτως, οἷον ὅτι 25 ἔστι μὲν ἡ ἀναπνοὴ τουδὶ χάριν, τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται διὰ τάδε ἐξ ἀνάγκης.
And we must demonstrate in this way, for example, that 25 respiration is for the sake of this, and this comes to be because of these things from necessity.
ἡ δʼ ἀνάγκη ὁτὲ μὲν σημαίνει ὅτι εἰ ἐκεῖνο ἔσται τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, ταύτα ἀνάγκη ἐστὶν ἔχειν, ὁτὲ δʼ ὅτι ἔστιν οὕτως ἔχοντα καὶ πεφυκότα.
And necessity sometimes means that if that "for the sake of which" is to be, these things must necessarily be had, and sometimes that things are thus and have such a nature.
τὸ θερμὸν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον ἐξιέναι καὶ πάλιν εἰσιέναι ἀντικροῦον, τὸν δʼ ἀέρα εἰσρεῖν.
For it is necessary for the hot to go out and, meeting resistance, to enter again, and for the air to flow in.
τοῦτο δʼ ἤδη ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν.
And this is already necessary.
τού ἐντὸς δὲ θερμοῦ ἀντικόπτοντος ἐν τῇ ψύξει τού θύραθεν ἀέρος ἡ εἴσοδος καὶ ἡ ἔξοδσς ὁ μὲν οὖν τρόπος οὗτος ὁ τῆς μεθόδου, καὶ περὶ ὧν δεῖ λαβεῖν τὰς αἰτίας, ταύτα καὶ τοιαῦτά ἐστιν.
And while the internal hot resists during the cooling by the external air, the inflow and outflow [occur]. This, then, is the way of the method, and the causes we must grasp, both these and of such a kind, are these.