Humanitext Reader

Aristotle · Parts of Animals §1.1.11-1.1.16

Critique of Material Causes and the Primacy of Form and Function

Passage 3 of 84 · Greek

Summary

Criticizes the early natural philosophers for their material-only explanations, and argues that form and function must take precedence in explaining animal bodies, using the inadequacy of Democritus's view of form and the analogy of a carpenter.

§1.1.1111 οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀρχαῖοι καὶ πρῶτοι φιλοσοφήσαντες περὶ φύσεως περὶ τῆς ὑλικῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης αἰτίας ἐσκόπουν, τίς καὶ ποία τις, καὶ πῶς ἐκ ταύτης γίνεται τὸ ὅλον, καὶ τίνος κινοῦντος, οἷον νείκους ἢ φιλίας ἢ υοῦ ἢ τοῦ αὐτομάτου, τῆς δʼ ὑποκειμένης ὕλης τοιάνδε τινὰ φύσιν ἐχούσης ἐξ ἀνάγκης, οἷον τοῦ μὲν πυρὸς θερμὴν, τῆς δὲ γῆς ψυχράν, καὶ τοῦ μὲν κούφην, τῆς δὲ βαρεῖαν.
Therefore, the ancients and the first who philosophized about nature were investigating the material principle and such a cause, what it is and of what kind, and how the whole comes to be from this, and by what moving agent, such as strife or friendship or intellect or the spontaneous, while the underlying matter has by necessity such-and-such a nature, as for instance fire has a hot nature, and earth a cold one, and fire a light one, and earth a heavy one.
οὕτω γὰρ καὶ τὸν κόσμον γεννῶσιν.
For in this way they also generate the cosmos.
§1.1.12ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ 12 περὶ τὴν τῶν ζῴων καὶ τῶν φυτῶν γένεσιν λέγουσιν, οἷον ὅτι ἐν τῷ σώματι ῥέοντος μὲν τοῦ ὕδατος κοιλίαν γενέσθαι καὶ πᾶσον ὑποδοχὴν τῆς τε τροφῆς καὶ τοῦ περιττώματος, τοῦ δὲ πνεύματος διαπορευθέντος τοὺς μυκτῆρας ἀναρραγῆναι.
And similarly they also speak 12 about the generation of animals and plants, as for instance that, because water flowed in the body, the stomach and every receptacle of food and residue came to be, and because the breath passed through, the nostrils were broken open.
ὁ δʼ ἀὴρ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ ὕλη τῶν σωμάτων ἐστίν· ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων γὰρ σωμάτων συνιστᾶσι τὴν φύσιν πάντες.
But air and water are the matter of bodies; for from such bodies everyone constitutes nature.
εἰ δʼ ἔστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὰ ζῷα φύσει καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτῶν, λεκτέον ἂν περὶ σαρκὸς εἴη καὶ ὀστοῦ καὶ αἵματος καὶ τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν ἁκάντων.
But if man and animals and their parts exist by nature, then we would have to speak about flesh, bone, blood, and all the homoeomerous parts.
§1.1.13ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν 13 ἀνομοιομερῶν, οἷον προσώπου, χειρὸς, ποδὸς, ᾗ τε τοιοῦτον ἕκαστόν ἐστιν αὐτῶν καὶ κατὰ ποίαν δύναμιν.
And similarly about the 13 anhomoeomerous parts, such as face, hand, foot, in what way each of them is such-and-such and according to what power.
οὐ γὰρ ἱκανὸν τὸ ἐκ τίνων ἐστίν, οἷον πυρὸς ἢ γῆς, ὥσπερ κἀν εἰ περὶ κλίνης ἐλέγομεν ἢ τινος ἄλλου τῶν τοιούτων, ἐπειρώμεθα μᾶλλον ἂν διορίζειν τὸ εἶδος αὐτῆς ἢ τὴν ὕλην, οἷον τὸν χαλκὸν τὸ εύλον· λον· εἰ δὲ μὴ, τὴν γε τοῦ συνόλου·
For it is not sufficient [to state] of what things they consist, such as fire or earth, just as if we were speaking about a bed or some other such thing, we would try rather to define its form than its matter, such as bronze or wood; and if not that, at least the form of the composite.
κλίνη γὰρ τόδε ἐν τῷδε τόδε τοιόνδε, ὥστε κἀν περὶ τού σχήματος εἴη λεκτέον, καὶ ποῖον τὴν ἰδέαν·
For a bed is this in this, or this of such-and-such a kind, so that we would have to speak also about its shape, and what kind of form it has.
ἡ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν μορφὴν φύσις κυριωτέρα τῆς ὑλικῆς φύσεως.
For nature according to form is more dominant than material nature.
§1.1.14εἰ μὲν 14 οὖν τῷ σχήματι καὶ τῷ χρώματι ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῶν τε ζῴων καὶ τῶν μορίων, ὀρθῶς ἂν Δημόκριτος λέγοι· φαίνεται γὰρ οὕτως ὑπολαβεῖν.
If, 14 then, each of the animals and of their parts exists by its shape and color, Democritus would speak correctly; for he seems to have assumed so.
φησὶ γοῦν παντὶ δῆλον εἶναι οἷόν τι τὴν μορφήν ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὡς ὄντος αὐτοῦ τῷ τε σχήματι καὶ τῷ χρώματι γνωρίμου.
At least he says that it is clear to everyone of what kind of form man is, as he is recognizable by his shape and color.
καίτοι καὶ ὁ τεθνεὼς ἔχει τὴν αὐτὴν τοῦ σχήματος μορφὴν, ἀλλʼ ὅμως οὐκ ἔστιν ἅνθρωπος.
And yet even a dead man has the same shape of form, but nevertheless he is not a man.
§1.1.15ἔτι 15 δʼ ἀδύνατον εἶναι χεῖρα ὁπωσοῦν διακειμένην, οἷον χαλκῆν ξυλίνην, πλὴν ὁμωνύμως, ὥσπερ τὸν γεγραμμένον ἰατρόν.
And further, 15 it is impossible for a hand in whatever state it may be, such as a bronze or a wooden one, to be a hand except homonymously, just like a painted physician.
οὐ γὰρ δυνήσεται ποιεῖν τὸ ἑαυτῆς ἔργον, ὥσπερ οὐδʼ αὐλοὶ λίθινοι τὸ ἑαυτῶν ἔργον, οὐδʼ ὁ γεγραμμένος ἰατρός.
For it will not be able to perform its own function, just as stone flutes cannot perform their own function, nor a painted physician.
ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις οὐδὲ τῶν τού τεθνηκότος μορίων οὐδὲν ἔτι τῶν τοιούτων ἐστί, λέγω δʼ οἷον ὀφθαλμός, χείρ.
And similarly to these, none of the parts of a dead person is any longer such a part, I mean, for example, an eye or a hand.
λίαν οὖν ἁπλῶς εἴρηται, καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὡσπερ ἂν εἰ τέκτων λέγοι περὶ χειρὸς ξυλίνης.
Therefore, it has been stated too simply, and in the same manner as if a carpenter were to speak about a wooden hand.
§1.1.1616 οὕτω γὰρ καὶ οἱ φυσιολόγοι τὰς γενέσεις καὶ τὰς αἰτίας τού σχήματος λέγουσιν· ὑπὸ τίνων γὰρ ἐδημιουργήθησαν δυνάμεων.
For in this way 16 the natural philosophers also state the generations and the causes of the shape; for by what powers they were fashioned.
ἀλλʼ ἴσως ὁ μὲν τέκτων ἐρεῖ πέλεκυν ἢ τρύπανον, ὁ δʼ ἀέρα καὶ γῆν, πλὴν βέλτιον ὁ τέκτων· οὐ γὰρ ἱκανὸν ἔσται αὐτῷ τὸ τοσοῦτον εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἐμπεσόντος τοῦ ὀργάνου τὸ μὲν κοῖλον ἐγένετο τὸ δὲ ἐπίπεδον, ἀλλὰ διότι τὴν πληγὴν ἐποιήσατο τοιαύτην, καὶ τίνος ἕνεκα, ἐρεῖ τὴν αἰτίαν, ὅπως τοιόνδε ἤ τοιόνδε ποτὲ τὴν μορφὴν γένηται.
But perhaps the carpenter will say a chisel or a drill, while the other will say air and earth, except that the carpenter is better; for it will not be sufficient for him to say just this, that because the tool fell upon it, this part became hollow and that part flat, but he will state the cause why he made the stroke of such a kind, and for the sake of what, so that it might at some time become of such-and-such a shape.
δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγουσι,
It is clear, then, that they do not speak correctly,

Notes

  1. 1.1.11τῆς δʼ ὑποκειμένης ὕλης τοιάνδε τινὰ φύσιν ἐχούσης ἐξ ἀνάγκης — Genitive absolute. It expresses the theoretical assumption (under the condition that the underlying matter necessarily has such-and-such a nature) held by the natural philosophers, functioning as an circumstantial clause subordinate to ἐσκόπουν.
  2. 1.1.12ὅτι ἐν τῷ σώματι ῥέοντος μὲν τοῦ ὕδατος κοιλίαν γενέσθαι — A mixture of indirect speech constructions (anacoluthon or blending), where the conjunction ὅτι is followed by an infinitive γενέσθαι (with its accusative subject κοιλίαν) instead of a finite verb.
  3. 1.1.13ὥσπερ κἀν εἰ περὶ κλίνης ἐλέγομεν... ἐπειρώμεθα μᾶλλον ἂν — A contrary-to-fact conditional construction, with κἀν (καὶ ἄν) εἰ followed by the imperfect indicative ἐλέγομεν in the protasis, and the imperfect indicative with ἄν (ἐπειρώμεθα ἄν) in the apodosis.
  4. 1.1.15ἔτι δʼ ἀδύνατον εἶναι χεῖρα ὁπωσοῦν διακειμένην... πλὴν ὁμωνύμως — Subject of the infinitive εἶναι with the impersonal adjective ἀδύνατον. The accusative χειρα ὁπωσοῦν διακειμένην acts as the subject. εἶναι can be understood either as 'to be [a hand]' or 'to exist,' meaning that it is impossible for such a hand to exist in the true sense, except homonymously.

Cite this passage

Aristotle, Parts of Animals §1.1.11-1.1.16. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg030.humanitext-grc1:1.1.11-1.1.16

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