Humanitext Reader

Aristotle · Metaphysics §9.8#1

Priority of Actuality over Potentiality

Passage 95 of 159 · Greek

Summary

Aristotle begins to prove that actuality (energeia) is prior to potentiality (dynamis) in definition (logos), in time (chronos), and in substance (ousia).

§9.8#1ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ πρότερον διώρισται ποσαχῶς λέγεται, φανερὸν ὅτι πρότερον ἐνέργεια δυνάμεώς ἐστιν.
Since we have determined in how many ways 'prior' is said, it is clear that actuality is prior to potentiality.
λέγω δὲ δυνάμεως οὐ μόνον τῆς ὡρισμένης ἣ λέγεται ἀρχὴ μεταβλητικὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ᾗ ἄλλο, ἀλλʼ ὅλως πάσης ἀρχῆς κινητικῆς ἢ στατικῆς.
I mean by potentiality not only that which is defined as a principle of change in another or qua other, but in general every principle of motion or of rest.
καὶ γὰρ ἡ φύσις ἐν ταὐτῷ γένει τῇ δυνάμει· ἀρχὴ γὰρ κινητική, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἀλλʼ ἐν αὐτῷ ᾗ αὐτό.
For nature also is in the same genus as potentiality; for it is a principle of motion, yet not in another but in the thing itself qua itself.
—πάσης δὴ τῆς τοιαύτης προτέρα ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ· χρόνῳ δʼ ἔστι μὲν ὥς, ἔστι δὲ ὡς οὔ.
Actuality is prior to all such potentiality both in definition and in substance; and in time it is prior in one way, but in another way not.
τῷ λόγῳ μὲν οὖν ὅτι προτέρα, δῆλον (τῷ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἐνεργῆσαι δυνατόν ἐστι τὸ πρώτως δυνατόν, οἷον λέγω οἰκοδομικὸν τὸ δυνάμενον οἰκοδομεῖν, καὶ ὁρατικὸν τὸ ὁρᾶν, καὶ ὁρατὸν τὸ δυνατὸν ὁρᾶσθαι· ὁ δʼ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥστʼ ἀνάγκη τὸν λόγον προϋπάρχειν καὶ τὴν γνῶσιν τῆς γνώσεως)·
Now that it is prior in definition is clear (for that which is capable in the primary sense is capable because it is possible for it to act; for example, I call capable of building that which can build, and capable of seeing that which sees, and visible that which is capable of being seen; and the same account applies to the other cases too, so that the definition and the knowledge [of the actual] must pre-exist the knowledge [of the potential]).
τῷ δὲ χρόνῳ πρότερον ὧδε· τὸ τῷ εἴδει τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνεργοῦν πρότερον, ἀριθμῷ δʼ οὔ.
And in time it is prior in this way: that which is the same in form and is active is prior, but that which is the same in number is not.
λέγω δὲ τοῦτο ὅτι τοῦδε μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τοῦ ἤδη ὄντος κατʼ ἐνέργειαν καὶ τοῦ σίτου καὶ τοῦ ὁρῶντος πρότερον τῷ χρόνῳ ἡ ὕλη καὶ τὸ σπέρμα καὶ τὸ ὁρατικόν, ἃ δυνάμει μέν ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος καὶ σῖτος καὶ ὁρῶν, ἐνεργείᾳ δʼ οὔπω· ἀλλὰ τούτων πρότερα τῷ χρόνῳ ἕτερα ὄντα ἐνεργείᾳ ἐξ ὧν ταῦτα ἐγένετο· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος γίγνεται τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὂν ὑπὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντος, οἷον ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἀνθρώπου, μουσικὸς ὑπὸ μουσικοῦ, ἀεὶ κινοῦντός τινος πρώτου· τὸ δὲ κινοῦν ἐνεργείᾳ ἤδη ἔστιν.
By this I mean that to this particular human who already exists in actuality, and to this corn, and to this seeing subject, the matter, the seed, and the capable of seeing are prior in time, which are potentially a human, corn, and seeing, but are not yet so in actuality; but prior to these in time are other things which exist in actuality, from which these things came to be; for from that which is potentially comes that which is actually, by means of that which is actually, as a human comes from a human, a musical person by a musical person, there being always some first mover, and the mover already exists in actuality.
εἴρηται δὲ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς οὐσίας λόγοις ὅτι πᾶν τὸ γιγνόμενον γίγνεται ἔκ τινος τι καὶ ὑπό τινος, καὶ τοῦτο τῷ εἴδει τὸ αὐτό.
And it has been said in the discussions on substance that everything that comes to be comes to be something from something and by something, and this is the same in form.
διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ ἀδύνατον εἶναι οἰκοδόμον εἶναι μὴ οἰκοδομήσαντα μηθὲν ἢ κιθαριστὴν μηθὲν κιθαρίσαντα· ὁ γὰρ μανθάνων κιθαρίζειν κιθαρίζων μανθάνει κιθαρίζειν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι.
Therefore it also seems impossible to be a builder without having built anything, or a lyre-player without having played anything; for he who learns to play the lyre learns to play the lyre by playing it, and likewise with the others.
ὅθεν ὁ σοφιστικὸς ἔλεγχος ἐγίγνετο ὅτι οὐκ ἔχων τις τὴν ἐπιστήμην ποιήσει οὗ ἡ ἐπιστήμη· ὁ γὰρ μανθάνων οὐκ ἔχει.
Whence arose the sophistical refutation that someone not possessing knowledge will do that of which the knowledge is; for he who learns does not possess it.
ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ τοῦ γιγνομένου γεγενῆσθαί τι καὶ τοῦ ὅλως κινουμένου κεκινῆσθαί τι (δῆλον δʼ ἐν τοῖς περὶ κινήσεως τοῦτο) καὶ τὸν μανθάνοντα ἀνάγκη ἔχειν τι τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἴσως.
But because of the fact that of that which is coming to be some part has already come to be, and of that which is moving as a whole some part has already been moved (and this is clear in the discussions on motion), it is necessary that he who learns also possesses some part of the knowledge, perhaps.
ἀλλʼ οὖν καὶ ταύτῃ γε δῆλον ὅτι ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ οὕτω προτέρα τῆς δυνάμεως κατὰ γένεσιν καὶ χρόνον.
But at all events, even by this it is clear that actuality is also in this way prior to potentiality in generation and time.
ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ οὐσίᾳ γε, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι τὰ τῇ γενέσει ὕστερα τῷ εἴδει καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ πρότερα (οἷον ἀνὴρ παιδὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπος σπέρματος· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἤδη ἔχει τὸ εἶδος τὸ δʼ οὔ), καὶ ὅτι ἅπαν ἐπʼ ἀρχὴν βαδίζει τὸ γιγνόμενον καὶ τέλος (ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, τοῦ τέλους δὲ ἕνεκα ἡ γένεσις), τέλος δʼ ἡ ἐνέργεια, καὶ τούτου χάριν ἡ δύναμις λαμβάνεται.
But indeed it is also prior in substance: first, because those things which are posterior in generation are prior in form and in substance (for example, an adult man is prior to a child, and a human to seed; for the former already has the form, but the latter does not), and because everything that comes to be moves toward a principle and an end (for that for the sake of which is a principle, and generation is for the sake of the end), and the actuality is the end, and it is for the sake of this that the potentiality is acquired.
οὐ γὰρ ἵνα ὄψιν ἔχωσιν ὁρῶσι τὰ ζῷα ἀλλʼ ὅπως ὁρῶσιν ὄψιν ἔχουσιν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἰκοδομικὴν ἵνα οἰκοδομῶσι καὶ τὴν θεωρητικὴν ἵνα θεωρῶσιν· ἀλλʼ οὐ θεωροῦσιν ἵνα θεωρητικὴν ἔχωσιν, εἰ μὴ οἱ μελετῶντες· οὗτοι δὲ οὐχὶ θεωροῦσιν ἀλλʼ ἢ ὡδί, †ἢ ὅτι οὐδὲν δέονται θεωρεῖν†.
For animals do not see in order that they may have sight, but they have sight in order that they may see; and likewise they possess the building capacity in order that they may build, and the contemplative capacity in order that they may contemplate; but they do not contemplate in order that they may have the contemplative capacity, except those who are practicing; and these do not contemplate except in this way, [or because they do not need to contemplate at all].
ἔτι ἡ ὕλη ἔστι δυνάμει ὅτι ἔλθοι ἂν εἰς τὸ εἶδος· ὅταν δέ γε ἐνεργείᾳ ᾖ, τότε ἐν τῷ εἴδει ἐστίν.
Further, matter is potentially because it may come to the form; and when it is in actuality, then it is in the form.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ ὧν κίνησις τὸ τέλος, διὸ ὥσπερ οἱ διδάσκοντες ἐνεργοῦντα ἐπιδείξαντες οἴονται τὸ τέλος ἀποδεδωκέναι, καὶ ἡ φύσις ὁμοίως.
And similarly in other cases, and those of which motion is the end; wherefore, just as teachers think they have delivered the end when they have exhibited the pupil acting, so too nature.
εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτω γίγνεται, ὁ Παύσωνος ἔσται Ἑρμῆς· ἄδηλος γὰρ καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη εἰ ἔσω ἢ ἔξω, ὥσπερ κἀκεῖνος.
For if it is not so, it will be like Pauson's Hermes; for the knowledge would be unclear whether it is inside or outside, just as that Hermes was.

Notes

  1. 1049b16τὴν γνῶσιν τῆς γνώσεως — Before τῆς γνώσεως, a double ellipsis is assumed, parallel to the priority of the definition: 'the knowledge of actuality' (τὴν γνῶσιν τῆς ἐνεργείας) is prior to 'the knowledge of potentiality' (τῆς γνώσεως τῆς δυνάμεως).
  2. 1049b18τὸ τῷ εἴδει τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνεργοῦν πρότερον, ἀριθμῷ δʼ οὔ — Shows the contrast that in temporal priority, within the same individual (numerical identity, e.g., seed and adult) potentiality precedes, whereas at the level of species (formal identity, e.g., parent and offspring) actuality always precedes.
  3. 1049b33ποιήσει οὗ ἡ ἐπιστήμη — The genitive relative pronoun οὗ is a contraction including its antecedent (ἐκεῖνο οὗ), serving here as the direct object of the verb ποιήσει ('that of which the knowledge is').
  4. 1050a13ἀλλʼ ἢ ὡδί — The combination of the strong restrictive ἀλλʼ ἤ ('except') and the adverb ὡδί ('in this way'), qualifying the imperfect mode of activity of those who are practicing.

Cite this passage

Aristotle, Metaphysics §9.8#1. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg025.humanitext-grc2:9.8%231

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