§9.8#2τὸ γὰρ ἔργον τέλος, ἡ δὲ ἐνέργεια τὸ ἔργον, διὸ καὶ τοὔνομα ἐνέργεια λέγεται κατὰ τὸ ἔργον καὶ συντείνει πρὸς τὴν ἐντελέχειαν.
For the work is the end, and the actuality is the work; wherefore even the name 'actuality' is said in relation to 'work' and points toward 'complete reality' (entelechy).
ἐπεὶ δʼ ἐστὶ τῶν μὲν ἔσχατον ἡ χρῆσις (οἷον ὄψεως ἡ ὅρασις, καὶ οὐθὲν γίγνεται παρὰ ταύτην ἕτερον ἀπὸ τῆς ὄψεως), ἀπʼ ἐνίων δὲ γίγνεταί τι (οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκοδομικῆς οἰκία παρὰ τὴν οἰκοδόμησιν), ὅμως οὐθὲν ἧττον ἔνθα μὲν τέλος, ἔνθα δὲ μᾶλλον τέλος τῆς δυνάμεώς ἐστιν·
And since in some cases the ultimate thing is the use (as seeing is of sight, and nothing else comes to be from sight besides this), but from others something comes to be (as a house from the art of building, besides the building activity), nevertheless, no less in the former case is it the end, and in the latter case it is even more the end of the potentiality.
ἡ γὰρ οἰκοδόμησις ἐν τῷ οἰκοδομουμένῳ, καὶ ἅμα γίγνεται καὶ ἔστι τῇ οἰκίᾳ.
For the building activity is in the thing being built, and it comes to be and exists at the same time as the house.
ὅσων μὲν οὖν ἕτερόν τί ἐστι παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν τὸ γιγνόμενον, τούτων μὲν ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ ἐστίν (οἷον ἥ τε οἰκοδόμησις ἐν τῷ οἰκοδομουμένῳ καὶ ἡ ὕφανσις ἐν τῷ ὑφαινομένῳ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ ὅλως ἡ κίνησις ἐν τῷ κινουμένῳ)· ὅσων δὲ μὴ ἔστιν ἄλλο τι ἔργον παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, ἐν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχει ἡ ἐνέργεια (οἷον ἡ ὅρασις ἐν τῷ ὁρῶντι καὶ ἡ θεωρία ἐν τῷ θεωροῦντι καὶ ἡ ζωὴ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, διὸ καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία· ζωὴ γὰρ ποιά τίς ἐστιν).
Therefore, in all cases where that which comes to be is something other than the use, the actuality is in the thing being made (as the building activity is in the thing being built, and the weaving activity is in the thing being woven, and similarly in the other cases, and in general motion is in the thing being moved); but in all cases where there is no other work besides the actuality, the actuality exists in the subjects themselves (as seeing is in the seeing subject, contemplation is in the contemplating subject, and life is in the soul, and therefore happiness too; for happiness is a certain kind of life).
ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ εἶδος ἐνέργειά ἐστιν.
So it is clear that substance and form are actuality.
κατά τε δὴ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον φανερὸν ὅτι πρότερον τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἐνέργεια δυνάμεως, καὶ ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, τοῦ χρόνου ἀεὶ προλαμβάνει ἐνέργεια ἑτέρα πρὸ ἑτέρας ἕως τῆς τοῦ ἀεὶ κινοῦντος πρώτως.
According to this argument, then, it is clear that actuality is prior in substance to potentiality; and, as we have said, in time one actuality always precedes another, right back to the actuality of the eternal first mover.
—ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ κυριωτέρως· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀΐδια πρότερα τῇ οὐσίᾳ τῶν φθαρτῶν, ἔστι δʼ οὐθὲν δυνάμει ἀΐδιον.
But indeed, actuality is prior also in a more authoritative sense; for eternal things are prior in substance to destructible things, and nothing which is eternal exists potentially.
λόγος δὲ ὅδε· πᾶσα δύναμις ἅμα τῆς ἀντιφάσεώς ἐστιν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ μὴ δυνατὸν ὑπάρχειν οὐκ ἂν ὑπάρξειεν οὐθενί, τὸ δυνατὸν δὲ πᾶν ἐνδέχεται μὴ ἐνεργεῖν.
And the argument is as follows: every potentiality is at the same time a potentiality for the contradiction; for that which is not capable of existing could not exist in anything, but everything which is capable may possibly not act.
τὸ ἄρα δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐνδέχεται καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι· τὸ αὐτὸ ἄρα δυνατὸν καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι.
Therefore, that which is capable of being may possibly both be and not be; the same thing, then, is capable both of being and of not being.
τὸ δὲ δυνατὸν μὴ εἶναι ἐνδέχεται μὴ εἶναι· τὸ δὲ ἐνδεχόμενον μὴ εἶναι φθαρτόν, ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ὃ λέγεται ἐνδέχεσθαι μὴ εἶναι, ἢ κατὰ τόπον ἢ κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ἢ ποιόν· ἁπλῶς δὲ τὸ κατʼ οὐσίαν.
And that which is capable of not being may possibly not be; and that which may possibly not be is destructible, either absolutely or in respect of this very thing which it is said that it may possibly not be, whether in place or in quantity or quality; and 'absolutely' means in respect of substance.
οὐθὲν ἄρα τῶν ἀφθάρτων ἁπλῶς δυνάμει ἔστιν ἁπλῶς (κατά τι δὲ οὐδὲν κωλύει, οἷον ποιὸν ἢ πού)· ἐνεργείᾳ ἄρα πάντα·
Therefore, nothing of things which are absolutely indestructible exists potentially in an absolute sense (though there is nothing to prevent its being so in some respect, for instance in quality or place); therefore all eternal things are in actuality.
οὐδὲ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων (καίτοι ταῦτα πρῶτα· εἰ γὰρ ταῦτα μὴ ἦν, οὐθὲν ἂν ἦν)·
Nor do any of the things that exist of necessity exist potentially (and yet these are primary; for if these did not exist, nothing would exist).
οὐδὲ δὴ κίνησις, εἴ τίς ἐστιν ἀΐδιος· οὐδʼ εἴ τι κινούμενον ἀΐδιον, οὐκ ἔστι κατὰ δύναμιν κινούμενον ἀλλʼ ἢ ποθὲν ποί (τούτου δʼ ὕλην οὐδὲν κωλύει ὑπάρχειν), διὸ ἀεὶ ἐνεργεῖ ἥλιος καὶ ἄστρα καὶ ὅλος ὁ οὐρανός, καὶ οὐ φοβερὸν μή ποτε στῇ, ὃ φοβοῦνται οἱ περὶ φύσεως.
Nor indeed is motion potential, if there is any eternal motion; nor, if there is any eternal moved thing, is it moved in respect of potentiality, except in moving from somewhere to somewhere (and nothing prevents matter existing for this). Therefore the sun and the stars and the whole heaven are always active, and there is no fear that they will ever stop, as the writers on nature fear.
οὐδὲ κάμνει τοῦτο δρῶντα· οὐ γὰρ περὶ τὴν δύναμιν τῆς ἀντιφάσεως αὐτοῖς, οἷον τοῖς φθαρτοῖς, ἡ κίνησις, ὥστε ἐπίπονον εἶναι τὴν συνέχειαν τῆς κινήσεως· ἡ γὰρ οὐσία ὕλη καὶ δύναμις οὖσα, οὐκ ἐνέργεια, αἰτία τούτου.
Nor do they tire in doing this; for their motion is not concerned with the potentiality for the contradiction, as is the case with destructible things, so that the continuity of the motion should be laborious; for the cause of this laboriousness is that their substance is matter and potentiality, not actuality.
μιμεῖται δὲ τὰ ἄφθαρτα καὶ τὰ ἐν μεταβολῇ ὄντα, οἷον γῆ καὶ πῦρ.
And those things which are in change, such as earth and fire, imitate the indestructible things.
καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα ἀεὶ ἐνεργεῖ· καθʼ αὑτὰ γὰρ καὶ ἐν αὑτοῖς ἔχει τὴν κίνησιν.
For these too are always active; for they have motion of themselves and in themselves.
αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι δυνάμεις, ἐξ ὧν διώρισται, πᾶσαι τῆς ἀντιφάσεώς εἰσιν· τὸ γὰρ δυνάμενον ὡδὶ κινεῖν δύναται καὶ μὴ ὡδί, ὅσα γε κατὰ λόγον· αἱ δʼ ἄλογοι τῷ παρεῖναι καὶ μὴ τῆς ἀντιφάσεως ἔσονται αἱ αὐταί.
But the other potentialities, as we have distinguished them, are all potentialities for the contradiction; for that which is capable of moving in this way is also capable of not moving in this way, at least in the case of those with rational principles; as for the irrational ones, they too will be for the contradiction by their presence and absence.
εἰ ἄρα τινὲς εἰσὶ φύσεις τοιαῦται ἢ οὐσίαι οἵας λέγουσιν οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις τὰς ἰδέας, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐπιστῆμον ἄν τι εἴη ἢ αὐτὸ ἐπιστήμη καὶ κινούμενον ἢ κίνησις· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐνέργειαι μᾶλλον, ἐκεῖναι δὲ δυνάμεις τούτων.
If, then, there are any such natures or substances as those who discuss the Forms speak of, there would be something much more knowing than knowledge itself, and something more moving than motion itself; for the former are more actual, whereas the Forms are potentialities for them.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν πρότερον ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ πάσης ἀρχῆς μεταβλητικῆς, φανερόν.
It is clear, then, that actuality is prior both to potentiality and to every principle of change.