§9.7πότε δὲ δυνάμει ἔστιν ἕκαστον καὶ πότε οὔ, διοριστέον· οὐ γὰρ ὁποτεοῦν.
But we must determine when each thing is potentially, and when not; for it is not so at any time whatsoever.
οἷον ἡ γῆ ἆρʼ ἐστὶ δυνάμει ἄνθρωπος;
For instance, is earth potentially a human?
ἢ οὔ, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὅταν ἤδη γένηται σπέρμα, καὶ οὐδὲ τότε ἴσως;
Or not, but rather when it has already become seed, and perhaps not even then?
ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδʼ ὑπὸ ἰατρικῆς ἅπαν ἂν ὑγιασθείη οὐδʼ ἀπὸ τύχης, ἀλλʼ ἔστι τι ὃ δυνατόν ἐστι, καὶ τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ὑγιαῖνον δυνάμει.
Just as not everything could be cured by medical art or by chance, but there is something which is capable of it, and this is what is potentially healthy.
ὅρος δὲ τοῦ μὲν ἀπὸ διανοίας ἐντελεχείᾳ γιγνομένου ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος, ὅταν βουληθέντος γίγνηται μηθενὸς κωλύοντος τῶν ἐκτός, ἐκεῖ δʼ ἐν τῷ ὑγιαζομένῳ, ὅταν μηθὲν κωλύῃ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ·
And the boundary of that which comes to be in actuality from that which is potentially by thought, is when it comes to be because the agent has willed it, provided nothing of external things prevents it; and there, in the case of the person being cured, when nothing in the person prevents it.
ὁμοίως δὲ δυνάμει καὶ οἰκία· εἰ μηθὲν κωλύει τῶν ἐν τούτῳ καὶ τῇ ὕλῃ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι οἰκίαν, οὐδʼ ἔστιν ὃ δεῖ προσγενέσθαι ἢ ἀπογενέσθαι ἢ μεταβαλεῖν, τοῦτο δυνάμει οἰκία·
Similarly, a house is also potentially a house; if nothing in this and in the matter prevents it from becoming a house, and there is nothing which must be added or taken away or changed, this is potentially a house.
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡσαύτως ὅσων ἔξωθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως.
And likewise in all other cases where the principle of generation is external.
καὶ ὅσων δὴ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἔχοντι, ὅσα μηθενὸς τῶν ἔξωθεν ἐμποδίζοντος ἔσται διʼ αὐτοῦ· οἷον τὸ σπέρμα οὔπω (δεῖ γὰρ ἐν ἄλλῳ πεσεῖν καὶ μεταβάλλειν), ὅταν δʼ ἤδη διὰ τῆς αὑτοῦ ἀρχῆς ᾖ τοιοῦτον, ἤδη τοῦτο δυνάμει·
And of all those things which have the principle of generation in the thing itself which possesses it, whatever will exist through itself provided nothing from outside hinders it; for instance, the seed is not yet so (for it must fall into another and change), but when it is already such through its own principle, it is already this potentially.
ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἑτέρας ἀρχῆς δεῖται, ὥσπερ ἡ γῆ οὔπω ἀνδριὰς δυνάμει (μεταβαλοῦσα γὰρ ἔσται χαλκός).
But the former needs another principle, just as earth is not yet potentially a statue (for it must change to become bronze).
ἔοικε δὲ ὃ λέγομεν εἶναι οὐ τόδε ἀλλʼ ἐκείνινον—οἷον τὸ κιβώτιον οὐ ξύλον ἀλλὰ ξύλινον, οὐδὲ τὸ ξύλον γῆ ἀλλὰ γήϊνον, πάλιν ἡ γῆ εἰ οὕτως μὴ ἄλλο ἀλλὰ ἐκείνινον—ἀεὶ ἐκεῖνο δυνάμει ἁπλῶς τὸ ὕστερόν ἐστιν.
It seems that what we say is not 'this' but 'made of that'—for example, a chest is not 'wood' but 'wooden', nor is wood 'earth' but 'earthen', and again earth, if in this way it is not something else but 'made of that'—that former thing is always potentially, without qualification, the subsequent thing.
οἷον τὸ κιβώτιον οὐ γήϊνον οὐδὲ γῆ ἀλλὰ ξύλινον· τοῦτο γὰρ δυνάμει κιβώτιον καὶ ὕλη κιβωτίου αὕτη, ἁπλῶς μὲν τοῦ ἁπλῶς τουδὶ δὲ τοδὶ τὸ ξύλον.
For example, a chest is not 'earthen' nor 'earth', but 'wooden'; for this is potentially a chest, and this is the matter of a chest—wood in general of a chest in general, and this particular wood of this particular chest.
εἰ δέ τί ἐστι πρῶτον ὃ μηκέτι κατʼ ἄλλο λέγεται ἐκείνινον, τοῦτο πρώτη ὕλη· οἷον εἰ ἡ γῆ ἀερίνη, ὁ δʼ ἀὴρ μὴ πῦρ ἀλλὰ πύρινος, τὸ πῦρ ὕλη πρώτη οὐ τόδε τι οὖσα.
But if there is some first thing which is no longer said to be 'made of that' in relation to something else, this is primary matter; for instance, if earth is 'airy', and air is not 'fire' but 'fiery', fire is primary matter, not being a 'this'.
τούτῳ γὰρ διαφέρει τὸ καθʼ οὗ καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον, τῷ εἶναι τόδε τι ἢ μὴ εἶναι· οἷον τοῖς πάθεσι τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἄνθρωπος καὶ σῶμα καὶ ψυχή, πάθος δὲ τὸ μουσικὸν καὶ λευκόν (λέγεται δὲ τῆς μουσικῆς ἐγγενομένης ἐκεῖνο οὐ μουσικὴ ἀλλὰ μουσικόν, καὶ οὐ λευκότης ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἀλλὰ λευκόν, οὐδὲ βάδισις ἢ κίνησις ἀλλὰ βαδίζον ἢ κινούμενον, ὡς τὸ ἐκείνινον)· —ὅσα μὲν οὖν οὕτω, τὸ ἔσχατον οὐσία· ὅσα δὲ μὴ οὕτως ἀλλʼ εἶδός τι καὶ τόδε τι τὸ κατηγορούμενον, τὸ ἔσχατον ὕλη καὶ οὐσία ὑλική.
For the subject of predication and the underlying substrate differ in this, in being a 'this' or not; for example, the substrate for affections is a human and a body and a soul, while the affection is musical and white (and when music has come to be in him, that person is called not 'music' but 'musical', and the human is not 'whiteness' but 'white', nor is he 'walking' or 'motion' but 'walking' or 'moving', just as in the case of 'made of that'); therefore, in all cases of this sort, the ultimate substrate is substance; but in all cases where this is not so, but the predicate is some form and a 'this', the ultimate substrate is matter and material substance.
καὶ ὀρθῶς δὴ συμβαίνει τὸ ἐκείνινον λέγεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ὕλην καὶ τὰ πάθη· ἄμφω γὰρ ἀόριστα.
And indeed it turns out rightly that 'made of that' is said of both matter and affections; for both are indefinite.
πότε μὲν οὖν λεκτέον δυνάμει καὶ πότε οὔ, εἴρηται.
So then, when we should say that a thing is potentially, and when not, has been said.