§9.6ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ τῆς κατὰ κίνησιν λεγομένης δυνάμεως εἴρηται, περὶ ἐνεργείας διορίσωμεν τί τέ ἐστιν ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ ποῖόν τι.
Since we have spoken of the potentiality which is spoken of in relation to motion, let us define actuality, what actuality is and what sort of thing it is.
καὶ γὰρ τὸ δυνατὸν ἅμα δῆλον ἔσται διαιροῦσιν, ὅτι οὐ μόνον τοῦτο λέγομεν δυνατὸν ὃ πέφυκε κινεῖν ἄλλο ἢ κινεῖσθαι ὑπʼ ἄλλου ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ τρόπον τινά, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑτέρως, διὸ ζητοῦντες καὶ περὶ τούτων διήλθομεν.
For in making this division the potential also will become clear at the same time, because we do not only call that potential which by its nature moves something else or is moved by something else, either without qualification or in a certain way, but also in another way, which is why we also discussed these in our inquiry.
ἔστι δὴ ἐνέργεια τὸ ὑπάρχειν τὸ πρᾶγμα μὴ οὕτως ὥσπερ λέγομεν δυνάμει·
Actuality, then, is the existence of a thing not in the way that we say it exists potentially.
λέγομεν δὲ δυνάμει οἷον ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ Ἑρμῆν καὶ ἐν τῇ ὅλῃ τὴν ἡμίσειαν, ὅτι ἀφαιρεθείη ἄν, καὶ ἐπιστήμονα καὶ τὸν μὴ θεωροῦντα, ἂν δυνατὸς ᾖ θεωρῆσαι·
And we say a thing exists potentially, for instance, a Hermes in the wood and the half-line in the whole, because it could be taken out, and we call someone a knower even when he is not contemplating, if he is capable of contemplating.
τὸ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ.
The other, however, exists in actuality.
δῆλον δʼ ἐπὶ τῶν καθʼ ἕκαστα τῇ ἐπαγωγῇ ὃ βουλόμεθα λέγειν, καὶ οὐ δεῖ παντὸς ὅρον ζητεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἀνάλογον συνορᾶν, ὅτι ὡς τὸ οἰκοδομοῦν πρὸς τὸ οἰκοδομικόν, καὶ τὸ ἐγρηγορὸς πρὸς τὸ καθεῦδον, καὶ τὸ ὁρῶν πρὸς τὸ μῦον μὲν ὄψιν δὲ ἔχον, καὶ τὸ ἀποκεκριμένον ἐκ τῆς ὕλης πρὸς τὴν ὕλην, καὶ τὸ ἀπειργασμένον πρὸς τὸ ἀνέργαστον.
What we mean to say is clear by induction from the particular cases, and we must not seek a definition of everything but also perceive the analogy, namely that as that which is building is to that which is capable of building, so is that which is awake to that which is asleep, and that which sees to that which has its eyes closed but has sight, and that which has been separated from the matter to the matter, and that which has been finished to that which is unfinished.
ταύτης δὲ τῆς διαφορᾶς θατέρῳ μορίῳ ἔστω ἡ ἐνέργεια ἀφωρισμένη θατέρῳ δὲ τὸ δυνατόν.
Of this difference, let actuality be defined by one part, and the potential by the other.
λέγεται δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ οὐ πάντα ὁμοίως ἀλλʼ ἢ τῷ ἀνάλογον, ὡς τοῦτο ἐν τούτῳ ἢ πρὸς τοῦτο, τόδʼ ἐν τῷδε ἢ πρὸς τόδε· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὡς κίνησις πρὸς δύναμιν τὰ δʼ ὡς οὐσία πρός τινα ὕλην.
But things are said to exist in actuality not all in the same way, but by analogy, as this is in this or in relation to this, so that is in that or in relation to that; for some are as motion to potentiality, and others as substance to some matter.
ἄλλως δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ τὸ κενόν, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, λέγεται δυνάμει καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ἢ πολλοῖς τῶν ὄντων, οἷον τῷ ὁρῶντι καὶ βαδίζοντι καὶ ὁρωμένῳ.
But the infinite and the void, and all such things, are said to exist potentially and in actuality in a different way from many existing things, such as that which sees, that which walks, and that which is seen.
ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἁπλῶς ἀληθεύεσθαί ποτε (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὁρώμενον ὅτι ὁρᾶται, τὸ δὲ ὅτι ὁρᾶσθαι δυνατόν)· τὸ δʼ ἄπειρον οὐχ οὕτω δυνάμει ἔστιν ὡς ἐνεργείᾳ ἐσόμενον χωριστόν, ἀλλὰ γνώσει.
For these latter can sometimes be truly said without qualification (for that which is seen is so called because it is seen, and the other because it is capable of being seen); but the infinite does not exist potentially in such a way that it will exist separately in actuality, but only in knowledge.
τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὑπολείπειν τὴν διαίρεσιν ἀποδίδωσι τὸ εἶναι δυνάμει ταύτην τὴν ἐνέργειαν, τὸ δὲ χωρίζεσθαι οὔ.
For the fact that division never comes to an end shows that this actuality exists potentially, but not that it exists separately.
ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν πράξεων ὧν ἔστι πέρας οὐδεμία τέλος ἀλλὰ τῶν περὶ τὸ τέλος, οἷον τὸ ἰσχναίνειν ἢ ἰσχνασία, αὐτὰ δὲ ὅταν ἰσχναίνῃ οὕτως ἐστὶν ἐν κινήσει, μὴ ὑπάρχοντα ὧν ἕνεκα ἡ κίνησις, οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα πρᾶξις ἢ οὐ τελεία γε (οὐ γὰρ τέλος)· ἀλλʼ ἐκείνη ᾗ ἐνυπάρχει τὸ τέλος καὶ πρᾶξις.
Since of the actions which have a limit none is an end, but they are of those things related to the end, as for instance slimming or the process of slimming, and these when they are slimming are in motion in this way, the things for the sake of which the motion exists not being present, these are not action, or at least not complete action (for they are not the end); but that action in which the end is present is indeed action.
οἷον ὁρᾷ ἅμα καὶ ἑώρακε, καὶ φρονεῖ καὶ πεφρόνηκε, καὶ νοεῖ καὶ νενόηκεν, ἀλλʼ οὐ μανθάνει καὶ μεμάθηκεν οὐδʼ ὑγιάζεται καὶ ὑγίασται·
For example, one sees and at the same time has seen, and understands and has understood, and thinks and has thought, but one is not learning and has learned, nor is being cured and has been cured.
εὖ ζῇ καὶ εὖ ἔζηκεν ἅμα, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖ καὶ εὐδαιμόνηκεν.
One lives well and has lived well at the same time, and is happy and has been happy.
εἰ δὲ μή, ἔδει ἄν ποτε παύεσθαι ὥσπερ ὅταν ἰσχναίνῃ, νῦν δʼ οὔ, ἀλλὰ ζῇ καὶ ἔζηκεν.
Otherwise, it would have to stop at some time, just as when one is slimming, but now it does not, but one lives and has lived.
τούτων δὴ δεῖ τὰς μὲν κινήσεις λέγειν, τὰς δʼ ἐνεργείας.
Of these, then, we must call some motions and others actualities.
πᾶσα γὰρ κίνησις ἀτελής, ἰσχνασία μάθησις βάδισις οἰκοδόμησις· αὗται δὴ κινήσεις, καὶ ἀτελεῖς γε.
For every motion is incomplete, slimming, learning, walking, building; these are indeed motions, and incomplete ones.
οὐ γὰρ ἅμα βαδίζει καὶ βεβάδικεν, οὐδʼ οἰκοδομεῖ καὶ ᾠκοδόμηκεν, οὐδὲ γίγνεται καὶ γέγονεν ἢ κινεῖται καὶ κεκίνηται, ἀλλʼ ἕτερον, καὶ κινεῖ καὶ κεκίνηκεν·
For one is not walking and has walked at the same time, nor is building and has built, nor is coming to be and has come to be, or is being moved and has been moved, but they are different; and one moves and has moved.
ἑώρακε δὲ καὶ ὁρᾷ ἅμα τὸ αὐτό, καὶ νοεῖ καὶ νενόηκεν.
But one has seen and sees the same thing at the same time, and thinks and has thought.
τὴν μὲν οὖν τοιαύτην ἐνέργειαν λέγω, ἐκείνην δὲ κίνησιν.
Now, such a thing I call actuality, and the other motion.
τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐνεργείᾳ τί τέ ἐστι καὶ ποῖον, ἐκ τούτων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων δῆλον ἡμῖν ἔστω.
What it is to be in actuality, then, and what sort of thing it is, let it be clear to us from these and such considerations.