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Aristotle · Metaphysics §8.4-8.5

Matter and the Four Causes in Natural Substances

Passage 87 of 159 · Greek

Summary

This section explains the specific and tiered material relations in generated natural substances, emphasizing the importance of investigating all four causes (matter, mover, form, and end), and analyzes the relationship between definitions and causes in natural phenomena like eclipses and sleep. It further explores the difficulties of things existing without change and how potential matter relates to contrary states, such as health and disease, or wine and vinegar.

§8.4περὶ δὲ τῆς ὑλικῆς οὐσίας δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι εἰ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πάντα πρώτου ἢ τῶν αὐτῶν ὡς πρώτων καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ὕλη ὡς ἀρχὴ τοῖς γιγνομένοις, ὅμως ἔστι τις οἰκεία ἑκάστου, οἷον φλέγματος τὰ γλυκέα ἢ λιπαρά, χολῆς δὲ τὰ πικρὰ ἢ ἄλλʼ ἄττα· ἴσως δὲ ταῦτα ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ.
Concerning material substance, we must not fail to notice that even if all things come from the same primary thing, or from the same things as primary, and the same matter is the principle for things that are generated, nevertheless there is a certain appropriate matter for each thing, for example, of phlegm, the sweet or the fatty, and of bile, the bitter or some other things; though perhaps these latter come from the same thing.
γίγνονται δὲ πλείους ὗλαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὅταν θατέρου ἡ ἑτέρα ᾖ, οἷον φλέγμα ἐκ λιπαροῦ καὶ γλυκέος εἰ τὸ λιπαρὸν ἐκ τοῦ γλυκέος, ἐκ δὲ χολῆς τῷ ἀναλύεσθαι εἰς τὴν πρώτην ὕλην τὴν χολήν.
And multiple matters of the same thing arise when one of them is the matter of the other, as phlegm comes from the fatty and the sweet if the fatty comes from the sweet, and it comes from bile by the bile being analyzed into the primary matter.
διχῶς γὰρ τόδʼ ἐκ τοῦδε, ἢ ὅτι πρὸ ὁδοῦ ἔσται ἢ ὅτι ἀναλυθέντος εἰς τὴν ἀρχήν.
For 'this from that' is said in two ways: either because it is on the way, or because it has been analyzed into its principle.
ἐνδέχεται δὲ μιᾶς τῆς ὕλης οὔσης ἕτερα γίγνεσθαι διὰ τὴν κινοῦσαν αἰτίαν, οἷον ἐκ ξύλου καὶ κιβωτὸς καὶ κλίνη.
And it is possible that when the matter is one, different things are generated owing to the moving cause, as both a chest and a bed are made from wood.
ἐνίων δʼ ἑτέρα ἡ ὕλη ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἑτέρων ὄντων, οἷον πρίων οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἐκ ξύλου, οὐδʼ ἐπὶ τῇ κινούσῃ αἰτίᾳ τοῦτο· οὐ γὰρ ποιήσει πρίονα ἐξ ἐρίου ἢ ξύλου.
But of some things, the matter is of necessity different when the products are different; for example, a saw cannot be made of wood, nor does this depend on the moving cause, for it will not make a saw out of wool or wood.
εἰ δʼ ἄρα τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνδέχεται ἐξ ἄλλης ὕλης ποιῆσαι, δῆλον ὅτι ἡ τέχνη καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἡ ὡς κινοῦσα ἡ αὐτή· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἡ ὕλη ἑτέρα καὶ τὸ κινοῦν, καὶ τὸ γεγονός.
But if indeed it is possible to make the same thing from different matter, it is clear that the art, that is, the principle as mover, is the same; for if both the matter and the mover were different, the product would be so too.
—ὅταν δή τις ζητῇ τὸ αἴτιον, ἐπεὶ πλεοναχῶς τὰ αἴτια λέγεται, πάσας δεῖ λέγειν τὰς ἐνδεχομένας αἰτίας.
Since, then, causes are spoken of in many ways, when one inquires into the cause, one must state all the possible causes.
οἷον ἀνθρώπου τίς αἰτία ὡς ὕλη;
For example, what is the cause of man as matter?
ἆρα τὰ καταμήνια;
Is it the menstrual fluid?
τί δʼ ὡς κινοῦν;
And what is it as mover?
ἆρα τὸ σπέρμα;
Is it the semen?
τί δʼ ὡς τὸ εἶδος;
And what is it as form?
τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι.
The essence.
τί δʼ ὡς οὗ ἕνεκα;
And what is it as that for the sake of which?
τὸ τέλος.
The end.
ἴσως δὲ ταῦτα ἄμφω τὸ αὐτό.
But perhaps these two are the same.
δεῖ δὲ τὰ ἐγγύτατα αἴτια λέγειν.
And one must state the nearest causes.
τίς ἡ ὕλη;
What is the matter?
μὴ πῦρ ἢ γῆν ἀλλὰ τὴν ἴδιον.
One must state not fire or earth, but the proper matter.
περὶ μὲν οὖν τὰς φυσικὰς οὐσίας καὶ γενητὰς ἀνάγκη οὕτω μετιέναι εἴ τις μέτεισιν ὀρθῶς, εἴπερ ἄρα αἴτιά τε ταῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτα καὶ δεῖ τὰ αἴτια γνωρίζειν·
Therefore, concerning natural and generated substances, if one is to proceed correctly, one must proceed in this way, if indeed these and so many are the causes, and one must know the causes.
ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν φυσικῶν μὲν ἀϊδίων δὲ οὐσιῶν ἄλλος λόγος. ἴσως γὰρ ἔνια οὐκ ἔχει ὕλην, ἢ οὐ τοιαύτην ἀλλὰ μόνον κατὰ τόπον κινητήν.
But in the case of substances which are natural but eternal, the account is different; for perhaps some of them do not have matter, or not this sort of matter, but only such as is movable in space.
οὐδʼ ὅσα δὴ φύσει μέν, μὴ οὐσίαι δέ, οὐκ ἔστι τούτοις ὕλη, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἡ οὐσία.
Nor indeed is there matter for those things which, though by nature, are not substances, but their substrate is the substance.
οἷον τί αἴτιον ἐκλείψεως, τίς ὕλη;
For example, what is the cause of an eclipse, what is its matter?
οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν, ἀλλʼ ἡ σελήνη τὸ πάσχον.
There is none, but the moon is the thing affected.
τί δʼ αἴτιον ὡς κινῆσαν καὶ φθεῖραν τὸ φῶς;
And what is the cause as having moved and destroyed the light?
ἡ γῆ.
The earth.
τὸ δʼ οὗ ἕνεκα ἴσως οὐκ ἔστιν.
The final cause, perhaps, does not exist.
τὸ δʼ ὡς εἶδος ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ ἄδηλος ἐὰν μὴ μετὰ τῆς αἰτίας ᾖ ὁ λόγος.
The formal cause is the formula, but it is unclear if the formula does not include the cause.
οἷον τί ἔκλειψις;
For example, what is an eclipse?
στέρησις φωτός.
Privation of light.
ἐὰν δὲ προστεθῇ τὸ ὑπὸ γῆς ἐν μέσῳ γιγνομένης, ὁ σὺν τῷ αἰτίῳ λόγος οὗτος.
But if there is added 'by the earth coming in the middle,' this is the formula containing the cause.
ὕπνου δʼ ἄδηλον τί τὸ πρῶτον πάσχον.
Concerning sleep, it is unclear what the primary thing affected is.
ἀλλʼ ὅτι τὸ ζῷον;
Is it the animal?
ναί, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο κατὰ τί, καὶ τί πρῶτον;
Yes, but in virtue of what part, and what is primary?
καρδία ἢ ἄλλο τι.
Is it the heart or something else?
εἶτα ὑπὸ τίνος;
Next, by what is it caused?
εἶτα τί τὸ πάθος, τὸ ἐκείνου καὶ μὴ τοῦ ὅλου;
Next, what is the affection—that of that part, and not of the whole?
ὅτι ἀκινησία τοιαδί;
That it is a certain kind of immobility?
ναί, ἀλλʼ αὕτη τῷ τί πάσχειν τὸ πρῶτον;
Yes, but this is due to the primary thing undergoing what?
§8.5ἐπεὶ δʼ ἔνια ἄνευ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς ἔστι καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν, οἷον αἱ στιγμαί, εἴπερ εἰσί, καὶ ὅλως τὰ εἴδη (οὐ γὰρ τὸ λευκὸν γίγνεται ἀλλὰ τὸ ξύλον λευκόν, εἰ ἔκ τινος καὶ τὶ πᾶν τὸ γιγνόμενον γίγνεται), οὐ πάντα ἂν τἀναντία γίγνοιτο ἐξ ἀλλήλων, ἀλλʼ ἑτέρως λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος ἐκ μέλανος ἀνθρώπου καὶ λευκὸν ἐκ μέλανος·
Since some things exist and do not exist without generation and perishing, like points, if indeed they exist, and in general forms (for it is not whiteness that is generated, but the wood becomes white, if indeed everything that is generated is generated from something and into something), not all contraries would be generated from one another, but a white man is generated from a black man, and whiteness from blackness, in different ways.
οὐδὲ παντὸς ὕλη ἔστιν ἀλλʼ ὅσων γένεσις ἔστι καὶ μεταβολὴ εἰς ἄλληλα· ὅσα δʼ ἄνευ τοῦ μεταβάλλειν ἔστιν ἢ μή, οὐκ ἔστι τούτων ὕλη.
Nor is there matter for everything, but only for those things of which there is generation and change into one another; but for those things which exist or do not exist without undergoing change, there is no matter.
—ἔχει δʼ ἀπορίαν πῶς πρὸς τἀναντία ἡ ὕλη ἡ ἑκάστου ἔχει.
But there is a difficulty as to how the matter of each thing is related to contraries.
οἷον εἰ τὸ σῶμα δυνάμει ὑγιεινόν, ἐναντίον δὲ νόσος ὑγιείᾳ, ἆρα ἄμφω δυνάμει;
For example, if the body is potentially healthy, and disease is contrary to health, is it potentially both?
καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ δυνάμει οἶνος καὶ ὄξος;
And is water potentially wine and vinegar?
ἢ τοῦ μὲν καθʼ ἕξιν καὶ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ὕλη, τοῦ δὲ κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ φθορὰν τὴν παρὰ φύσιν;
Or is it the matter of the one according to the state and the form, but of the other according to the privation and the contrary-to-nature perishing?
ἀπορία δέ τις ἔστι καὶ διὰ τί ὁ οἶνος οὐχ ὕλη τοῦ ὄξους οὐδὲ δυνάμει ὄξος (καίτοι γίγνεται ἐξ αὐτοῦ ὄξος) καὶ ὁ ζῶν δυνάμει νεκρός.
There is also a certain difficulty as to why wine is not the matter of vinegar, nor potentially vinegar (even though vinegar comes from it), and whether the living thing is potentially dead.
ἢ οὔ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἱ φθοραί, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ζῴου ὕλη αὐτὴ κατὰ φθορὰν νεκροῦ δύναμις καὶ ὕλη, καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ ὄξους·
Or is it not so, but the perishings are accidental, and the matter of the living animal is itself, in virtue of perishing, the potentiality and matter of a dead body, and water that of vinegar?
γίγνεται γὰρ ἐκ τούτων ὥσπερ ἐξ ἡμέρας νύξ.
For they come from these as night comes from day.
καὶ ὅσα δὴ οὕτω μεταβάλλει εἰς ἄλληλα, εἰς τὴν ὕλην δεῖ ἐπανελθεῖν, οἷον εἰ ἐκ νεκροῦ ζῷον, εἰς τὴν ὕλην πρῶτον, εἶθʼ οὕτω ζῷον· καὶ τὸ ὄξος εἰς ὕδωρ, εἶθʼ οὕτως οἶνος.
And indeed, whatever things change into one another in this way must return to their matter; for example, if a living animal is to come from a dead one, it must first return to its matter, and only then become a living animal; and vinegar must return to water, and only then become wine.

Notes

  1. 1044a15εἰ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πάντα πρώτου — In the concessive clause introduced by `εἰ καὶ...`, a verb such as `γίγνεται` (or `ἐστι`) is omitted with the subject `πάντα`. The subsequent clause `ἡ αὐτὴ ὕλη ὡς ἀρχὴ τοῖς γιγνομένοις` is also part of this concessive construction, which is answered by `ὅμως` ("nevertheless") in the main clause.
  2. 1044a20ὅταν θατέρου ἡ ἑτέρα ᾖ — `θατέρου` (one of the two) is a genitive of relation depending on the other `ἡ ἑτέρα` ("when the one is the [matter] of the other"). This indicates a tiered relationship where one material serves as the matter for another, yielding multiple levels of matter for the same product.
  3. 1044b12ἐὰν μὴ μετὰ τῆς αἰτίας ᾖ ὁ λόγος — A conditional clause meaning "unless the formula (λόγος) includes the cause." `λόγος` is the subject, and `μετὰ τῆς αἰτίας` functions predicatively. As shown in the eclipse example (ll. 14–15), a definition that merely states the phenomenon (privation of light) is unclear unless it incorporates the physical cause (the intervention of the earth), which truly clarifies the form.
  4. 1044b30τοῦ μὲν καθʼ ἕξιν καὶ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ὕλη, τοῦ δὲ κατὰ στέρησιν — `τοῦ μὲν... τοῦ δὲ` are genitives referring to the two contraries mentioned just before (`ἄμφω`, e.g., health and disease, or wine and vinegar). This distinguishes two ways in which matter can be in potentiality: one as the proper matter in virtue of "state (ἕξις) and form," and the other as the accidental matter in virtue of "privation (στέρησις) and contrary-to-nature perishing."

Cite this passage

Aristotle, Metaphysics §8.4-8.5. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg025.humanitext-grc2:8.4-8.5

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