§8.3δεῖ δὲ μὴ ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἐνίοτε λανθάνει πότερον σημαίνει τὸ ὄνομα τὴν σύνθετον οὐσίαν ἢ τὴν ἐνέργειαν καὶ τὴν μορφήν, οἷον ἡ οἰκία πότερον σημεῖον τοῦ κοινοῦ ὅτι σκέπασμα ἐκ πλίνθων καὶ λίθων ὡδὶ κειμένων, ἢ τῆς ἐνεργείας καὶ τοῦ εἴδους ὅτι σκέπασμα, καὶ γραμμὴ πότερον δυὰς ἐν μήκει ἢ δυάς, καὶ ζῷον πότερον ψυχὴ ἐν σώματι ἢ ψυχή· αὕτη γὰρ οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια σώματός τινος.
We must not fail to notice that it is sometimes unclear whether the name signifies the composite substance or the actuality and the form, for example, whether "house" is a sign of the composite—that it is a covering made of bricks and stones placed in this way—or of the actuality and the form, that it is a covering; and whether "line" is a dyad in length or a dyad; and whether "animal" is a soul in a body or a soul, for the latter is the substance and actuality of a certain body.
εἴη δʼ ἂν καὶ ἐπʼ ἀμφοτέροις τὸ ζῷον, οὐχ ὡς ἑνὶ λόγῳ λεγόμενον ἀλλʼ ὡς πρὸς ἕν.
And "animal" might apply to both, not as spoken of by a single formula, but as related to one thing.
ἀλλὰ ταῦτα πρὸς μέν τι ἄλλο διαφέρει, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ζήτησιν τῆς οὐσίας τῆς αἰσθητῆς οὐδέν· τὸ γὰρ τί ἦν εἶναι τῷ εἴδει καὶ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ὑπάρχει.
But while these distinctions make a difference for some other purpose, they make none for the inquiry into sensible substance, for the essence belongs to the form and the actuality.
ψυχὴ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ψυχῇ εἶναι ταὐτόν, ἀνθρώπῳ δὲ καὶ ἄνθρωπος οὐ ταὐτόν, εἰ μὴ καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἄνθρωπος λεχθήσεται· οὕτω δὲ τινὶ μὲν τινὶ δʼ οὔ.
Indeed, soul and being a soul are the same, but man and being a man are not the same, unless the soul is also to be called man; and in this way they are the same in one sense, but not in another.
—οὐ φαίνεται δὴ ζητοῦσιν ἡ συλλαβὴ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων οὖσα καὶ συνθέσεως, οὐδʼ ἡ οἰκία πλίνθοι τε καὶ σύνθεσις.
Indeed, to those who investigate, a syllable does not appear to be composed of the letters and the composition, nor a house of bricks and the composition.
καὶ τοῦτο ὀρθῶς· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ σύνθεσις οὐδʼ ἡ μῖξις ἐκ τούτων ὧν ἐστὶ σύνθεσις ἢ μῖξις.
And this is correct; for neither composition nor mixture is composed of those things of which it is the composition or mixture.
ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐθέν, οἷον εἰ ὁ οὐδὸς θέσει, οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ οὐδοῦ ἡ θέσις ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον οὗτος ἐξ ἐκείνης.
Similarly, this is true of none of the other things; for instance, if the threshold is defined by position, the position is not composed of the threshold, but rather the threshold is composed of the position.
οὐδὲ δὴ ὁ ἄνθρωπός ἐστι τὸ ζῷον καὶ δίπουν, ἀλλά τι δεῖ εἶναι ὃ παρὰ ταῦτά ἐστιν, εἰ ταῦθʼ ὕλη, οὔτε δὲ στοιχεῖον οὔτʼ ἐκ στοιχείου, ἀλλʼ ἡ οὐσία· ὃ ἐξαιροῦντες τὴν ὕλην λέγουσιν.
Nor indeed is man "animal" and "two-footed," but there must be something which is besides these, if these are matter, and which is neither an element nor composed of an element, but is the substance; which they leave out when they speak of the matter.
εἰ οὖν τοῦτʼ αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι, καὶ οὐσία τοῦτο, αὐτὴν ἂν τὴν οὐσίαν οὐ λέγοιεν. (ἀνάγκη δὴ ταύτην ἢ ἀΐδιον εἶναι ἢ φθαρτὴν ἄνευ τοῦ φθείρεσθαι καὶ γεγονέναι ἄνευ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι.
If, then, this is the cause of being, and this is the substance, they would not be speaking of the substance itself. (Now, this must either be eternal or perishable without undergoing perishing, and generated without undergoing generation.
δέδεικται δὲ καὶ δεδήλωται ἐν ἄλλοις ὅτι τὸ εἶδος οὐθεὶς ποιεῖ οὐδὲ γεννᾷ, ἀλλὰ ποιεῖται τόδε, γίγνεται δὲ τὸ ἐκ τούτων.
But it has been shown and made clear in other works that no one makes or generates the form, but it is the individual "this" that is made, and the composite of these that is generated.
εἰ δʼ εἰσὶ τῶν φθαρτῶν αἱ οὐσίαι χωρισταί, οὐδέν πω δῆλον· πλὴν ὅτι γʼ ἐνίων οὐκ ἐνδέχεται δῆλον, ὅσα μὴ οἷόν τε παρὰ τὰ τινὰ εἶναι, οἷον οἰκίαν ἢ σκεῦος.
But whether the substances of perishable things are separable is not yet clear at all, except that it is clear that for some things they cannot be separable, namely, those which cannot exist apart from particular instances, like a house or an utensil.
ἴσως μὲν οὖν οὐδʼ οὐσίαι εἰσὶν οὔτʼ αὐτὰ ταῦτα οὔτε τι τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα μὴ φύσει συνέστηκεν· τὴν γὰρ φύσιν μόνην ἄν τις θείη τὴν ἐν τοῖς φθαρτοῖς οὐσίαν. ) ὥστε ἡ ἀπορία ἣν οἱ Ἀντισθένειοι καὶ οἱ οὕτως ἀπαίδευτοι ἠπόρουν ἔχει τινὰ καιρόν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τὸ τί ἔστιν ὁρίσασθαι (τὸν γὰρ ὅρον λόγον εἶναι μακρόν), ἀλλὰ ποῖον μέν τί ἐστιν ἐνδέχεται καὶ διδάξαι, ὥσπερ ἄργυρον, τί μέν ἐστιν οὔ, ὅτι δʼ οἷον καττίτερος·
Perhaps, then, neither these things themselves nor any other things that are not constituted by nature are substances; for one might post nature alone as the substance in perishable things.) Consequently, the difficulty which the followers of Antisthenes and those who are similarly uneducated used to raise has a certain relevance—namely, that it is not possible to define "what a thing is" (for the definition, they say, is a long formula), but it is indeed possible to teach "what sort of thing it is," just as we cannot define what silver is, but we can say that it is like tin.
ὥστʼ οὐσίας ἔστι μὲν ἧς ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ὅρον καὶ λόγον, οἷον τῆς συνθέτου, ἐάν τε αἰσθητὴ ἐάν τε νοητὴ ᾖ· ἐξ ὧν δʼ αὕτη πρώτων, οὐκέτι, εἴπερ τὶ κατὰ τινὸς σημαίνει ὁ λόγος ὁ ὁριστικὸς καὶ δεῖ τὸ μὲν ὥσπερ ὕλην εἶναι τὸ δὲ ὡς μορφήν.
Therefore, there is indeed a substance of which there can be a definition and formula, namely the composite substance, whether it is sensible or intelligible; but of the primary parts of which this composite consists, there can no longer be a definition, if a definitional formula signifies something of something, and one part must be like matter and the other like form.
—φανερὸν δὲ καὶ διότι, εἴπερ εἰσί πως ἀριθμοὶ αἱ οὐσίαι, οὕτως εἰσὶ καὶ οὐχ ὥς τινες λέγουσι μονάδων· ὅ τε γὰρ ὁρισμὸς ἀριθμός τις· διαιρετός τε γὰρ καὶ εἰς ἀδιαίρετα (οὐ γὰρ ἄπειροι οἱ λόγοι), καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς δὲ τοιοῦτον.
It is also clear why, if substances are in a way numbers, they are so in this way, and not, as some say, numbers of units; for a definition also is a sort of number, since it is divisible, and divisible into indivisible parts (for formulas are not infinite), and number is also of this character.
καὶ ὥσπερ οὐδʼ ἀπʼ ἀριθμοῦ ἀφαιρεθέντος τινὸς ἢ προστεθέντος ἐξ ὧν ὁ ἀριθμός ἐστιν, οὐκέτι ὁ αὐτὸς ἀριθμός ἐστιν ἀλλʼ ἕτερος, κἂν τοὐλάχιστον ἀφαιρεθῇ ἢ προστεθῇ, οὕτως οὐδὲ ὁ ὁρισμὸς οὐδὲ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι οὐκέτι ἔσται ἀφαιρεθέντος τινὸς ἢ προστεθέντος.
And just as if any of the parts of which a number consists is subtracted or added, it is no longer the same number but a different one, even if the smallest part is subtracted or added, so neither the definition nor the essence will any longer be the same if anything is subtracted or added.
καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν δεῖ εἶναί τι ᾧ εἷς, ὃ νῦν οὐκ ἔχουσι λέγειν τίνι εἷς, εἴπερ ἐστὶν εἷς (ἢ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλʼ οἷον σωρός, ἢ εἴπερ ἐστί, λεκτέον τί τὸ ποιοῦν ἓν ἐκ πολλῶν)·
Also, there must be something by which a number is one, which they cannot now say, namely, by what it is one, if indeed it is one (for either it is not one but like a heap, or if it is, they must say what it is that makes one out of many).
καὶ ὁ ὁρισμὸς εἷς ἐστίν, ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτον ἔχουσι λέγειν.
And the definition is one, and similarly they cannot state this either.
καὶ τοῦτο εἰκότως συμβαίνει· τοῦ αὐτοῦ γὰρ λόγου, καὶ ἡ οὐσία ἓν οὕτως, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὡς λέγουσί τινες οἷον μονάς τις οὖσα ἢ στιγμή, ἀλλʼ ἐντελέχεια καὶ φύσις τις ἑκάστη.
And this happens reasonably; for by the same argument, substance is also one in this way, yet not as some say, by being a sort of unit or point, but each substance is a certain actuality and a nature.
καὶ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ὁ ἀριθμὸς ἔχει τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, οὐδʼ ἡ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος οὐσία, ἀλλʼ εἴπερ, ἡ μετὰ τῆς ὕλης.
And just as number does not admit of the "more and less," neither does the substance according to form, but if indeed any does, it is that with matter.
περὶ μὲν οὖν γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τῶν λεγομένων οὐσιῶν, πῶς τʼ ἐνδέχεται καὶ πῶς ἀδύνατον, καὶ περὶ τῆς εἰς τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἀναγωγῆς, ἔστω μέχρι τούτων διωρισμένον.
Therefore, concerning the generation and destruction of the so-called substances, how they are possible and how impossible, and concerning their reduction to number, let it be defined up to this point.