§7.9ἀπορήσειε δʼ ἄν τις διὰ τί τὰ μὲν γίγνεται καὶ τέχνῃ καὶ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου, οἷον ὑγίεια, τὰ δʼ οὔ, οἷον οἰκία.
But one might raise the question why some things come to be both by art and by chance, like health, while others do not, like a house.
αἴτιον δὲ ὅτι τῶν μὲν ἡ ὕλη ἡ ἄρχουσα τῆς γενέσεως ἐν τῷ ποιεῖν καὶ γίγνεσθαί τι τῶν ἀπὸ τέχνης, ἐν ᾗ ὑπάρχει τι μέρος τοῦ πράγματος,—ἡ μὲν τοιαύτη ἐστὶν οἵα κινεῖσθαι ὑφʼ αὑτῆς ἡ δʼ οὔ, καὶ ταύτης ἡ μὲν ὡδὶ οἵα τε ἡ δὲ ἀδύνατος·
The cause is that, as for the matter which rules the coming-to-be in making and in the coming-to-be of something produced by art, in which matter some part of the thing is present, some matter is of such a nature as to be moved by itself, and some is not; and of the former, some is able to be moved in this particular way, and some is incapable.
πολλὰ γὰρ δυνατὰ μὲν ὑφʼ αὑτῶν κινεῖσθαι ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὡδί, οἷον ὀρχήσασθαι.
For many things are able to be moved by themselves, but not in this particular way, as for example to dance.
ὅσων οὖν τοιαύτη ἡ ὕλη, οἷον οἱ λίθοι, ἀδύνατον ὡδὶ κινηθῆναι εἰ μὴ ὑπʼ ἄλλου, ὡδὶ μέντοι ναί—καὶ τὸ πῦρ.
Therefore, in the case of things whose matter is of this kind, like stones, it is impossible to be moved in this particular way except by something else, though in this way indeed they can be. And fire is similar.
διὰ τοῦτο τὰ μὲν οὐκ ἔσται ἄνευ τοῦ ἔχοντος τὴν τέχνην τὰ δὲ ἔσται· ὑπὸ γὰρ τούτων κινηθήσεται τῶν οὐκ ἐχόντων τὴν τέχνην, κινεῖσθαι δὲ δυναμένων αὐτῶν ὑπʼ ἄλλων οὐκ ἐχόντων τὴν τέχνην ἢ ἐκ μέρους.
For this reason, some things will not exist without the person who possesses the art, while others will; for they will be moved by those things which do not possess the art, but which are capable of being moved themselves by other things that do not possess the art, or in part.
δῆλον δʼ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ὅτι τρόπον τινὰ πάντα γίγνεται ἐξ ὁμωνύμου, ὥσπερ τὰ φύσει, ἢ ἐκ μέρους ὁμωνύμου (οἷον ἡ οἰκία ἐξ οἰκίας, ᾗ ὑπὸ νοῦ· ἡ γὰρ τέχνη τὸ εἶδος) ἢ ἔχοντός τι μέρος,—ἐὰν μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γίγνηται·
And it is also clear from what has been said that in a way all things come to be either from a homonymous thing (just as things produced by nature), or from a part that is homonymous (for example, a house from a house, insofar as it is produced by intellect; for the art is the form), or from something containing a homonymous part — unless they come to be accidentally.
τὸ γὰρ αἴτιον τοῦ ποιεῖν πρῶτον καθʼ αὑτὸ μέρος.
For the first per se cause of producing is a part (of the form).
θερμότης γὰρ ἡ ἐν τῇ κινήσει θερμότητα ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐποίησεν·
For the heat in the movement produced heat in the body.
αὕτη δὲ ἐστὶν ἢ ὑγίεια ἢ μέρος, ἢ ἀκολουθεῖ αὐτῇ μέρος τι τῆς ὑγιείας ἢ αὐτὴ ἡ ὑγίεια·
And this is either health or a part of it, or some part of health follows it, or health itself.
διὸ καὶ λέγεται ποιεῖν, ὅτι ἐκεῖνο ποιεῖ ᾧ ἀκολουθεῖ καὶ συμβέβηκε.
Therefore, it is also said to produce, because it produces that which health follows and to which it is accidental.
ὥστε, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς, πάντων ἀρχὴ ἡ οὐσία· ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ τί ἐστιν οἱ συλλογισμοί εἰσιν, ἐνταῦθα δὲ αἱ γενέσεις.
So that, just as in syllogisms, the substance is the starting-point of all; for syllogisms are from 'what a thing is', and here comings-to-be are from it.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ φύσει συνιστάμενα τούτοις ἔχει.
And things constituted by nature are in a similar state to these.
τὸ μὲν γὰρ σπέρμα ποιεῖ ὥσπερ τὰ ἀπὸ τέχνης (ἔχει γὰρ δυνάμει τὸ εἶδος, καὶ ἀφʼ οὗ τὸ σπέρμα, ἐστί πως ὁμώνυμον—οὐ γὰρ πάντα οὕτω δεῖ ζητεῖν ὡς ἐξ ἀνθρώπου ἄνθρωπος· καὶ γὰρ γυνὴ ἐξ ἀνδρός—ἐὰν μὴ πήρωμα ᾖ· διὸ ἡμίονος οὐκ ἐξ ἡμιόνου)·
For the seed produces just like things produced by art (for it has the form potentially, and that from which the seed comes is in a way homonymous — for we must not always look for things to be so as 'man from man', since a woman also comes from a man — unless it is a deformity; therefore a mule does not come from a mule).
ὅσα δὲ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ γίγνεται, ὅσων ἡ ὕλη δύναται καὶ ὑφʼ αὑτῆς κινεῖσθαι ταύτην τὴν κίνησιν ἣν τὸ σπέρμα κινεῖ· ὅσων δὲ μή, ταῦτα ἀδύνατα γίγνεσθαι ἄλλως πως ἢ ἐξ αὐτῶν. —οὐ μόνον δὲ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας ὁ λόγος δηλοῖ τὸ μὴ γίγνεσθαι τὸ εἶδος, ἀλλὰ περὶ πάντων ὁμοίως τῶν πρώτων κοινὸς ὁ λόγος, οἷον ποσοῦ ποιοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κατηγοριῶν.
And those things which come to be by chance do so just as in the other case (art), namely, those whose matter is able to be moved by itself also with that movement with which the seed moves it; but those whose matter is not so able, are impossible to come to be in any other way than from their own kind. — And the argument that the form does not come to be shows this not only in the case of substance, but the argument is common to all the primary classes alike, such as quantity, quality, and the other categories.
γίγνεται γὰρ ὥσπερ ἡ χαλκῆ σφαῖρα ἀλλʼ οὐ σφαῖρα οὐδὲ χαλκός, καὶ ἐπὶ χαλκοῦ, εἰ γίγνεται (ἀεὶ γὰρ δεῖ προϋπάρχειν τὴν ὕλην καὶ τὸ εἶδος), οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ τί ἐστι καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ποιοῦ καὶ ποσοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως κατηγοριῶν· οὐ γὰρ γίγνεται τὸ ποιὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ ποιὸν ξύλον, οὐδὲ τὸ ποσὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ ποσὸν ξύλον ἢ ζῷον.
For just as the bronze sphere comes to be, but not the sphere nor the bronze, and in the case of bronze, if it comes to be (for the matter and the form must always pre-exist), so it is also in the case of 'what a thing is', and of quality, quantity, and the other categories alike; for it is not quality that comes to be, but the wood of a certain quality, nor quantity, but the wood or the animal of a certain quantity.
ἀλλʼ ἴδιον τῆς οὐσίας ἐκ τούτων λαβεῖν ἔστιν ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον προϋπάρχειν ἑτέραν οὐσίαν ἐντελεχείᾳ οὖσαν ἣ ποιεῖ, οἷον ζῷον εἰ γίγνεται ζῷον·
But we can grasp from these as a peculiarity of substance that it is necessary that another substance, which produces it and exists in actuality, should pre-exist; for example, if an animal comes to be, an animal must pre-exist.
ποιὸν δʼ ἢ ποσὸν οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἀλλʼ ἢ δυνάμει μόνον.
But in the case of quality or quantity, this is not necessary except potentially only.