§7.10#1ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ ὁρισμὸς λόγος ἐστί, πᾶς δὲ λόγος μέρη ἔχει, ὡς δὲ ὁ λόγος πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα, καὶ τὸ μέρος τοῦ λόγου πρὸς τὸ μέρος τοῦ πράγματος ὁμοίως ἔχει, ἀπορεῖται ἤδη πότερον δεῖ τὸν τῶν μερῶν λόγον ἐνυπάρχειν ἐν τῷ τοῦ ὅλου λόγῳ ἢ οὔ.
Since definition is a formula, and every formula has parts, and as the formula is to the thing, so also the part of the formula is to the part of the thing likewise, the question now arises whether the formula of the parts must be present in the formula of the whole or not.
ἐπʼ ἐνίων μὲν γὰρ φαίνονται ἐνόντες ἐνίων δʼ οὔ.
For in some cases they appear to be present, and in others not.
τοῦ μὲν γὰρ κύκλου ὁ λόγος οὐκ ἔχει τὸν τῶν τμημάτων, ὁ δὲ τῆς συλλαβῆς ἔχει τὸν τῶν στοιχείων· καίτοι διαιρεῖται καὶ ὁ κύκλος εἰς τὰ τμήματα ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ συλλαβὴ εἰς τὰ στοιχεῖα.
For the formula of the circle does not contain that of the segments, but that of the syllable contains that of the letters; and yet the circle is also divided into segments just as the syllable is into letters.
ἔτι δὲ εἰ πρότερα τὰ μέρη τοῦ ὅλου, τῆς δὲ ὀρθῆς ἡ ὀξεῖα μέρος καὶ ὁ δάκτυλος τοῦ ζῴου, πρότερον ἂν εἴη ἡ ὀξεῖα τῆς ὀρθῆς καὶ ὁ δάκτυλος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.
And further, if the parts are prior to the whole, and the acute angle is a part of the right angle, and the finger a part of the animal, the acute angle would be prior to the right angle, and the finger to the man.
δοκεῖ δʼ ἐκεῖνα εἶναι πρότερα· τῷ λόγῳ γὰρ λέγονται ἐξ ἐκείνων, καὶ τῷ εἶναι δὲ ἄνευ ἀλλήλων πρότερα. —ἢ πολλαχῶς λέγεται τὸ μέρος, ὧν εἷς μὲν τρόπος τὸ μετροῦν κατὰ τὸ ποσόν—ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ἀφείσθω· ἐξ ὧν δὲ ἡ οὐσία ὡς μερῶν, τοῦτο σκεπτέον.
But those (the wholes) seem to be prior; for in formula they are spoken of from those (the parts being defined by the wholes), and they are also prior in being by existing without each other. — Or, "part" is spoken of in many ways, of which one way is that which measures in respect of quantity — but let this be set aside; but we must examine that from which substance consists as parts.
εἰ οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν ὕλη τὸ δὲ εἶδος τὸ δʼ ἐκ τούτων, καὶ οὐσία ἥ τε ὕλη καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ ἐκ τούτων, ἔστι μὲν ὡς καὶ ἡ ὕλη μέρος τινὸς λέγεται, ἔστι δʼ ὡς οὔ, ἀλλʼ ἐξ ὧν ὁ τοῦ εἴδους λόγος.
If, then, one thing is matter, another form, and a third that which is from these, and substance is both the matter, the form, and that which is from these, there is a sense in which even matter is spoken of as a part of something, and a sense in which it is not, but those from which the formula of the form consists are parts.
οἷον τῆς μὲν κοιλότητος οὐκ ἔστι μέρος ἡ σάρξ (αὕτη γὰρ ἡ ὕλη ἐφʼ ἧς γίγνεται), τῆς δὲ σιμότητος μέρος· καὶ τοῦ μὲν συνόλου ἀνδριάντος μέρος ὁ χαλκὸς τοῦ δʼ ὡς εἴδους λεγομένου ἀνδριάντος οὔ (λεκτέον γὰρ τὸ εἶδος καὶ ᾗ εἶδος ἔχει ἕκαστον, τὸ δʼ ὑλικὸν οὐδέποτε καθʼ αὑτὸ λεκτέον)· διὸ ὁ μὲν τοῦ κύκλου λόγος οὐκ ἔχει τὸν τῶν τμημάτων, ὁ δὲ τῆς συλλαβῆς ἔχει τὸν τῶν στοιχείων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ στοιχεῖα τοῦ λόγου μέρη τοῦ εἴδους καὶ οὐχ ὕλη, τὰ δὲ τμήματα οὕτως μέρη ὡς ὕλη ἐφʼ ἧς ἐπιγίγνεται· ἐγγυτέρω μέντοι τοῦ εἴδους ἢ ὁ χαλκὸς ὅταν ἐν χαλκῷ ἡ στρογγυλότης ἐγγένηται.
For example, of concavity, flesh is not a part (for this is the matter on which it comes to be), but of snubness it is a part; and of the composite statue bronze is a part, but of the statue spoken of as form it is not (for we must speak of the form and in respect of how each thing has form, but the material must never be spoken of by itself); therefore, the formula of the circle does not contain that of the segments, but that of the syllable contains that of the letters; for the letters are parts of the formula of the form and not matter, but the segments are parts in the sense of matter on which it supervenes; indeed, they are closer to the form than the bronze when roundness comes to be in the bronze.
ἔστι δʼ ὡς οὐδὲ τὰ στοιχεῖα πάντα τῆς συλλαβῆς ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἐνέσται, οἷον ταδὶ τὰ κήρινα ἢ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι· ἤδη γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα μέρος τῆς συλλαβῆς ὡς ὕλη αἰσθητή.
But there is a sense in which not even all the letters of the syllable will be present in the formula, such as these waxen ones or those in the air; for these too are already part of the syllable as sensible matter.
καὶ γὰρ ἡ γραμμὴ οὐκ εἰ διαιρουμένη εἰς τὰ ἡμίση φθείρεται, ἢ ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰς τὰ ὀστᾶ καὶ νεῦρα καὶ σάρκας, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ εἰσὶν ἐκ τούτων οὕτως ὡς ὄντων τῆς οὐσίας μερῶν, ἀλλʼ ὡς ἐξ ὕλης, καὶ τοῦ μὲν συνόλου μέρη, τοῦ εἴδους δὲ καὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος οὐκέτι· διόπερ οὐδʼ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις.
For even if the line is dissolved into halves when divided, or man into bones, sinews, and flesh, they do not on this account exist from these as if they were parts of the substance, but as from matter, and they are parts of the composite, but no longer of the form and of that which the formula is about; therefore, they are not in the formulas either.
τῷ μὲν οὖν ἐνέσται ὁ τῶν τοιούτων μερῶν λόγος, τῷ δʼ οὐ δεῖ ἐνεῖναι, ἂν μὴ ᾖ τοῦ συνειλημμένου· διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο ἔνια μὲν ἐκ τούτων ὡς ἀρχῶν ἐστὶν εἰς ἃ φθείρονται, ἔνια δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν.
In some things, then, the formula of such parts will be present, but in others it must not be present, unless it is of the concrete thing; for it is because of this that some things consist of these as principles into which they are dissolved, while others do not.
ὅσα μὲν οὖν συνειλημμένα τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ ὕλη ἐστίν, οἷον τὸ σιμὸν ἢ ὁ χαλκοῦς κύκλος, ταῦτα μὲν φθείρεται εἰς ταῦτα καὶ μέρος αὐτῶν ἡ ὕλη· ὅσα δὲ μὴ συνείληπται τῇ ὕλῃ ἀλλὰ ἄνευ ὕλης, ὧν οἱ λόγοι τοῦ εἴδους μόνον, ταῦτα δʼ οὐ φθείρεται, ἢ ὅλως ἢ οὔτοι οὕτω γε· ὥστʼ ἐκείνων μὲν ἀρχαὶ καὶ μέρη ταῦτα τοῦ δὲ εἴδους οὔτε μέρη οὔτε ἀρχαί.
Those, then, which are the form and the matter taken together, like the snub or the bronze circle, are dissolved into these, and matter is a part of them; but those which are not taken together with matter but are without matter, whose formulas are of the form alone, do not dissolve, either at all or at least not in this way; so that while these are principles and parts of those (the composites), they are neither parts nor principles of the form.
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο φθείρεται ὁ πήλινος ἀνδριὰς εἰς πηλὸν καὶ ἡ σφαῖρα εἰς χαλκὸν καὶ ὁ Καλλίας εἰς σάρκα καὶ ὀστᾶ, ἔτι δὲ ὁ κύκλος εἰς τὰ τμήματα· ἔστι γάρ τις ὃς συνείληπται τῇ ὕλῃ· ὁμωνύμως γὰρ λέγεται κύκλος ὅ τε ἁπλῶς λεγόμενος καὶ ὁ καθʼ ἕκαστα διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἴδιον ὄνομα τοῖς καθʼ ἕκαστον. —εἴρηται μὲν οὖν καὶ νῦν τὸ ἀληθές, ὅμως δʼ ἔτι σαφέστερον εἴπωμεν ἐπαναλαβόντες.
And for this reason, the clay statue is dissolved into clay, the sphere into bronze, and Callias into flesh and bones, and further, the circle into segments; for there is a certain circle which is taken together with matter; for "circle" is spoken of homonymously both of that which is spoken of simply and of the particulars, because there is no peculiar name for the particulars. — Now indeed, the truth has been stated, but still let us state it even more clearly by repeating it.