§7.4#2οὐκ ἔσται ἄρα οὐδενὶ τῶν μὴ γένους εἰδῶν ὑπάρχον τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τούτοις μόνον (ταῦτα γὰρ δοκεῖ οὐ κατὰ μετοχὴν λέγεσθαι καὶ πάθος οὐδʼ ὡς συμβεβηκός)·
Therefore, the essence will not belong to any of the things that are not species of a genus, but to these alone (for these seem not to be said by participation and as an affection, nor as an accident).
ἀλλὰ λόγος μὲν ἔσται ἑκάστου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τί σημαίνει, ἐὰν ᾖ ὄνομα, ὅτι τόδε τῷδε ὑπάρχει, ἢ ἀντὶ λόγου ἁπλοῦ ἀκριβέστερος· ὁρισμὸς δʼ οὐκ ἔσται οὐδὲ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι.
But there will be a formula of each of the others also, of what it signifies, if there is a name—namely, that this belongs to that—or a formula more precise than a simple one; but there will be neither definition nor essence.
ἢ καὶ ὁ ὁρισμὸς ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ τί ἐστι πλεοναχῶς λέγεται;
Or is definition, just like "what-it-is," also said in many ways?
καὶ γὰρ τὸ τί ἐστιν ἕνα μὲν τρόπον σημαίνει τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ τόδε τι, ἄλλον δὲ ἕκαστον τῶν κατηγορουμένων, ποσὸν ποιὸν καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα.
For indeed, "what-it-is" in one way signifies substance and a "this," and in another way each of the categories, such as quantity, quality, and all other such things.
ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἔστιν ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν πρώτως τοῖς δʼ ἑπομένως, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τί ἐστιν ἁπλῶς μὲν τῇ οὐσίᾳ πὼς δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις·
For just as "is" belongs to all, yet not in the same way, but to one primarily and to others derivatively, so also "what-it-is" belongs without qualification to substance, and in a certain way to the others.
καὶ γὰρ τὸ ποιὸν ἐροίμεθʼ ἂν τί ἐστιν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ ποιὸν τῶν τί ἐστιν, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος λογικῶς φασί τινες εἶναι τὸ μὴ ὄν, οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ μὴ ὄν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ποιόν.
For indeed we might ask what a quality is, so that quality also is among the "what-it-is" things, yet not without qualification, but just as on the subject of non-being some say logically that non-being "is"—not without qualification but "is non-being"—so also with quality.
—δεῖ μὲν οὖν σκοπεῖν καὶ τὸ πῶς δεῖ λέγειν περὶ ἕκαστον, οὐ μὴν μᾶλλόν γε ἢ τὸ πῶς ἔχει· διὸ καὶ νῦν ἐπεὶ τὸ λεγόμενον φανερόν, καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ὁμοίως ὑπάρξει πρώτως μὲν καὶ ἁπλῶς τῇ οὐσίᾳ, εἶτα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ τί ἐστιν, οὐχ ἁπλῶς τί ἦν εἶναι ἀλλὰ ποιῷ ἢ ποσῷ τί ἦν εἶναι.
We must indeed consider how we ought to speak about each, yet not more than how the case stands; wherefore now also, since what is said is clear, the essence likewise will belong primarily and without qualification to substance, and then also to the others, just like "what-it-is"—not essence without qualification, but the essence of a quality or of a quantity.
δεῖ γὰρ ἢ ὁμωνύμως ταῦτα φάναι εἶναι ὄντα, ἢ προστιθέντας καὶ ἀφαιροῦντας, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐπιστητὸν ἐπιστητόν, ἐπεὶ τό γε ὀρθόν ἐστι μήτε ὁμωνύμως φάναι μήτε ὡσαύτως ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ τὸ ἰατρικὸν τῷ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν καὶ ἕν, οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ καὶ ἕν, οὐ μέντοι οὐδὲ ὁμωνύμως· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἰατρικὸν σῶμα καὶ ἔργον καὶ σκεῦος λέγεται οὔτε ὁμωνύμως οὔτε καθʼ ἓν ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕν.
For we must say either that these are beings homonymously, or by adding and subtracting—just as the non-knowable is knowable—since the correct view is to say they are neither homonymously nor in the same way, but just as "medical" is said by relation to the same and one thing, yet not being the same and one, nor yet homonymously; for neither are a medical body, a medical operation, and a medical instrument spoken of either homonymously or in virtue of a single thing, but in relation to one thing.
ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ὁποτέρως τις ἐθέλει λέγειν διαφέρει οὐδέν· ἐκεῖνο δὲ φανερὸν ὅτι ὁ πρώτως καὶ ἁπλῶς ὁρισμὸς καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι τῶν οὐσιῶν ἐστίν.
But which of these ways one wishes to speak makes no difference; this, however, is clear that primary and unqualified definition and essence belong to substances.
οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως ἐστί, πλὴν οὐ πρώτως.
Not but what they belong also to the others likewise, only not primarily.
οὐ γὰρ ἀνάγκη, ἂν τοῦτο τιθῶμεν, τούτου ὁρισμὸν εἶναι ὃ ἂν λόγῳ τὸ αὐτὸ σημαίνῃ, ἀλλὰ τινὶ λόγῳ· τοῦτο δὲ ἐὰν ἑνὸς ᾖ, μὴ τῷ συνεχεῖ ὥσπερ ἡ Ἰλιὰς ἢ ὅσα συνδέσμω ι,ι ἀλλʼ ἐὰν ὁσαχῶς λέγεται τὸ ἕν·
For if we posit this, it is not necessary that there be a definition of whatever signifies the same thing by a formula, but only of what does so by a certain kind of formula; and this is so if it is of a "one," not by being continuous like the Iliad or whatever is joined by a connective, but in any of the ways "one" is said.
τὸ δʼ ἓν λέγεται ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν· τὸ δὲ ὂν τὸ μὲν τόδε τι τὸ δὲ ποσὸν τὸ δὲ ποιόν τι σημαίνει.
And "one" is said just as "being" is; and "being" signifies in one way a "this," in another a quantity, and in another a quality.
διὸ καὶ λευκοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἔσται λόγος καὶ ὁρισμός, ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον καὶ τοῦ λευκοῦ καὶ οὐσίας.
Wherefore there will be a formula and definition of "a white man" also, but in a different way, and also of "white" and of substance.