§7.4#1ἐπεὶ δʼ ἐν ἀρχῇ διειλόμεθα πόσοις ὁρίζομεν τὴν οὐσίαν, καὶ τούτων ἕν τι ἐδόκει εἶναι τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, θεωρητέον περὶ αὐτοῦ.
Since at the start we distinguished in how many ways we define substance, and one of these appeared to be the essence (what-it-was-to-be), we must speculate about it.
καὶ πρῶτον εἴπωμεν ἔνια περὶ αὐτοῦ λογικῶς, ὅτι ἐστὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἑκάστου ὃ λέγεται καθʼ αὑτό.
And first let us say some things about it logically, namely that the essence of each thing is what is said of it in virtue of itself.
οὐ γάρ ἐστι τὸ σοὶ εἶναι τὸ μουσικῷ εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ κατὰ σαυτὸν εἶ μουσικός.
For to be you is not to be musical; for you are not musical in virtue of yourself.
ὃ ἄρα κατὰ σαυτόν.
What is in virtue of yourself, then, is your essence.
οὐδὲ δὴ τοῦτο πᾶν· οὐ γὰρ τὸ οὕτως καθʼ αὑτὸ ὡς ἐπιφανείᾳ λευκόν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἐπιφανείᾳ εἶναι τὸ λευκῷ εἶναι.
But indeed, not even all of this is essence; for it is not what is in virtue of itself in the way that a surface is white, because to be a surface is not to be white.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, τὸ ἐπιφανείᾳ λευκῇ, ὅτι πρόσεστιν αὐτό.
But indeed, neither is it the combination of both, namely "to be a white surface," because it (the surface) is added.
ἐν ᾧ ἄρα μὴ ἐνέσται λόγῳ αὐτό, λέγοντι αὐτό, οὗτος ὁ λόγος τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι ἑκάστῳ, ὥστʼ εἰ τὸ ἐπιφανείᾳ λευκῇ εἶναί ἐστι τὸ ἐπιφανείᾳ εἶναι λείᾳ, τὸ λευκῷ καὶ λείῳ εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἕν.
Therefore, that formula in which it itself will not be present when one states it—this is the formula of the essence for each thing; so that if "to be a white surface" is "to be a smooth surface," then "to be white" and "to be smooth" are one and the same.
ἐπεὶ δʼ ἔστι καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας κατηγορίας σύνθετα (ἔστι γάρ τι ὑποκείμενον ἑκάστῳ, οἷον τῷ ποιῷ καὶ τῷ ποσῷ καὶ τῷ ποτὲ καὶ τῷ ποὺ καὶ τῇ κινήσει), σκεπτέον ἆρʼ ἔστι λόγος τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι ἑκάστῳ αὐτῶν, καὶ ὑπάρχει καὶ τούτοις τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, οἷον λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. ἔστω δὴ ὄνομα αὐτῷ ἱμάτιον. τί ἐστι τὸ ἱματίῳ εἶναι;
But since there are compounds in the other categories as well (for there is an underlying subject for each, such as for quality, quantity, time, place, and motion), we must consider whether there is a formula of the essence for each of them, and whether essence belongs also to these, as for instance to "a white man." Let its name be "cloak." What is it "to be a cloak"?
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῶν καθʼ αὑτὸ λεγομένων οὐδὲ τοῦτο.
But indeed, neither is this among the things said in virtue of themselves.
ἢ τὸ οὐ καθʼ αὑτὸ λέγεται διχῶς, καὶ τούτου ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν ἐκ προσθέσεως τὸ δὲ οὔ.
Or is that which is not said in virtue of itself spoken of in two ways, of which one is by addition, and the other is not?
τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῷ αὐτὸ ἄλλῳ προσκεῖσθαι λέγεται ὃ ὁρίζεται, οἷον εἰ τὸ λευκῷ εἶναι ὁριζόμενος λέγοι λευκοῦ ἀνθρώπου λόγον· τὸ δὲ τῷ ἄλλο αὐτῷ, οἷον εἰ σημαίνοι τὸ ἱμάτιον λευκὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὁ δὲ ὁρίζοιτο ἱμάτιον ὡς λευκόν. τὸ δὴ λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος ἔστι μὲν λευκόν, οὐ μέντοι τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι λευκῷ εἶναι. —ἀλλὰ τὸ ἱματίῳ εἶναι ἆρά ἐστι τί ἦν εἶναί τι ὅλως;
For one is said by the fact that the thing itself is added to something else which is defined, as if someone, in defining "to be white," should state the formula of "a white man"; and the other by the fact that something else is added to it, as if "cloak" should signify "a white man," and someone should define "cloak" as "white." Now, "a white man" is indeed white, but yet is not the essence of white.—But then, is "to be a cloak" an essence at all?
ἢ οὔ;
Or is it not?
ὅπερ γάρ τί ἐστι τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι· ὅταν δʼ ἄλλο κατʼ ἄλλου λέγηται, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπερ τόδε τι, οἷον ὁ λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπερ τόδε τι, εἴπερ τὸ τόδε ταῖς οὐσίαις ὑπάρχει μόνον· ὥστε τὸ τί ἦν εἶναί ἐστιν ὅσων ὁ λόγος ἐστὶν ὁρισμός.
For the essence is a "just what some-thing is"; but when one thing is said of another, it is not a "just what a 'this' is," as for instance "a white man" is not a "just what a 'this' is," if indeed "a 'this'" belongs only to substances; so that the essence belongs only to those things whose formula is a definition.
ὁρισμὸς δʼ ἐστὶν οὐκ ἂν ὄνομα λόγῳ ταὐτὸ σημαίνῃ (πάντες γὰρ ἂν εἶεν οἱ λόγοι ὅροι· ἔσται γὰρ ὄνομα ὁτῳοῦν λόγῳ, ὥστε καὶ ἡ Ἰλιὰς ὁρισμὸς ἔσται), ἀλλʼ ἐὰν πρώτου τινὸς ᾖ· τοιαῦτα δʼ ἐστὶν ὅσα λέγεται μὴ τῷ ἄλλο κατʼ ἄλλου λέγεσθαι.
And a definition is not when a name signifies the same as a formula (for then all formulas would be definitions; for there will be a name for any formula whatever, so that even the Iliad will be a definition), but if it is of some primary thing; and such are those things which are said not by one thing being said of another.