§7.5ἔχει δʼ ἀπορίαν, ἐάν τις μὴ φῇ ὁρισμὸν εἶναι τὸν ἐκ προσθέσεως λόγον, τίνος ἔσται ὁρισμὸς τῶν οὐχ ἁπλῶν ἀλλὰ συνδεδυασμένων·
But there is a difficulty: if one does not allow that a formula by addition is a definition, of what will there be a definition among things that are not simple but coupled?
ἐκ προσθέσεως γὰρ ἀνάγκη δηλοῦν.
For it is necessary to make them clear by addition.
λέγω δὲ οἷον ἔστι ῥὶς καὶ κοιλότης, καὶ σιμότης τὸ ἐκ τῶν δυοῖν λεγόμενον τῷ τόδε ἐν τῷδε, καὶ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός γε οὔθʼ ἡ κοιλότης οὔθʼ ἡ σιμότης πάθος τῆς ῥινός, ἀλλὰ καθʼ αὑτήν· οὐδʼ ὡς τὸ λευκὸν Καλλίᾳ, ἢ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι Καλλίας λευκὸς ᾧ συμβέβηκεν ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι, ἀλλʼ ὡς τὸ ἄρρεν τῷ ζῴῳ καὶ τὸ ἴσον τῷ ποσῷ καὶ πάντα ὅσα λέγεται καθʼ αὑτὰ ὑπάρχειν.
I mean, for example, there is nose and concavity, and snubness, which is spoken of from the two because this is in that; and neither concavity nor snubness is an accident, but rather an affection of the nose in virtue of itself; nor as white belongs to Callias, or to a man because Callias, who happens to be a man, is white, but as male belongs to animal, and equal to quantity, and all other things that are said to belong in virtue of themselves.
ταῦτα δʼ ἐστὶν ἐν ὅσοις ὑπάρχει ἢ ὁ λόγος ἢ τοὔνομα οὗ ἐστὶ τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, καὶ μὴ ἐνδέχεται δηλῶσαι χωρίς, ὥσπερ τὸ λευκὸν ἄνευ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐνδέχεται ἀλλʼ οὐ τὸ θῆλυ ἄνευ τοῦ ζῴου·
And these are those cases in which there belongs either the formula or the name of that subject of which this is the affection, and which cannot be expressed separately, just as white can be expressed without man, but female cannot without animal.
ὥστε τούτων τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ ὁρισμὸς ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδενὸς ἤ, εἰ ἔστιν, ἄλλως, καθάπερ εἰρήκαμεν.
Consequently, of these things there is either no essence and definition of any, or if there is, it is in a different way, as we have said.
ἔστι δὲ ἀπορία καὶ ἑτέρα περὶ αὐτῶν.
But there is also another difficulty about them.
εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτό ἐστι σιμὴ ῥὶς καὶ κοίλη ῥίς, τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται τὸ σιμὸν καὶ τὸ κοῖλον· εἰ δὲ μή, διὰ τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶναι εἰπεῖν τὸ σιμὸν ἄνευ τοῦ πράγματος οὗ ἐστὶ πάθος καθʼ αὑτό (ἔστι γὰρ τὸ σιμὸν κοιλότης ἐν ῥινί), τὸ ῥῖνα σιμὴν εἰπεῖν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ δὶς τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται εἰρημένον, ῥὶς ῥὶς κοίλη (ἡ γὰρ ῥὶς ἡ σιμὴ ῥὶς ῥὶς κοίλη ἔσται), διὸ ἄτοπον τὸ ὑπάρχειν τοῖς τοιούτοις τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι· εἰ δὲ μή, εἰς ἄπειρον εἶσιν· ῥινὶ γὰρ ῥινὶ σιμῇ ἔτι ἄλλο ἐνέσται.
For if a snub nose and a concave nose are the same, then snub and concave will be the same; but if not, because it is impossible to speak of "snub" without the thing of which it is an affection in virtue of itself (for snubness is concavity in a nose), then to say "snub nose" will either be impossible, or the same thing will have been said twice, namely, "nose nose concave" (for the snub nose will be "nose nose concave"); wherefore it is absurd that essence should belong to such things; or if not, it will go on to infinity, for in "nose snub nose" yet another "nose" will be inherent.
δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι μόνης τῆς οὐσίας ἐστὶν ὁ ὁρισμός.
It is clear, then, that definition belongs to substance alone.
εἰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κατηγοριῶν, ἀνάγκη ἐκ προσθέσεως εἶναι, οἷον τοῦ †ποιοῦ† καὶ περιττοῦ· οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ ἀριθμοῦ, οὐδὲ τὸ θῆλυ ἄνευ ζῴου (τὸ δὲ ἐκ προσθέσεως λέγω ἐν οἷς συμβαίνει δὶς τὸ αὐτὸ λέγειν ὥσπερ ἐν τούτοις).
For if it belongs to the other categories also, it must be by addition, as in the case of †quality† and the odd; for the odd is not without number, nor is female without animal (and by "by addition" I mean those cases in which it happens that one says the same thing twice, as in these).
εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἀληθές, οὐδὲ συνδυαζομένων ἔσται, οἷον ἀριθμοῦ περιττοῦ· ἀλλὰ λανθάνει ὅτι οὐκ ἀκριβῶς λέγονται οἱ λόγοι.
And if this is true, neither will there be definitions of coupled terms, such as "odd number"; but it escapes notice that their formulae are not stated with precision.
εἰ δʼ εἰσὶ καὶ τούτων ὅροι, ἤτοι ἄλλον τρόπον εἰσὶν ἢ καθάπερ ἐλέχθη πολλαχῶς λεκτέον εἶναι τὸν ὁρισμὸν καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, ὥστε ὡδὶ μὲν οὐδενὸς ἔσται ὁρισμὸς οὐδὲ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι οὐδενὶ ὑπάρξει πλὴν ταῖς οὐσίαις, ὡδὶ δʼ ἔσται.
But if there are definitions of these as well, they are either in a different way, or, as has been said, we must say that definition and essence are spoken of in many ways, so that in one way there will be no definition of anything, nor will essence belong to anything except substances, but in another way there will be.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὁ ὁρισμὸς ὁ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι λόγος, καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἢ μόνων τῶν οὐσιῶν ἐστὶν ἢ μάλιστα καὶ πρώτως καὶ ἁπλῶς, δῆλον.
That definition, then, is the formula of the essence, and that essence belongs either to substances alone or most of all and primarily and without qualification, is clear.