§7.3λέγεται δʼ ἡ οὐσία, εἰ μὴ πλεοναχῶς, ἀλλʼ ἐν τέτταρσί γε μάλιστα·
Substance is spoken of, if not in more ways, at least chiefly in four.
καὶ γὰρ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὸ καθόλου καὶ τὸ γένος οὐσία δοκεῖ εἶναι ἑκάστου, καὶ τέταρτον τούτων τὸ ὑποκείμενον.
For the essence, the universal, and the genus are thought to be the substance of each thing, and the fourth of these is the underlying subject.
τὸ δʼ ὑποκείμενόν ἐστι καθʼ οὗ τὰ ἄλλα λέγεται, ἐκεῖνο δὲ αὐτὸ μηκέτι κατʼ ἄλλου·
Now the underlying subject is that of which other things are predicated, while it itself is no longer predicated of anything else.
διὸ πρῶτον περὶ τούτου διοριστέον· μάλιστα γὰρ δοκεῖ εἶναι οὐσία τὸ ὑποκείμενον πρῶτον.
Therefore, we must first determine about this; for the primary underlying subject is thought to be substance in the highest degree.
τοιοῦτον δὲ τρόπον μέν τινα ἡ ὕλη λέγεται, ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἡ μορφή, τρίτον δὲ τὸ ἐκ τούτων (λέγω δὲ τὴν μὲν ὕλην οἷον τὸν χαλκόν, τὴν δὲ μορφὴν τὸ σχῆμα τῆς ἰδέας, τὸ δʼ ἐκ τούτων τὸν ἀνδριάντα τὸ σύνολον), ὥστε εἰ τὸ εἶδος τῆς ὕλης πρότερον καὶ μᾶλλον ὄν, καὶ τοῦ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν πρότερον ἔσται διὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον.
And in one sense matter is said to be of this nature, in another sense form, and in a third that which is composed of these (by matter I mean, for instance, bronze; by form, the shape of its appearance; and by that which is composed of these, the statue as a whole). Therefore, if the form is prior to matter and more truly existing, it will also be prior to that which is composed of both, for the same reason.
νῦν μὲν οὖν τύπῳ εἴρηται τί ποτʼ ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία, ὅτι τὸ μὴ καθʼ ὑποκειμένου ἀλλὰ καθʼ οὗ τὰ ἄλλα·
Now, then, it has been stated in outline what substance is: namely, that which is not predicated of an underlying subject, but that of which other things are predicated.
δεῖ δὲ μὴ μόνον οὕτως· οὐ γὰρ ἱκανόν· αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτο ἄδηλον, καὶ ἔτι ἡ ὕλη οὐσία γίγνεται.
But we must not state it only in this way, for it is not sufficient; for this itself is unclear, and, furthermore, matter becomes substance.
εἰ γὰρ μὴ αὕτη οὐσία, τίς ἐστιν ἄλλη διαφεύγει· περιαιρουμένων γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων οὐ φαίνεται οὐδὲν ὑπομένον·
For if this is not substance, what else is escapes us; for when other things are stripped away, nothing appears to remain.
τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλα τῶν σωμάτων πάθη καὶ ποιήματα καὶ δυνάμεις, τὸ δὲ μῆκος καὶ πλάτος καὶ βάθος ποσότητές τινες ἀλλʼ οὐκ οὐσίαι (τὸ γὰρ ποσὸν οὐκ οὐσία), ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ᾧ ὑπάρχει ταῦτα πρώτῳ, ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν οὐσία.
For the other things are affections, products, and potentialities of bodies, while length, breadth, and depth are certain quantities and not substances (for quantity is not substance); rather, that to which these first belong is substance.
ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀφαιρουμένου μήκους καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους οὐδὲν ὁρῶμεν ὑπολειπόμενον, πλὴν εἴ τί ἐστι τὸ ὁριζόμενον ὑπὸ τούτων, ὥστε τὴν ὕλην ἀνάγκη φαίνεσθαι μόνην οὐσίαν οὕτω σκοπουμένοις.
But indeed, when length, breadth, and depth are taken away, we see nothing remaining, unless there is something which is bounded by these, so that to those who consider it in this way, matter must appear to be the only substance.
λέγω δʼ ὕλην ἣ καθʼ αὑτὴν μήτε τὶ μήτε ποσὸν μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν λέγεται οἷς ὥρισται τὸ ὄν.
By matter I mean that which in itself is said to be neither a "what" nor a quantity nor any other of those things by which being is determined.
ἔστι γάρ τι καθʼ οὗ κατηγορεῖται τούτων ἕκαστον, ᾧ τὸ εἶναι ἕτερον καὶ τῶν κατηγοριῶν ἑκάστῃ (τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλα τῆς οὐσίας κατηγορεῖται, αὕτη δὲ τῆς ὕλης), ὥστε τὸ ἔσχατον καθʼ αὑτὸ οὔτε τὶ οὔτε ποσὸν οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδέν ἐστιν· οὐδὲ δὴ αἱ ἀποφάσεις, καὶ γὰρ αὗται ὑπάρξουσι κατὰ συμβεβηκός.
For there is something of which each of these is predicated, whose being is different from that of each of the predications (for other things are predicated of substance, but this of matter), so that the ultimate thing in itself is neither a "what" nor a quantity nor anything else; nor indeed is it negations, for these also will belong to it only accidentally.
ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων θεωροῦσι συμβαίνει οὐσίαν εἶναι τὴν ὕλην· ἀδύνατον δέ·
For those who consider it from these premises, then, it follows that matter is substance; but this is impossible.
καὶ γὰρ τὸ χωριστὸν καὶ τὸ τόδε τι ὑπάρχειν δοκεῖ μάλιστα τῇ οὐσίᾳ, διὸ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν οὐσία δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι μᾶλλον τῆς ὕλης.
For both separability and being a "this" are thought to belong most of all to substance, wherefore the form and that which is composed of both would seem to be substance more than matter.
τὴν μὲν τοίνυν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν οὐσίαν, λέγω δὲ τὴν ἔκ τε τῆς ὕλης καὶ τῆς μορφῆς, ἀφετέον, ὑστέρα γὰρ καὶ δήλη· φανερὰ δέ πως καὶ ἡ ὕλη·
The substance composed of both, then—I mean that composed of matter and form—must be set aside, for it is posterior and obvious; and matter too is in a way clear.
περὶ δὲ τῆς τρίτης σκεπτέον, αὕτη γὰρ ἀπορωτάτη.
But we must consider the third, for this is the most difficult.
ὁμολογοῦνται δʼ οὐσίαι εἶναι τῶν αἰσθητῶν τινές, ὥστε ἐν ταύταις ζητητέον πρῶτον.
And some of the sensible things are agreed to be substances, so that we must seek first among these.
πρὸ ἔργου γὰρ τὸ μεταβαίνειν εἰς τὸ γνωριμώτερον.
For it is advantageous to pass to that which is more knowable.
ἡ γὰρ μάθησις οὕτω γίγνεται πᾶσι διὰ τῶν ἧττον γνωρίμων φύσει εἰς τὰ γνώριμα μᾶλλον· καὶ τοῦτο ἔργον ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐκ τῶν ἑκάστῳ ἀγαθῶν τὰ ὅλως ἀγαθὰ ἑκάστῳ ἀγαθά, οὕτως ἐκ τῶν αὐτῷ γνωριμωτέρων τὰ τῇ φύσει γνώριμα αὐτῷ γνώριμα.
For learning proceeds in this way for all, through things that are less knowable by nature to those that are more knowable; and this is the task, just as in practical conduct it is the task to make what is good by nature good for each out of those things that are good for each, so to make what is knowable by nature knowable to oneself out of those things that are more knowable to oneself.
τὰ δʼ ἑκάστοις γνώριμα καὶ πρῶτα πολλάκις ἠρέμα ἐστὶ γνώριμα, καὶ μικρὸν ἢ οὐθὲν ἔχει τοῦ ὄντος· ἀλλʼ ὅμως ἐκ τῶν φαύλως μὲν γνωστῶν αὐτῷ δὲ γνωστῶν τὰ ὅλως γνωστὰ γνῶναι πειρατέον, μεταβαίνοντας, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, διὰ τούτων αὐτῶν.
But the things that are knowable to each and primary are often only slightly knowable, and have little or no being; yet we must try to know what is knowable as a whole from what is poorly known but known to oneself, passing, as has been said, through these very things.