§7.17τί δὲ χρὴ λέγειν καὶ ὁποῖόν τι τὴν οὐσίαν, πάλιν ἄλλην οἷον ἀρχὴν ποιησάμενοι λέγωμεν· ἴσως γὰρ ἐκ τούτων ἔσται δῆλον καὶ περὶ ἐκείνης τῆς οὐσίας ἥτις ἐστὶ κεχωρισμένη τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὐσιῶν.
Let us state what and what kind of thing substance should be said to be, making as it were another fresh start; for perhaps from this it will also become clear about that substance which exists separated from sensible substances.
ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ οὐσία ἀρχὴ καὶ αἰτία τις ἐστίν, ἐντεῦθεν μετιτέον.
Since, then, substance is a certain principle and cause, we must proceed from this point.
ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ διὰ τί ἀεὶ οὕτως, διὰ τί ἄλλο ἄλλῳ τινὶ ὑπάρχει.
Now, the inquiry 'why' is always of this form: why one thing belongs to some other thing.
τὸ γὰρ ζητεῖν διὰ τί ὁ μουσικὸς ἄνθρωπος μουσικὸς ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, ἤτοι ἐστὶ τὸ εἰρημένον ζητεῖν, διὰ τί ὁ ἄνθρωπος μουσικός ἐστιν, ἢ ἄλλο.
For to inquire why the musical man is a musical man is either to inquire what has been said, namely, why the man is musical, or it is something else.
τὸ μὲν οὖν διὰ τί αὐτό ἐστιν αὐτό, οὐδέν ἐστι ζητεῖν (δεῖ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι καὶ τὸ εἶναι ὑπάρχειν δῆλα ὄντα—λέγω δʼ οἷον ὅτι ἡ σελήνη ἐκλείπει—, αὐτὸ δὲ ὅτι αὐτό, εἷς λόγος καὶ μία αἰτία ἐπὶ πάντων, διὰ τί ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπος ἢ ὁ μουσικὸς μουσικός, πλὴν εἴ τις λέγοι ὅτι ἀδιαίρετον πρὸς αὑτὸ ἕκαστον, τοῦτο δʼ ἦν τὸ ἑνὶ εἶναι· ἀλλὰ τοῦτο κοινόν γε κατὰ πάντων καὶ σύντομον)·
Now, to inquire why a thing itself is itself is to inquire into nothing, for the 'that' and the 'being' must be already clear—I mean, for example, that the moon is eclipsed—but 'that a thing itself is itself' has one explanation and one cause in all cases, such as why the man is a man or the musical person is a musical person, unless indeed one were to say that each thing is indivisible from itself, and this is what it is to be one; but this is common to all things and a short way.
ζητήσειε δʼ ἄν τις διὰ τί ἅνθρωπός ἐστι ζῷον τοιονδί.
But one might inquire why a man is an animal of such a kind.
τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν δῆλον, ὅτι οὐ ζητεῖ διὰ τί ὅς ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν· τὶ ἄρα κατά τινος ζητεῖ διὰ τί ὑπάρχει (ὅτι δʼ ὑπάρχει, δεῖ δῆλον εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως, οὐδὲν ζητεῖ), οἷον διὰ τί βροντᾷ; διὰ τί ψόφος γίγνεται ἐν τοῖς νέφεσιν; ἄλλο γὰρ οὕτω κατʼ ἄλλου ἐστὶ τὸ ζητούμενον.
This then is clear, that one does not inquire why he who is a man is a man; one is therefore inquiring why something belongs to something else (and that it does belong must be clear; for if not, one is inquiring into nothing), for example, 'why does it thunder?' which is 'why does a sound arise in the clouds?' For what is inquired into is in this way one thing of another.
καὶ διὰ τί ταδί, οἷον πλίνθοι καὶ λίθοι, οἰκία ἐστίν; φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι ζητεῖ τὸ αἴτιον· τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, ὡς εἰπεῖν λογικῶς, ὃ ἐπʼ ἐνίων μέν ἐστι τίνος ἕνεκα, οἷον ἴσως ἐπʼ οἰκίας ἢ κλίνης, ἐπʼ ἐνίων δὲ τί ἐκίνησε πρῶτον·
And 'why are these things, for example, bricks and stones, a house?' It is clear, then, that one is seeking the cause; and this is the essence (what it was to be), to speak logically, which in some cases is that for the sake of which (the final cause), as perhaps in the case of a house or a bed, and in other cases is that which first moved (the moving cause); for this also is a cause.
αἴτιον γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν τοιοῦτον αἴτιον ἐπὶ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι ζητεῖται καὶ φθείρεσθαι, θάτερον δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ εἶναι.
But while such a cause is sought in the case of coming to be and passing away, the other is sought also in the case of being.
λανθάνει δὲ μάλιστα τὸ ζητούμενον ἐν τοῖς μὴ κατʼ ἀλλήλων λεγομένοις, οἷον ἄνθρωπος τί ἐστι ζητεῖται διὰ τὸ ἁπλῶς λέγεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ διορίζειν ὅτι τάδε τόδε.
But what is sought is most of all overlooked in those cases where one thing is not predicated of another, as when it is inquired 'what is man?' because it is stated simply and does not define that 'these things are this'.
ἀλλὰ δεῖ διαρθρώσαντας ζητεῖν· εἰ δὲ μή, κοινὸν τοῦ μηθὲν ζητεῖν καὶ τοῦ ζητεῖν τι γίγνεται.
But we must inquire by articulating the question; otherwise, it becomes a common case of inquiring into nothing and inquiring into something.
ἐπεὶ δὲ δεῖ ἔχειν τε καὶ ὑπάρχειν τὸ εἶναι, δῆλον δὴ ὅτι τὴν ὕλην ζητεῖ διὰ τί τί ἐστιν· οἷον οἰκία ταδὶ διὰ τί; ὅτι ὑπάρχει ὃ ἦν οἰκίᾳ εἶναι.
And since being must be possessed and belong to the subject, it is clear indeed that one is inquiring why the matter is some particular thing; for example, 'why are these things a house?' Because that which is the essence of a house belongs to them.
καὶ ἄνθρωπος τοδί, ἢ τὸ σῶμα τοῦτο τοδὶ ἔχον.
And 'man is this', or 'this body having this'.
ὥστε τὸ αἴτιον ζητεῖται τῆς ὕλης (τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶ τὸ εἶδος) ᾧ τί ἐστιν· τοῦτο δʼ ἡ οὐσία.
Therefore, the cause of the matter is sought (and this is the form) by which it is something; and this is substance.
φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι ἐπὶ τῶν ἁπλῶν οὐκ ἔστι ζήτησις οὐδὲ δίδαξις, ἀλλʼ ἕτερος τρόπος τῆς ζητήσεως τῶν τοιούτων.
It is clear, then, that in the case of simple things there is no inquiry nor teaching, but there is another way of inquiry for such things.
—ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἔκ τινος σύνθετον οὕτως ὥστε ἓν εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, μὴ ὡς σωρὸς ἀλλʼ ὡς ἡ συλλαβή—ἡ δὲ συλλαβὴ οὐκ ἔστι τὰ στοιχεῖα, οὐδὲ τῷ βα ταὐτὸ τὸ β καὶ α, οὐδʼ ἡ σὰρξ πῦρ καὶ γῆ (διαλυθέντων γὰρ τὰ μὲν οὐκέτι ἔστιν, οἷον ἡ σὰρξ καὶ ἡ συλλαβή, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα ἔστι, καὶ τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἡ γῆ)· ἔστιν ἄρα τι ἡ συλλαβή, οὐ μόνον τὰ στοιχεῖα τὸ φωνῆεν καὶ ἄφωνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕτερόν τι, καὶ ἡ σὰρξ οὐ μόνον πῦρ καὶ γῆ ἢ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕτερόν τι—εἰ τοίνυν ἀνάγκη κἀκεῖνο ἢ στοιχεῖον ἢ ἐκ στοιχείων εἶναι, εἰ μὲν στοιχεῖον, πάλιν ὁ αὐτὸς ἔσται λόγος (ἐκ τούτου γὰρ καὶ πυρὸς καὶ γῆς ἔσται ἡ σὰρξ καὶ ἔτι ἄλλου, ὥστʼ εἰς ἄπειρον βαδιεῖταi)· εἰ δὲ ἐκ στοιχείου, δῆλον ὅτι οὐχ ἑνὸς ἀλλὰ πλειόνων, ἢ ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ ἔσται, ὥστε πάλιν ἐπὶ τούτου τὸν αὐτὸν ἐροῦμεν λόγον καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς σαρκὸς ἢ συλλαβῆς.
Now, since that which is compounded from something in such a way that the whole is one, not like a heap but like a syllable—and the syllable is not the elements, nor is 'ba' the same as 'b' and 'a', nor is flesh fire and earth (for when they are dissolved, the former no longer exist, such as the flesh and the syllable, but the elements exist, both the fire and the earth); therefore, the syllable is something, not only the elements (the vowel and the voiceless letter) but also something else, and the flesh is not only fire and earth, or the hot and the cold, but also something else—if, then, it is necessary that that other thing also is either an element or composed of elements, if on the one hand it is an element, the same argument will apply again (for from this and fire and earth there will be flesh, and still of another, so that it will proceed to infinity); but if on the other hand it is composed of an element, it is clear that it is not of one but of several, or else it will be that very thing itself, so that again in this case we shall use the same argument as for flesh or a syllable.
δόξειε δʼ ἂν εἶναι τὶ τοῦτο καὶ οὐ στοιχεῖον, καὶ αἴτιόν γε τοῦ εἶναι τοδὶ μὲν σάρκα τοδὶ δὲ συλλαβήν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
But it would seem that this is something and not an element, and indeed the cause of this being flesh and that being a syllable; and similarly in the other cases as well.
οὐσία δὲ ἑκάστου μὲν τοῦτο (τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιον πρῶτον τοῦ εἶναι)—ἐπεὶ δʼ ἔνια οὐκ οὐσίαι τῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλʼ ὅσαι οὐσίαι, κατὰ φύσιν καὶ φύσει συνεστήκασι, φανείη ἂν αὕτη ἡ φύσις οὐσία, ἥ ἐστιν οὐ στοιχεῖον ἀλλʼ ἀρχή—· στοιχεῖον δʼ ἐστὶν εἰς ὃ διαιρεῖται ἐνυπάρχον ὡς ὕλην, οἷον τῆς συλλαβῆς τὸ α καὶ τὸ β.
And this is the substance of each thing (for this is the primary cause of being)—and since some things are not substances, but as many as are substances are constituted according to nature and by nature, this nature would appear to be substance, which is not an element but a principle—and an element is that into which a thing is divided, being present in it as matter, such as 'a' and 'b' of the syllable.