§7.16φανερὸν δὲ ὅτι καὶ τῶν δοκουσῶν εἶναι οὐσιῶν αἱ πλεῖσται δυνάμεις εἰσί, τά τε μόρια τῶν ζῴων (οὐθὲν γὰρ κεχωρισμένον αὐτῶν ἐστίν· ὅταν δὲ χωρισθῇ, καὶ τότε ὄντα ὡς ὕλη πάντα) καὶ γῆ καὶ πῦρ καὶ ἀήρ· οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἕν ἐστιν, ἀλλʼ οἷον σωρός, πρὶν ἢ πεφθῇ καὶ γένηταί τι ἐξ αὐτῶν ἕν.
It is obvious that even of those things which are thought to be substances, most are only potentialities, both the parts of animals (for none of them exists in separation; and when they are separated, even then they all exist only as matter) and earth, fire, and air; for none of them is one, but they are like a heap, until they are concocted and some one thing is formed out of them.
μάλιστα δʼ ἄν τις τὰ τῶν ἐμψύχων ὑπολάβοι μόρια καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάρεγγυς ἄμφω γίγνεσθαι, ὄντα καὶ ἐντελεχείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει, τῷ ἀρχὰς ἔχειν κινήσεως ἀπό τινος ἐν ταῖς καμπαῖς· διὸ ἔνια ζῷα διαιρούμενα ζῇ.
But one might suppose most of all that the parts of living things and the parts of the soul are very close to being both, existing both in actuality and in potentiality, by having principles of movement derived from something in their joints; which is why some animals live when divided.
ἀλλʼ ὅμως δυνάμει πάντʼ ἔσται, ὅταν ᾖ ἓν καὶ συνεχὲς φύσει, ἀλλὰ μὴ βίᾳ ἢ συμφύσει· τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον πήρωσις.
Yet, all of them will exist only in potentiality when they are one and continuous by nature, and not by force or by concretion; for such a thing is a mutilation.
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἓν λέγεται ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὄν, καὶ ἡ οὐσία ἡ τοῦ ἑνὸς μία, καὶ ὧν μία ἀριθμῷ ἓν ἀριθμῷ, φανερὸν ὅτι οὔτε τὸ ἓν οὔτε τὸ ὂν ἐνδέχεται οὐσίαν εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ στοιχείῳ εἶναι ἢ ἀρχῇ· ἀλλὰ ζητοῦμεν τίς οὖν ἡ ἀρχή, ἵνα εἰς γνωριμώτερον ἀναγάγωμεν.
Since 'one' is used in as many ways as 'being', and the substance of the one is one, and those things of which the substance is numerically one are numerically one, it is obvious that neither 'one' nor 'being' can be the substance of things, just as being an element or a principle cannot be so; but we inquire what the principle is, so that we may lead it back to what is more knowable.
μᾶλλον μὲν οὖν τούτων οὐσία τὸ ὂν καὶ ἓν ἢ ἥ τε ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ στοιχεῖον καὶ τὸ αἴτιον, οὔπω δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα, εἴπερ μηδʼ ἄλλο κοινὸν μηδὲν οὐσία· οὐδενὶ γὰρ ὑπάρχει ἡ οὐσία ἀλλʼ ἢ αὑτῇ τε καὶ τῷ ἔχοντι αὐτήν, οὗ ἐστὶν οὐσία.
Now 'being' and 'one' are more of the nature of substance than the principle, the element, and the cause, but not even these are yet substance, if indeed no other common thing is substance; for substance belongs to nothing except to itself and to that which has it, of which it is the substance.
ἔτι τὸ ἓν πολλαχῇ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἅμα, τὸ δὲ κοινὸν ἅμα πολλαχῇ ὑπάρχει· ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲν τῶν καθόλου ὑπάρχει παρὰ τὰ καθʼ ἕκαστα χωρίς.
Further, the one cannot be in many places at the same time, but what is common belongs to many places at the same time; so that it is clear that nothing of the universals exists separately apart from the individuals.
ἀλλʼ οἱ τὰ εἴδη λέγοντες τῇ μὲν ὀρθῶς λέγουσι χωρίζοντες αὐτά, εἴπερ οὐσίαι εἰσί, τῇ δʼ οὐκ ὀρθῶς, ὅτι τὸ ἓν ἐπὶ πολλῶν εἶδος λέγουσιν.
But those who assert the existence of the Forms are right in one way in separating them, if indeed they are substances, but in another way they are not right, because they say that the one over many is a Form.
αἴτιον δʼ ὅτι οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἀποδοῦναι τίνες αἱ τοιαῦται οὐσίαι αἱ ἄφθαρτοι παρὰ τὰς καθʼ ἕκαστα καὶ αἰσθητάς· ποιοῦσιν οὖν τὰς αὐτὰς τῷ εἴδει τοῖς φθαρτοῖς (ταύτας γὰρ ἴσμεν), αὐτοάνθρωπον καὶ αὐτόϊππον, προστιθέντες τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὸ ῥῆμα τὸ
"αὐτό"
.
The reason is that they cannot explain what such indestructible substances are apart from the individual and sensible ones; they therefore make them the same in species as the perishable ones (for these are the ones we know), 'man-itself' and 'horse-itself', adding to the sensible things the word 'itself'.
καίτοι κἂν εἰ μὴ ἑωράκειμεν τὰ ἄστρα, οὐδὲν ἂν ἧττον, οἶμαι, ἦσαν οὐσίαι ἀΐδιοι παρʼ ἃς ἡμεῖς ᾔδειμεν· ὥστε καὶ νῦν εἰ μὴ ἔχομεν τίνες εἰσίν, ἀλλʼ εἶναί γέ τινας ἴσως ἀναγκαῖον.
And yet, even if we had not seen the stars, there would none the less, I think, have been eternal substances apart from those which we knew; so that even if we do not now know what they are, yet it is probably necessary that some should exist.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὔτε τῶν καθόλου λεγομένων οὐδὲν οὐσία οὔτʼ ἐστὶν οὐσία οὐδεμία ἐξ οὐσιῶν, δῆλον.
It is clear, then, that none of those things which are called universal is substance, and that no substance is composed of substances.