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Aristotle · Metaphysics §8.1

Sensible Substance and Matter as Substratum

Passage 84 of 159 · Greek

Summary

Reviewing the achievements of Book VII, the author announces the start of the inquiry into agreed-upon sensible substances, explaining their components (matter, form, and compound), the role of matter in various kinds of change, and the unique nature of substantial change.

§8.1ἐκ δὴ τῶν εἰρημένων συλλογίσασθαι δεῖ καὶ συναγαγόντας τὸ κεφάλαιον τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι.
We must draw our conclusions from what has been said, and after summarizing the main points, put the finishing touches to our work.
εἴρηται δὴ ὅτι τῶν οὐσιῶν ζητεῖται τὰ αἴτια καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα.
For it has been said that the causes, principles, and elements of substances are being sought.
οὐσίαι δὲ αἱ μὲν ὁμολογούμεναί εἰσιν ὑπὸ πάντων, περὶ δὲ ἐνίων ἰδίᾳ τινὲς ἀπεφήναντο·
Some substances are universally agreed upon, but concerning certain others, some individuals have made private pronouncements.
ὁμολογούμεναι μὲν αἱ φυσικαί, οἷον πῦρ γῆ ὕδωρ ἀὴρ καὶ τἆλλα τὰ ἁπλᾶ σώματα, ἔπειτα τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτῶν, καὶ τὰ ζῷα καὶ τὰ μόρια τῶν ζῴων, καὶ τέλος ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ τὰ μόρια τοῦ οὐρανοῦ·
Agreed upon are the physical substances, such as fire, earth, water, air, and the other simple bodies, and then plants and their parts, and animals and the parts of animals, and finally the heaven and the parts of the heaven.
ἰδίᾳ δέ τινες οὐσίας λέγουσιν εἶναι τά τʼ εἴδη καὶ τὰ μαθηματικά.
But some people privately declare that the forms and the objects of mathematics are substances.
ἄλλας δὲ δὴ συμβαίνει ἐκ τῶν λόγων οὐσίας εἶναι, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον·
Furthermore, it turns out from our arguments that other things are substances, namely, the essence and the substrate.
ἔτι ἄλλως τὸ γένος μᾶλλον τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τὸ καθόλου τῶν καθʼ ἕκαστα·
And in yet another way, the genus is more of a substance than the species, and the universal than the particulars.
τῷ δὲ καθόλου καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ αἱ ἰδέαι συνάπτουσιν (κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν γὰρ λόγον οὐσίαι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι).
And the ideas are connected with the universal and the genus (for they are thought to be substances for the same reason).
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι οὐσία, τούτου δὲ λόγος ὁ ὁρισμός, διὰ τοῦτο περὶ ὁρισμοῦ καὶ περὶ τοῦ καθʼ αὑτὸ διώρισται·
And since the essence is substance, and the definition is the formula of this, for this reason we have made determinations about definition and about what is essential (in itself).
ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ ὁρισμὸς λόγος, ὁ δὲ λόγος μέρη ἔχει, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ περὶ μέρους ἦν ἰδεῖν, ποῖα τῆς οὐσίας μέρη καὶ ποῖα οὔ, καὶ εἰ ταῦτα καὶ τοῦ ὁρισμοῦ.
And since the definition is a formula, and the formula has parts, it was also necessary to investigate concerning the part, what sort of parts are parts of the substance and what are not, and whether these are also parts of the definition.
ἔτι τοίνυν οὔτε τὸ καθόλου οὐσία οὔτε τὸ γένος·
Further, then, neither the universal nor the genus is substance.
περὶ δὲ τῶν ἰδεῶν καὶ τῶν μαθηματικῶν ὕστερον σκεπτέον· παρὰ γὰρ τὰς αἰσθητὰς οὐσίας ταύτας λέγουσί τινες εἶναι. —νῦν δὲ περὶ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων οὐσιῶν ἐπέλθωμεν.
But about the ideas and the mathematical objects we must inquire later; for some say that these exist besides the sensible substances. —But now let us proceed to the agreed upon substances.
αὗται δʼ εἰσὶν αἱ αἰσθηταί· αἱ δʼ αἰσθηταὶ οὐσίαι πᾶσαι ὕλην ἔχουσιν.
These are the sensible ones; and all sensible substances have matter.
ἔστι δʼ οὐσία τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ἄλλως μὲν ἡ ὕλη (ὕλην δὲ λέγω ἣ μὴ τόδε τι οὖσα ἐνεργείᾳ δυνάμει ἐστὶ τόδε τι), ἄλλως δʼ ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ μορφή, ὃ τόδε τι ὂν τῷ λόγῳ χωριστόν ἐστιν·
And substance is the substrate, in one sense being matter (and by matter I mean that which, not being a "this" in actuality, is a "this" potentially), in another sense the formula and the form, which, being a "this", is separable in formula.
τρίτον δὲ τὸ ἐκ τούτων, οὗ γένεσις μόνου καὶ φθορά ἐστι, καὶ χωριστὸν ἁπλῶς· τῶν γὰρ κατὰ τὸν λόγον οὐσιῶν αἱ μὲν αἱ δʼ οὔ.
And thirdly, that which is composed of these, of which alone there is coming to be and passing away, and which is separable without qualification; for of the substances in formula, some are separable and some are not.
ὅτι δʼ ἐστὶν οὐσία καὶ ἡ ὕλη, δῆλον· ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς ἀντικειμέναις μεταβολαῖς ἐστί τι τὸ ὑποκείμενον ταῖς μεταβολαῖς, οἷον κατὰ τόπον τὸ νῦν μὲν ἐνταῦθα πάλιν δʼ ἄλλοθι, καὶ κατʼ αὔξησιν ὃ νῦν μὲν τηλικόνδε πάλιν δʼ ἔλαττον ἢ μεῖζον, καὶ κατʼ ἀλλοίωσιν ὃ νῦν μὲν ὑγιὲς πάλιν δὲ κάμνον·
And that matter is also substance is clear; for in all opposite changes there is something which is the substrate of the changes, for example, in respect of place, that which is now here and again elsewhere, and in respect of increase, that which is now of such a size and again smaller or larger, and in respect of alteration, that which is now healthy and again diseased.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατʼ οὐσίαν ὃ νῦν μὲν ἐν γενέσει πάλιν δʼ ἐν φθορᾷ, καὶ νῦν μὲν ὑποκείμενον ὡς τόδε τι πάλιν δʼ ὑποκείμενον ὡς κατὰ στέρησιν.
Similarly also in respect of substance, that which is now in coming to be and again in passing away, and now is the substrate as a "this", and again as in respect of privation.
καὶ ἀκολουθοῦσι δὴ ταύτῃ αἱ ἄλλαι μεταβολαί, τῶν δʼ ἄλλων ἢ μιᾷ ἢ δυοῖν αὕτη οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ· οὐ γὰρ ἀνάγκη, εἴ τι ὕλην ἔχει τοπικήν, τοῦτο καὶ γεννητὴν καὶ φθαρτὴν ἔχειν.
And while the other changes follow this one, this one does not follow either one or two of the others; for it is not necessary, if something has spatial matter, that it should also have matter that is generable and destructible.
τίς μὲν οὖν διαφορὰ τοῦ ἁπλῶς γίγνεσθαι καὶ μὴ ἁπλῶς, ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς εἴρηται.
Now, what the difference is between coming to be without qualification and not without qualification has been stated in the Physics.

Notes

  1. 1042a29τῷ λόγῳ χωριστόν — Meaning "separable in formula (definition)". It indicates that while the form cannot physically exist separate from the matter, it can be grasped and defined apart from the material substrate in thought.
  2. 1042b3τῶν δʼ ἄλλων ἢ μιᾷ ἢ δυοῖν αὕτη οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ — Indicates the asymmetric relation between substantial change (αὕτη) and other changes (τῶν δʼ ἄλλων). While substantial change (generation and destruction) entails other accidental changes, other changes (e.g., spatial movement in heavenly bodies) do not necessarily entail substantial change.

Cite this passage

Aristotle, Metaphysics §8.1. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg025.humanitext-grc2:8.1

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