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Aristotle · Metaphysics §5.19-5.23

Definitions of Disposition, Habit, Affection, and Privation

Passage 56 of 159 · Greek

Summary

The text explains the definitions and various semantic categories of disposition, habit, affection, privation, and the concept of having.

§5.19διάθεσις λέγεται τοῦ ἔχοντος μέρη τάξις ἢ κατὰ τόπον ἢ κατὰ δύναμιν ἢ κατʼ εἶδος· θέσιν γὰρ δεῖ τινὰ εἶναι, ὥσπερ καὶ τοὔνομα δηλοῖ ἡ διάθεσις.
"Disposition" is said of the arrangement of that which has parts, either in respect of place, or of potency, or of form; for there must be a certain position, just as the name "disposition" also indicates.
§5.20ἕξις δὲ λέγεται ἕνα μὲν τρόπον οἷον ἐνέργειά τις τοῦ ἔχοντος καὶ ἐχομένου, ὥσπερ πρᾶξίς τις ἢ κίνησις (ὅταν γὰρ τὸ μὲν ποιῇ τὸ δὲ ποιῆται, ἔστι ποίησις μεταξύ· οὕτω καὶ τοῦ ἔχοντος ἐσθῆτα καὶ τῆς ἐχομένης ἐσθῆτος ἔστι μεταξὺ ἕξις)· —ταύτην μὲν οὖν φανερὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἔχειν ἕξιν (εἰς ἄπειρον γὰρ βαδιεῖται, εἰ τοῦ ἐχομένου ἔσται ἔχειν τὴν ἕξιν), ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἕξις λέγεται διάθεσις καθʼ ἣν ἢ εὖ ἢ κακῶς διάκειται τὸ διακείμενον, καὶ ἢ καθʼ αὑτὸ ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο, οἷον ἡ ὑγίεια ἕξις τις·
"Habit" is said, in one way, as a certain activity of the possessor and the possessed, like a certain action or movement (for when one acts and the other is acted upon, there is an acting between them; so also between the one who possesses clothes and the clothes possessed there is a possessing);—it is clear, then, that it is not possible to possess this possessing (for it will go on to infinity, if there is to be a possessing of the possessing of what is possessed); in another way, "habit" is said of a disposition according to which that which is disposed is disposed well or ill, and either in itself or in relation to something else, as health is a certain habit; for it is such a disposition.
διάθεσις γάρ ἐστι τοιαύτη. ἔτι ἕξις λέγεται ἂν ᾖ μόριον διαθέσεως τοιαύτης· διὸ καὶ ἡ τῶν μερῶν ἀρετὴ ἕξις τίς ἐστιν.
Further, it is called "habit" if it is a part of such a disposition; wherefore the virtue of the parts is also a certain habit.
§5.21πάθος λέγεται ἕνα μὲν τρόπον ποιότης καθʼ ἣν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι ἐνδέχεται, οἷον τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν, καὶ γλυκὺ καὶ πικρόν, καὶ βαρύτης καὶ κουφότης, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα· ἕνα δὲ αἱ τούτων ἐνέργειαι καὶ ἀλλοιώσεις ἤδη.
"Affection" is said, in one way, of a quality in respect of which change of state is possible, as white and black, sweet and bitter, heaviness and lightness, and all other such things; in another way, the actualizations and already completed alterations of these.
ἔτι τούτων μᾶλλον αἱ βλαβεραὶ ἀλλοιώσεις καὶ κινήσεις, καὶ μάλιστα αἱ λυπηραὶ βλάβαι.
Further, more than these, harmful alterations and movements, and especially painful injuries.
ἔτι τὰ μεγέθη τῶν συμφορῶν καὶ λυπηρῶν πάθη λέγεται.
Further, great misfortunes and painful experiences are called affections.
§5.22στέρησις λέγεται ἕνα μὲν τρόπον ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ τι τῶν πεφυκότων ἔχεσθαι, κἂν μὴ αὐτὸ ᾖ πεφυκὸς ἔχειν, οἷον φυτὸν ὀμμάτων ἐστερῆσθαι λέγεται· ἕνα δὲ ἂν πεφυκὸς ἔχειν, ἢ αὐτὸ ἢ τὸ γένος, μὴ ἔχῃ, οἷον ἄλλως ἄνθρωπος ὁ τυφλὸς ὄψεως ἐστέρηται καὶ ἀσπάλαξ, τὸ μὲν κατὰ τὸ γένος τὸ δὲ καθʼ αὑτό.
"Privation" is said, in one way, if a thing does not have something of those things which are naturally possessed, even if the thing itself is not of such a nature as to possess it; for example, a plant is said to be deprived of eyes; in another way, if it does not possess it when it, or its genus, is of a nature to possess it; for example, a blind man and a mole are deprived of sight in different ways, the former in respect of his genus, the latter in himself.
ἔτι ἂν πεφυκὸς καὶ ὅτε πέφυκεν ἔχειν μὴ ἔχῃ· ἡ γὰρ τυφλότης στέρησίς τις, τυφλὸς δʼ οὐ κατὰ πᾶσαν ἡλικίαν, ἀλλʼ ἐν ᾗ πέφυκεν ἔχειν, ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ.
Further, if it does not have it when it is of a nature to have it and at the time when it is of a nature to have it; for blindness is a certain privation, but a person is not blind at every age, but only if he does not have sight at the age when he is of a nature to have it.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἂν ᾖ πεφυκὸς καὶ καθʼ ὃ καὶ πρὸς ὃ καὶ ὥς, ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ.
And likewise also in the respect in which, and through what, and in relation to what, and in the manner in which it is of a nature to have it, if it does not have it.
ἔτι ἡ βιαία ἑκάστου ἀφαίρεσις στέρησις λέγεται.
Further, the violent removal of each thing is called privation.
καὶ ὁσαχῶς δὲ αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ α ἀποφάσεις λέγονται, τοσαυταχῶς καὶ αἱ στερήσεις λέγονται· ἄνισον μὲν γὰρ τῷ μὴ ἔχειν ἰσότητα πεφυκὸς λέγεται, ἀόρατον δὲ καὶ τῷ ὅλως μὴ ἔχειν χρῶμα καὶ τῷ φαύλως, καὶ ἄπουν καὶ τῷ μὴ ἔχειν ὅλως πόδας καὶ τῷ φαύλους.
And in as many ways as negations starting with alpha are said, in so many ways privations are also said; for "unequal" is said of that which, though of a nature to have equality, does not have it; "invisible" both of that which has no color at all and of that which has it poorly; "footless" both of that which has no feet at all and of that which has poor feet.
ἔτι καὶ τῷ μικρὸν ἔχειν, οἷον τὸ ἀπύρηνον· τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶ τὸ φαύλως πως ἔχειν.
Further, also of that which has a small amount, as "stoneless"; and this is to have it in some poor way.
ἔτι τῷ μὴ ῥᾳδίως ἢ τῷ μὴ καλῶς, οἷον τὸ ἄτμητον οὐ μόνον τῷ μὴ τέμνεσθαι ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ μὴ ῥᾳδίως ἢ μὴ καλῶς.
Further, of that which is not done easily or not done well; for example, "uncuttable" is said not only of that which cannot be cut, but also of that which cannot be cut easily or well.
ἔτι τῷ πάντῃ μὴ ἔχειν· τυφλὸς γὰρ οὐ λέγεται ὁ ἑτερόφθαλμος ἀλλʼ ὁ ἐν ἀμφοῖν μὴ ἔχων ὄψιν· διὸ οὐ πᾶς ἀγαθὸς ἢ κακός, ἢ δίκαιος ἢ ἄδικος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ μεταξύ.
Further, of that which does not have it at all; for a one-eyed man is not called blind, but only the one who lacks sight in both eyes; wherefore not everyone is good or bad, or just or unjust, but there is also that which is between.
§5.23τὸ ἔχειν λέγεται πολλαχῶς, ἕνα μὲν τρόπον τὸ ἄγειν κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ ὁρμήν, διὸ λέγεται πυρετός τε ἔχειν τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ οἱ τύραννοι τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὴν ἐσθῆτα οἱ ἀμπεχόμενοι· ἕνα δʼ ἐν ᾧ ἄν τι ὑπάρχῃ ὡς δεκτικῷ, οἷον ὁ χαλκὸς ἔχει τὸ εἶδος τοῦ ἀνδριάντος καὶ τὴν νόσον τὸ σῶμα· ἕνα δὲ ὡς τὸ περιέχον τὰ περιεχόμενα· ἐν ᾧ γάρ ἐστι περιέχοντι, ἔχεσθαι ὑπὸ τούτου λέγεται, οἷον τὸ ἀγγεῖον ἔχειν τὸ ὑγρόν φαμεν καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἀνθρώπους καὶ τὴν ναῦν ναύτας, οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἔχειν τὰ μέρη.
"To have" is said in many ways: in one way, to direct according to one's own nature or one's own impulse, wherefore a fever is said to have the man, tyrants to have their cities, and those who wear clothes to have their clothes; in another way, that in which something belongs as in a receptive subject, as the bronze has the form of the statue and the body has the disease; in another way, as the container contains the things contained; for that which is in a container is said to be had by it, as we say that the vessel has the liquid, and the city has men, and the ship has sailors, and in this way also the whole has its parts.
ἔτι τὸ κωλῦον κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ ὁρμήν τι κινεῖσθαι ἢ πράττειν ἔχειν λέγεται τοῦτο αὐτό, οἷον καὶ οἱ κίονες τὰ ἐπικείμενα βάρη, καὶ ὡς οἱ ποιηταὶ τὸν Ἄτλαντα ποιοῦσι τὸν οὐρανὸν ἔχειν ὡς συμπεσόντʼ ἂν ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν φυσιολόγων τινές φασιν·
Further, that which prevents something from moving or acting according to its own impulse is said to "have" this very thing, as pillars have the weights resting on them, and as the poets make Atlas have the heaven, which would otherwise collapse upon the earth.
τοῦτον δὲ τὸν τρόπον καὶ τὸ συνέχον λέγεται ἃ συνέχει ἔχειν, ὡς διαχωρισθέντα ἂν κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ ὁρμὴν ἕκαστον.
And in this way that which holds things together is also said to "have" the things it holds together, since they would otherwise be separated, each according to its own impulse.
καὶ τὸ ἔν τινι δὲ εἶναι ὁμοτρόπως λέγεται καὶ ἑπομένως τῷ ἔχειν.
And "to be in something" is said in a similar way and consequently to "having."

Notes

  1. 1022b1τοῦ ἔχοντος μέρη — Genitive of "that which has parts." This indicates the subject that is disposed in the definition of `διάθεσις` (disposition). Disposition presupposes "that which has parts" and is defined as the "arrangement (τάξις)" of these parts.
  2. 1022b4ἐνέργειά τις τοῦ ἔχοντος καὶ ἐχομένου — `τοῦ ἔχοντος καὶ ἐχομένου` (of the possessor and the possessed) are genitives depending on `ἐνέργεια` (activity). Since this activity lies between the active (possessing) and passive (being possessed) subjects, both are expressed in the genitive. Aristotle notes in the parenthesis immediately following that this meaning of `ἕξις` cannot be "possessed" by another `ἕξις`, as it would lead to an infinite regress.
  3. 1022b22κἂν μὴ αὐτὸ ᾖ πεφυκὸς ἔχειν — A concessive clause using `κἂν` (conjunction `καὶ ἐάν`) with the subjunctive. It marks the first meaning of privation (`στέρησις`), where a thing is said to be deprived of something even if the thing itself does not naturally possess it (e.g., a plant lacking eyes), provided that the possessed thing is naturally capable of being possessed.
  4. 1023a2τῷ μὴ ῥᾳδίως ἢ τῷ μὴ καλῶς — Dative of cause or reason. It explains how the negative prefix alpha (ἀ- / ἀποφάσεις) can signify not just absolute negation, but also modal imperfection, such as "not easily" (μὴ ῥᾳδίως) or "not well" (μὴ καλῶς).
  5. 1023a8τὸ ἄγειν κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ ὁρμήν — The verb `ἄγειν` used as part of the first definition of "to have" (`ἔχειν`). Here it is used in the sense of "to direct," "to lead," or "to control" (according to one's own nature or impulse), which explains how a fever possesses a person or a tyrant possesses a city.

Cite this passage

Aristotle, Metaphysics §5.19-5.23. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg025.humanitext-grc2:5.19-5.23

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