§5.16τέλειον λέγεται ἓν μὲν οὗ μὴ ἔστιν ἔξω τι λαβεῖν μηδὲ ἓν μόριον (οἷον χρόνος τέλειος ἑκάστου οὗτος οὗ μὴ ἔστιν ἔξω λαβεῖν χρόνον τινὰ ὃς τούτου μέρος ἐστὶ τοῦ χρόνου), καὶ τὸ κατʼ ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸ εὖ μὴ ἔχον ὑπερβολὴν πρὸς τὸ γένος, οἷον τέλειος ἰατρὸς καὶ τέλειος αὐλητὴς ὅταν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος τῆς οἰκείας ἀρετῆς μηθὲν ἐλλείπωσιν (οὕτω δὲ μεταφέροντες καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κακῶν λέγομεν συκοφάντην τέλειον καὶ κλέπτην τέλειον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀγαθοὺς λέγομεν αὐτούς, οἷον κλέπτην ἀγαθὸν καὶ συκοφάντην ἀγαθόν· καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ τελείωσίς τις· ἕκαστον γὰρ τότε τέλειον καὶ οὐσία πᾶσα τότε τελεία, ὅταν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος τῆς οἰκείας ἀρετῆς μηδὲν ἐλλείπῃ μόριον τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν μεγέθους)· ἔτι οἷς ὑπάρχει τὸ τέλος, σπουδαῖον ὄν, ταῦτα λέγεται τέλεια· κατὰ γὰρ τὸ ἔχειν τὸ τέλος τέλεια, ὥστʼ ἐπεὶ τὸ τέλος τῶν ἐσχάτων τί ἐστι, καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ φαῦλα μεταφέροντες λέγομεν τελείως ἀπολωλέναι καὶ τελείως ἐφθάρθαι, ὅταν μηδὲν ἐλλείπῃ τῆς φθορᾶς καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ τῷ ἐσχάτῳ ᾖ· διὸ καὶ ἡ τελευτὴ κατὰ μεταφορὰν λέγεται τέλος, ὅτι ἄμφω ἔσχατα· τέλος δὲ καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἔσχατον.
"Perfect" (or "complete") is said, in one sense, of that of which it is not possible to find even one part outside (for example, the perfect time of each thing is that of which it is not possible to find any time outside which is a part of this time); also, that which, in respect of virtue and excellence, has no excess with regard to its genus, as for example a perfect doctor and a perfect flute-player when, in respect of the form of their own virtue, they lack nothing (and thus by extension we also speak of bad things, calling someone a perfect slanderer and a perfect thief, since we also call them good, as a good thief and a good slanderer; and virtue is a certain completion, for each thing is then perfect, and every substance is then perfect, when, in respect of the form of its own virtue, no part of its natural magnitude is lacking); further, those things to which their end belongs, being excellent, are said to be perfect; for it is by having their end that they are perfect, so that since the end is one of the extremes, we also by extension speak of bad things, saying that they are "perfectly ruined" and "perfectly destroyed" when nothing of the destruction and the evil is lacking but it is at the extreme; wherefore death is also by extension called an end, because both are extremes; and the end is also that for the sake of which, as an extreme.
τὰ μὲν οὖν καθʼ αὑτὰ λεγόμενα τέλεια τοσαυταχῶς λέγεται, τὰ μὲν τῷ κατὰ τὸ εὖ μηδὲν ἐλλείπειν μηδʼ ἔχειν ὑπερβολὴν μηδὲ ἔξω τι λαβεῖν, τὰ δʼ ὅλως κατὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ὑπερβολὴν ἐν ἑκάστῳ γένει μηδʼ εἶναί τι ἔξω·
The things, then, that are called perfect in themselves are said in so many ways: some because in respect of excellence they lack nothing, have no excess, and have nothing to be found outside; others, in general, because they have no excess in each genus and nothing is outside.
τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἤδη κατὰ ταῦτα τῷ ἢ ποιεῖν τι τοιοῦτον ἢ ἔχειν ἢ ἁρμόττειν τούτῳ ἢ ἁμῶς γέ πως λέγεσθαι πρὸς τὰ πρώτως λεγόμενα τέλεια.
The other things are already called so in respect of these, by either producing such a thing, or possessing it, or fitting it, or in some way or other being said in relation to the primary things called perfect.
§5.17πέρας λέγεται τό τε ἔσχατον ἑκάστου καὶ οὗ ἔξω μηδὲν ἔστι λαβεῖν πρώτου καὶ οὗ ἔσω πάντα πρώτου, καὶ ὃ ἂν ᾖ εἶδος μεγέθους ἢ ἔχοντος μέγεθος, καὶ τὸ τέλος ἑκάστου (τοιοῦτον δʼ ἐφʼ ὃ ἡ κίνησις καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις, καὶ οὐκ ἀφʼ οὗ—ὁτὲ δὲ ἄμφω, καὶ ἀφʼ οὗ καὶ ἐφʼ ὃ καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα), καὶ ἡ οὐσία ἡ ἑκάστου καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἑκάστῳ· τῆς γνώσεως γὰρ τοῦτο πέρας· εἰ δὲ τῆς γνώσεως, καὶ τοῦ πράγματος.
"Limit" is said of the extreme of each thing, and of that outside of which it is not possible to find anything first, and inside of which everything is first; and whatever is the form of a magnitude or of that which has magnitude; and the end of each thing (such as that toward which movement and action are directed, and not that from which—though sometimes both, that from which and that toward which, and that for the sake of which); and the substance of each thing, and the essence (the what-it-is-to-be) of each thing; for this is the limit of knowledge, and if of knowledge, also of the thing.
ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ὁσαχῶς τε ἡ ἀρχὴ λέγεται, τοσαυταχῶς καὶ τὸ πέρας, καὶ ἔτι πλεοναχῶς· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὴ πέρας τι, τὸ δὲ πέρας οὐ πᾶν ἀρχή.
So it is clear that in as many ways as "beginning" (or "principle") is said, in so many ways "limit" is also said, and even in more; for the beginning is a certain limit, but not every limit is a beginning.
§5.18τὸ καθʼ ὃ λέγεται πολλαχῶς, ἕνα μὲν τρόπον τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ οὐσία ἑκάστου πράγματος, οἷον καθʼ ὃ ἀγαθός, αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν, ἕνα δὲ ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι, οἷον τὸ χρῶμα ἐν τῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ.
"In respect of which" (or "by which") is said in many ways: in one way, the form and substance of each thing, as that in respect of which one is good is the good itself; in another way, that in which something naturally first comes to be, as color in the surface.
τὸ μὲν οὖν πρώτως λεγόμενον καθʼ ὃ τὸ εἶδός ἐστι, δευτέρως δὲ ὡς ἡ ὕλη ἑκάστου καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἑκάστῳ πρῶτον.
That which is said in the primary way, then, is the form, and in the secondary way as the matter of each thing and the first subject for each.
ὅλως δὲ τὸ καθʼ ὃ ἰσαχῶς καὶ τὸ αἴτιον ὑπάρξει· κατὰ τί γὰρ ἐλήλυθεν ἢ οὗ ἕνεκα ἐλήλυθε λέγεται, καὶ κατὰ τί παραλελόγισται ἢ συλλελόγισται, ἢ τί τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ ἢ παραλογισμοῦ.
In general, "in respect of which" will belong to things in as many ways as "cause" does; for we ask "in respect of what did he come?" or "for the sake of what did he come?", and "in respect of what did he reason falsely or reason truly?", i.e., what was the cause of the reasoning or the false reasoning.
ἔτι δὲ τὸ καθʼ ὃ τὸ κατὰ θέσιν λέγεται, καθʼ ὃ ἕστηκεν ἢ καθʼ ὃ βαδίζει· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα τόπον σημαίνει καὶ θέσιν.
Further, "in respect of which" is said in respect of position, in respect of which one stands or in respect of which one walks; for all these signify place and position.
ὥστε καὶ τὸ καθʼ αὑτὸ πολλαχῶς ἀνάγκη λέγεσθαι.
So also "in itself" must be said in many ways.
ἓν μὲν γὰρ καθʼ αὑτὸ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἑκάστῳ, οἷον ὁ Καλλίας καθʼ αὑτὸν Καλλίας καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι Καλλίᾳ· ἓν δὲ ὅσα ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν ὑπάρχει, οἷον ζῷον ὁ Καλλίας καθʼ αὑτόν· ἐν γὰρ τῷ λόγῳ ἐνυπάρχει τὸ ζῷον· ζῷον γάρ τι ὁ Καλλίας.
For in one way "in itself" is the essence of each thing, as Callias is in himself Callias and the essence of Callias; in another way, all those things that are present in the definition of "what it is," as Callias is in himself an animal; for in the definition "animal" is present, since Callias is a certain animal.
ἔτι δὲ εἰ ἐν αὑτῷ δέδεκται πρώτῳ ἢ τῶν αὑτοῦ τινί, οἷον ἡ ἐπιφάνεια λευκὴ καθʼ ἑαυτήν, καὶ ζῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καθʼ αὑτόν· ἡ γὰρ ψυχὴ μέρος τι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἐν ᾗ πρώτῃ τὸ ζῆν.
Further, if it has received something in itself primarily or in any of its own parts, as the surface is in itself white, and a man lives in himself; for the soul is a part of the man, in which primarily living is present.
ἔτι οὗ μὴ ἔστιν ἄλλο αἴτιον· τοῦ γὰρ ἀνθρώπου πολλὰ αἴτια, τὸ ζῷον, τὸ δίπουν, ἀλλʼ ὅμως καθʼ αὑτὸν ἄνθρωπος ὁ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν.
Further, that of which there is no other cause; for of man there are many causes, such as animal, two-footed, but nevertheless man is in himself man.
ἔτι ὅσα μόνῳ ὑπάρχει καὶ ᾗ μόνον διʼ αὐτὸ κεχωρισμένον καθʼ αὑτό.
Further, all those things that belong to a thing alone and insofar as it is alone, on account of which it is separated by itself.